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OVERVIEW OF PROJECT WORK AND OUTCOMES
Non-technical summary
Extreme weather events affect vulnerable urban areas adversely, with substantial damage,
disruption of normal economic and social activities and services and loss of human life and can also
alter the medium or long-term development trajectory of the cities. Thus, disaster management is
an important context for integrating adaptation into decision-making for the cities at risk. The APNfunded research project in Mumbai, Bangkok and Manila has been undertaken with the primary
objective of identifying and measuring the short to medium-term impacts and responses to extreme
weather events and their policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity and development
planning for the cities. The project includes analysis of primary and secondary data to measure the
physical, economic and social losses in the case study cities. We also examine the short to mediumterm responses from the local government and citizens and evaluate if they enhance the adaptation
capacity of the cities to cope with future weather events and flood risks. This analysis has policy
implications for disaster management, city resilience and adaptive capacity of the cities in the longterm. The project is particularly relevant to the selected cities belonging to the developing world
where natural disasters have long-term implications for development and poverty alleviation.

Objectives
The main objectives of the project were:
1.
Analysis of immediate to medium-term impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme
events of flooding faced by three coastal cities, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and
Manila (Philippines)
2.
Examine the effects of short to medium-term responses to extreme events on enhancing the
long-term adaptation capacity of these cities
3.
Explore the policy implications of the findings for long-term disaster management, city
resilience and long-term development plans

Amount received and number years supported
The Grant awarded to this project: US$ 65,000 for One Year
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Activity undertaken
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In order to achieve the objectives, the following activities were carried out under the project:
1.
Developing a common methodology in the inception workshop held in December 2010 to
identify and measure the immediate to medium-term impacts of selected weather events
resulting in flooding in the three cities.
2.
Measuring physical, economic and social impacts of floods with particular focus on stock and
flow variables using primary and secondary data
3.
Examining the short to medium-term responses of local government institutions and the
community at large including households and private sector
4.
Exploring the linkages of the response measures to adaption capacity in the long-term and
policy implications for development planning and city resilience
5.
Initiating the process for integrating post event recovery strategy with investment and
development plans through stakeholder workshops that would lead to long term reduction
in vulnerability and enhancement of adaptive capacity in the three cities

Results
The project findings in the three cities highlight their vulnerability to climate risks due to their
geographic location, flood prone topography, large population with a major percentage living a life
of poverty in informal settlements, changing land use pattern, rapid infrastructure development
often by reclaiming land from sea (as in case of Mumbai) and inadequate civic amenities. The study

has examined the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events leading
to flash floods in the three cities. An important finding is that the huge monetary costs of these
impacts are the uninsured losses borne by households belonging to poor strata of society and the
private sector mostly engaged in informal activities. The study also examines the responses of local
government institutions as well as people to cope with flooding. There are a number of public and
private adaptation strategies that have been identified in this report. A significant finding is that all
private initiatives and responses are a direct out-of-pocket expense for the concerned individuals or
establishments. There is virtually no insurance cover that helps them to deal with the adverse
impacts of floods and bring about changes or improvements in the existing infrastructure. Some of
the public and private responses have the potential to enhance the medium to long-term adaptation
capacity of the city to cope with future floods. However, there is a need to address the larger issues
of climate risks and adaptation in the long-term development planning for the cities.

Relevance to the APN Goals, Science Agenda and to Policy Processes
The project is relevant to the climate agenda of the APN. The methodology developed and used in
the project to identify and analyze the immediate to medium-term impacts and responses of
flooding events is expected to improving the understanding of adaptation interventions coming
from the government as well as communities. The project will help in enhancing the APN agenda
of identifying and developing effective methodologies in different areas of global change research
and transferring the knowledge base to the scientific community and policy makers. Better
characterization of post-event impacts and the recovery process would further help in improving
the disaster management interventions. The findings of this project will also help inform the
broader “Cities at Risk” theme being developed by START and the new ICSU international science
project on Integrated Research in Disaster Risk (IRDR). The UNEP has recently launched the AsiaPacific Climate Change Adaptation Network, supported by the UNEP regional office in Bangkok and
by the governments of Japan and Sweden. This project will also contribute directly to the activities
of this Network.

Self evaluation
The project has achieved its stated objective of analyzing the short to medium-term impacts and
responses in the aftermath of extreme weather events leading to floods in the three cities. The case
studies developed here further examine if the response measures undertaken by both local
administration and communities has the potential to enhance the adaptation capacity of the city in
the long-term. There are critical policy implications of the findings of this study, in particular, the
huge monetary burden of the impacts of floods which is borne by the community in the absence of
insurance coverage and other compensation or aid. Responses also mean the cost related private
adaptation. Such private costs, especially the costs borne by the poor and vulnerable sections in
these cities and informal sectors often go unaccounted for in usual damage impact assessment
studies.

Potential for further work
The findings of the project are quite relevant for the three cities which are in transition and on a
development path. It is extremely important that these findings are shared with the larger audience
of policy makers, academia and local community to initiate a meaningful dialogue on climate risks,
general perceptions about the adaptive capacity and how adaptation can be mainstreamed in policy
processes. Therefore, the project should culminate in journal articles as well as be presented in
different forums to make it more relevant. The next logical step would also be to study the policy
processes further, especially the formulation of development and investment plans in the cities to
understand how climate risks and adaptation can be incorporated into these plans.

Publications
Not available now but we would be publishing two articles in peer-reviewed journals where all the
collaborators would contribute.
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TECHNICAL REPORT
Preface
It is now widely accepted that impacts of future climate change will often be observed through
changes in the magnitude and frequency of existing climate-related hazards. Therefore, disaster risk
reduction and management are important strategies for integrating or mainstreaming adaptation
into decision-making. The project has undertake a detailed analysis of the immediate to mediumterm post-disaster impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme weather events (flooding) in
three Asian cities of Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and Manila (Philippines). We quantify the
impacts and evaluate if short to medium-term responses enhance the adaptation capacity of the
cities for future climate risks.
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1.0 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that impacts of future climate change will often be observed through
changes in the magnitude and frequency of existing climate-related hazards in the form of extreme
weather events. Therefore, disaster risk reduction and disaster management is an important context
for integrating or mainstreaming adaptation into decision-making for the cities at risk.
Extreme weather events affect vulnerable urban areas (cities) adversely, with substantial damage
and disruption of normal economic and social activities. The loss of physical, economic and financial
resource base is also supplemented by the loss of economic and social services. This combination of
stock and flow effects can potentially alter the medium to long-term development trajectory of the
city. Most of the existing natural hazards and impacts literature focuses on short-term and
immediate damage to human, built and natural capital, as measured by indicators such as mortality
and insured losses to private and public property and infrastructure. Very few studies have critically
examined the process and outcomes associated with immediate to medium-term responses from
the governments as well as communities to understand the relation between short-term damage,
short to medium-term responses and longer-term adaptive capacity in the affected cities. Effective
adaptation planning requires not only the mitigation of immediate losses but also an enhancement
of the speed and extent of post-disaster recovery. Of additional importance is the need to ensure
that the post-event recovery leads to long-term reduction in vulnerability and enhancement of
adaptive capacity.
This research project aims to fill this research gap by undertaking an analysis of the immediate to
medium-term post-disaster recovery scenario in the aftermath of extreme weather events of
flooding faced by vulnerable cities in three Asian developing countries, namely, Mumbai (India),
Bangkok (Thailand) and Manila (Philippines). The selected Asian cities fall under the densely
populated low lying coastal areas described by the IPCC Fourth Assessment report as ‘key societal
hotspots of coastal vulnerability’. With millions of people residing in these cities, the risk to life and
property increases manifold with vulnerability to extreme weather events such as flooding.
Incidentally, many instances of severe flooding due to heavy intensity precipitation have been
recorded in these cities in recent years, including the unprecedented floods in Bangkok in 2011.
The main objectives of the research project are:
1.
Analysis of immediate to medium-term impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme
events of flooding faced by three coastal cities, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and
Manila (Philippines)
2.
Examine the effects of short to medium-term responses to extreme events on enhancing the
long-term adaptation capacity of these cities
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Explore the policy implications of the findings for long-term disaster management,
city resilience and long-term development plans

The project has developed three case studies for the selected cities. Each of the studies have
measured the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events of flooding,
identified the public and private responses in the short to medium-term and explored their policy
implications for long-term adaptation capacity, city resilience and investment and development
plans. Each study is based on the analysis of primary and secondary data pertaining to the selected
events of flooding and their resultant physical, economic and social impacts. The impacts considered
here include loss of life, injuries, damage to property and infrastructure, damage to economic stocks
like physical capital, inventory and indirect impacts on flow variables like income, investment,
employment and disruption of essential services. After measuring these impacts, the analysis has
focused on the immediate to medium-term post recovery scenario, wherein, we have examined the

responses of the civic administration as well as citizens themselves to cope with future floods. The
findings have significant policy implications for integrating adaptation strategies with long-term
investment and development plans for the cities at risk. This exercise is particularly relevant to these
cities belonging to the developing world, where natural disasters have long-term implications for not
only economic development but poverty alleviation as well.
Better understanding of the process of responding to climate-related hazards, including aspects such
as relief and recovery is important for planning and implementing adaptation interventions. Given
the rapid growth of urban infrastructure in Asian cities, it is important to ensure that this growth
enhances climate resilience and adaptive capacity and is done in a manner sensitive to the
possibilities of mal-adaptation. Therefore, the project is relevant to the climate agenda of the APN.
The project has developed a methodology to identify and analyze the immediate to medium-term
stock and flow impacts of flood events and has also tried to put a monetary tag on the uninsured
losses which normally go unaccounted for in damage assessment exercises. We hope that the
findings of the project will contribute to improving the understanding of vulnerability and the actual
design and implementation of adaptation interventions by integrating climate risk considerations
into decision-making at different levels.
The project teams located in the three countries have jointly developed the methodology and have
gathered the relevant data pertaining to impacts and responses in the respective cities. The
methodology used here and the findings of the study are being shared with the policy makers, local
government institutions and other stakeholders including the scientific and research community and
local people through workshops and proposed publications in the pipeline. Vulnerability and
adaptation to climate change have been recognized as important areas for scientific and institutional
capacity-building. By linking leading institutions in the region, the project also presents an
opportunity to strengthen the research capacity. In addition, the project has also directly engaged
the local and regional decision-makers while carrying out the case studies which would help in better
understanding and articulation of adaptation needs and options for future.
This project report gives a detailed description of the methodology used in the case studies in the
next section. Section 3 presents the results of the case studies and discusses the main findings. This
is followed by conclusions in Section 4 and future directions for research in Section 5.

As described earlier, this research project has developed three case studies for Mumbai, Bangkok
and Manila. The project teams located in the three countries have jointly developed the
methodology and have gathered the relevant data pertaining to impacts and responses in the
respective cities. Each of the studies have measured the physical, economic and social impacts of
selected extreme weather events of flooding, identified the public and private responses in the short
to medium-term and explored their policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity, city
resilience and investment and development plans. Each study is based on the analysis of primary
and secondary data pertaining to the selected events of flooding and their resultant physical,
economic and social impacts. The case studies also identify the immediate to medium-term post
disaster responses of the civic administration as well as citizens to cope with future floods. The
following activities have been carried out under this project in each of the cities:
1.
2.
3.

Measuring physical, economic and social impacts of floods with particular focus on stock and
flow variables using primary and secondary data
Examining the short to medium-term responses of local government institutions and the
community at large including households and private sector
Exploring the linkages of the response measures to adaption capacity in the long-term and
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policy implications for development planning and city resilience

4.

Initiating the process for integrating post event recovery strategy with investment
and development plans through active engagement and dialogue with the policy
makers and other stakeholders through information dissemination and workshops
that would lead to better understanding of adaptation needs in future

We describe the methodology used for the case studies in detail in this section. The following subsections give details like brief description of the selected extreme flood events, methodology used in
the respective cities, study areas, primary and secondary data sources and analytical techniques
used.

2.1 Mumbai
Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay) is one of the largest mega cities with the population of more
than 12 million. The city is the financial capital of India with a large commercial and trading base.
With per capita income thrice that of the national average, Mumbai makes huge contribution to the
total tax revenues of the country. The city is an important international sea port and strategic from
defense perspective. Unfortunately, the city is also acutely vulnerable to climate risks due to its
location on the sea coast, flood prone topography and the landmass composed largely of reclaimed
areas. In recent years, Mumbai has been experiencing many weather events, including the extreme
weather event in July 2005 that led to unprecedented floods, massive damages, loss of life and
property and affected the economic and social activities adversely. Such events tend to have longterm consequences for economic development and poverty alleviation in the city where majority of
the residents (60% in case of Mumbai) live in slums and squatter settlements.

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

The extreme weather event of July 2005 has been selected in this case study to examine the impacts
and responses and to study the policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity. On July 26,
2005, Mumbai was struck with a heavy storm. India Meteorological Department (IMD) weather
station recorded 944mm rainfall (45% of the annual average rainfall in Mumbai) over a 24-hour
period, with the highest precipitation (380 mm) for a few hours between 2.30 pm and 7.30 pm. This
unprecedented rainfall coinciding with the high tide brought the city to a standstill. 22% of the city
was submerged that day with very heavy flooding in the suburbs.
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In order to measure the stock and flow impacts of the July 2005 events and analyze the response
strategies, the study has used both primary data collected from communities and secondary data
collected from government institutions. The impacts include stock variables like loss of life, injuries,
damage to property and infrastructure, damage to physical capital and inventory and health impacts
as well as flow variables like loss of income, investment, employment and disruption of essential
services like water and electricity. Similarly, response strategies are identified at both the
institutional and community level. The study then focuses on the policy implications of the response
efforts for disaster management, city resilience and adaptive capacity in the long-term.
The methodology used in Mumbai case study is outlined here:
1. Primary data were collected from households and commercial and small industrial
establishments in Mumbai by administering a detailed questionnaire in six wards (administrative
units) of Mumbai.
a. Six flood prone wards in Mumbai – F North, F South, H East, K East, L and P North –
selected for the survey. These wards were most affected by July 2005 floods. They are
low-lying and reclaimed areas or fall in the river flood plain making them more
vulnerable to flash floods.

b. Detailed questionnaires were administered to 1168 households and 792 commercial and
small industrial establishments spread over the six wards. The sample selected from the
six wards is given in Table 1 below.
c. Survey questionnaires pertain to impacts of July 2005 floods, community and
administration response, costs of damage and repairs/replacements, response measures
undertaken in the aftermath of July 2005 and experience of subsequent flood events

Table 1: Ward-wise details of the sample selected in Mumbai
Wards

Total population

Households

F North
F South
H East
K East
L Ward
P North

5,24,393
3,96,122
5,80,835
8,10,002
7,78,278
7,98,775

177
103
176
241
231
240

Commercial &
Industrial
102
149
98
139
204
100

2. Information was also collection through unstructured interviews of selected local government
officials working at the ward level, with Disaster Management Cell (DMC) and key planners.
a. Personal interviews were carried out based on open-ended questions to understand
their views on flooding events in Mumbai, climate risk perception, current adaptation
events, level of preparedness and enhancing long-term coping capacity through short
and medium-term measures undertaken by the local government

The study reported the costs of damage to physical infrastructure as per the damage assessment
reports of MCGM. For the primary data analysis, descriptive statistics were used to understand the
average costs of damages to physical infrastructure, appliances and inventory as well as economic
losses for households and commercial and small industrial establishments. These costs were
extrapolated using certain assumptions to arrive at rough and indicative estimates of the total costs
of direct impacts on households and other establishments due to July 2005 floods. The important
point to be noted here is that these are uninsured losses and hence are normally not taken into
account when damage assessment is done.
For the indirect impacts like non-availability of goods and services and disruption of essential
services like electricity, we used the proxy variables such as daily octroi collection at entry points
into the city and daily electricity supply in the suburbs by a private utility.
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3. Secondary data were collected from the DMC and other relevant departments within Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), the civic authority, as well as private sector electricity
utility to understand the magnitude of impact on city infrastructure and provision of services,
relief and recovery efforts, disaster management priorities and practices and overall
development planning process.
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2.2 Bangkok
Bangkok, the capital of Thailand since 1782, is not only the country’s political centre, but also its
administrative and economic heart. Located on the lower plain of the Chao Phraya River Basin, the
city is now a sprawling urban agglomeration and one of Asia’s emerging megacities. The sheer pace
of its spatial and demographic growth has meant that Bangkok itself has had to be continuously
redefined. The city is now classified as the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), an area of around
1,569km2 that includes the five adjacent provinces of Samut Sakon, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi,
Pathum Thani and Samutprakarn. According to the National Statistics Office (NSO), Bangkok’s
population in 2009 was at 5.701 million but other figures put the population at almost 10 million or
even more, when unregistered migrants are factored in. Much of Thailand’s industrial and
commercial capacity is concentrated within metropolitan Bangkok, as well as the bulk of its
communications and transport infrastructure. In 2006, the year of this case study, the BMR
generated 43% of Thailand’s GDP.
This economic primacy, together with the expanding population, is a major dimension in the city’s
increasing vulnerability and exposure to flooding. When a major flood event affects Bangkok, it not
only threatens the political and administrative functioning of the capital, but also puts much of the
country’s factories and industrial parks at risk, and by extension, the homes and livelihoods of
hundreds of thousands of the city’s residents. A second important element in Bangkok’s
development is its transition from a water-based urban form, when the city fabric was designed
sympathetically around its natural climate and hydrology, to an impermeable ‘concrete pad’. This
has weakened its capacity to cope with heavy rains.
This study examines the impact of the 2006 floods, with a focus on four districts in the eastern
region of Bangkok: Minburi, Nong Jork, Lat Krabang and Klong Samwa. During the 2006 flood,
these districts were among the worst hit. As with other instances of flooding in Bangkok, the
circumstances that led to the city’s inundation in 2006 were both unique and generalised. Heavy
precipitation, large volumes of runoff from the north of the country and significant sea level rises
due to seasonal high tides were all contributing factors. In response, the floodwater was managed by
allowing the agricultural land north of the city to flood and also channelling the water to the east of
the city, where the case study districts are located. In 2006, Thailand was affected by a number of
tropical depressions between the months of August and October. These resulted in short periods of
intense precipitation across Thailand during this period, on 27-31 August, 9-12 September and 18-23
September. The last, the ‘Xangsane’ typhoon, occurred on 1-3 October. This triggered intense flash
precipitation in Bangkok. 24 hours of heavy localized rain caused the city to be inundated as its
drainage system was unable to cope with rainfall exceeding 60mm/hour.
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Estimating the full extent of the 2006 flooding and its impact requires a detailed and wide-ranging
assessment of its effects. This study aims to develop, through a variety of measurements and
proxies, a more comprehensive picture of the impacts of the 2006 flooding on communities in the
four study districts. This case study uses the methodology outlined below:
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1. Secondary data: A diverse selection of secondary data, such as damage profiles, relief subsidies
and mental health assessments were used in this study. The study draws on previous studies and
assessments on the 2006 flood, some conducted in its immediate aftermath, that together
illustrate some of the long-term consequences of the disaster for economic growth and social
development in the case study districts.
2. However, the available resources are relatively limited and so a full taxonomy of its effects is not
possible. The quantifiable measurements are therefore confined to the aspects listed below:

Physical:

Total inundated area
Damage to property and infrastructure
Loss of agricultural produce

Environment: Water quality
Sanitary level
Social:

Psychological assessment

3. Secondly, fieldwork was undertaken in the case study districts, using semi-structured interviews
with residents to gain a better qualitative understanding of the 2006 flooding.
4. The primary data were collected in the four selected districts of Nong Jork, Minburi, Ladkrabang
and Khlongsamwa, all located outside the King’s dyke in eastern Bangkok. A total of 380 surveys
were undertaken to assess flood-related impacts across four main sectors: 300 household
samples, 50 agricultural samples, 28 business samples and 2 industrial samples, namely the
Bangchan and Ladkrabang industrial estates, the only ones in the study area.
In order to gauge the true effects of the flooding, the researchers designed a series of proxies to
better measure the impacts, direct and indirect, on livelihoods and the local economy as seen in
Table 2 below. This involved synthesizing existing data at the national level, together with the
primary data gathered through the fieldwork.
Table 2: Proxies for gauging flooding effects, by sector in Bangkok
Sector

Proxies

Household

Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /
Health (physical and mental)

Agricultural

Flood level / Flood duration / Cost physical damage / Work absence /
Product price

Business

Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /
Stock / Custom and trade

Industrial

Household surveys. Flood prevention plan

Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) is the center of political, economic, and sociocultural activities of Philippines. Its strategic location by Manila Bay and the mouth of the Pasig River
accounts for the growth of the capital city. Being near a river and a good harbor made possible the
development and expansion of the city of Manila to its suburbs in the last 30 years. With large inmigration and rapid population growth, the city expanded to the suburbs, surrounding
municipalities, and to risky areas for habitation (e.g., swampy areas, near or above esteros or water
canals, along the river and earthquake fault lines). Socio-economic forces like land use,
infrastructural development, building practices, urban development policies and programs have
greatly shaped the settlement patterns of the city. In 2007, the National Statistics Office (NSO)
reported that Metro Manila has 12 million residents but the average daytime population is about 16
million. In third world cities like Metro Manila where urban growth and sprawl remains largely
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unregulated, the vulnerability of populations, especially marginal sectors, to climate change-related
effects like floods is quite high, reducing their potential for adaptation and resilience.
This study was carried out in Metro Manila, in the Pasig-Marikina flood basin, with special focus on
the cities of Marikina and Pasig. These cities suffered extreme flooding brought about by the tropical
storm, Ondoy in late September 2009 and Pepeng in early October 2009. In this study, the impacts
and responses to Ondoy in these cities were compared to another flooding event in 2011, the heavy
rains and floods brought by Pedring and Quiel in September 2011 and early October 2011. Until
tropical storm Sendong hit northen Mindanao and Eastern Visayas in December 2011, these were
considered the worst to have brought extreme flooding to the national capital.
The study utilized the following main data sources:
1. Secondary data sources: The main secondary source utilized here to complement the current
APN survey is the 2008 climate change household survey conducted by the author in the three
flood plains of Metro Manila.
2. Household and commercial surveys: This study interviewed 200 households1, sampled from
those severely flooded communities in the extreme flooding of Ondoy in late September and
Pepeng in early October 2009 located in the flood basin of the Pasig-Marikina River Basin, one of
the three flood basins of Metro Manila (see map below). The other two flood basins are located
in the cities of Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas, and Valenzuela (KAMANAVA) and in the city of
Taguig and the municipality of Pateros known as the West Mangahan area. These areas often
experience flooding coming from the nearby riverine systems and the regular tidal/storm surges
(see figure 1 below). To obtain the losses/damages and responses at the commercial-industrial
level, the study conducted a survey of 100 commercial-industrial units or 50 in each of the cities.

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

The above data sources were supplemented with key informant interviews and Focus group
discussions (FGDs) among local and national officials, civil society leaders, influential private sector
leaders, and community leaders/residents. Overall, the study assessed the vulnerability of Metro
Manila residents and commercial-industrial establishments to extreme flooding in 2009 (Ondoy and
Pepeng), their adaptive responses and potentials for mainstreaming these adaptations to urban
planning, governance, and to medium/long-term development.
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1

Originally, the study planned to interview 300 households obtained through systematic sampling with a

random start but had to reduce this to 200 because the people were tired of being interviewed about the
effects and their responses to Ondoy. In the same manner, 100 owners/managers of commercial and
industrial units were expected to be interviewed in both cities but in the end we were able to process 87
interview protocols because 13 respondents had several call backs that eventually we dropped them out
of the sample.

3.0 Results & Discussion
The project findings in the three cities highlight their vulnerability to climate risks due to their
geographic location, flood prone topography, large population with a major percentage living a life
of poverty in informal settlements, changing land use pattern, rapid infrastructure development
often by reclaiming land from sea (as in case of Mumbai) and inadequate civic amenities. The study
has examined the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events leading
to flash floods in the three cities. An important finding is that the huge monetary costs of these
impacts are often the uninsured losses borne by households belonging to poor strata of society and
the private sector mostly engaged in informal activities. The study also examines the responses of
local government institutions as well as people to cope with flooding. There are a number of public
and private adaptation strategies that have been identified in this report.
We describe in this section the results of the analysis carried out using primary and secondary data
in the three cities. The following sub-sections give details of the stock and flow impacts, the
estimates costs of the damage during the extreme weather events on households and other
establishments and response strategies adopted by local governments and people on their own
(prominently in case of Mumbai).

3.1 Findings of Mumbai study
MCGM, the civic authority, undertook damage assessment exercise in the immediate aftermath of
July 2005 floods and submitted the report to seek financial assistance from the central government
under the CRF (Central Relief Fund). This exercise has estimated the cost of damages to municipal
infrastructure including municipal buildings, water supply systems, roads and storm water drains to
the tune of Indian Rupees (INR) 2475 Million or US$ 55 million. However, the damages and costs
estimated by the government agencies reflect only a fraction of the total costs of damages to
physical infrastructure and assets as the damages suffered by households and commercial
establishments are not accounted for in the absence of insurance coverage and unavailability of
data. To overcome this limitation of impact assessment, this study carried out the survey of 1168
households and 792 commercial and small industrial establishments from six wards of Mumbai.

Table 3 shows the total costs of repair/replacement for the flood affected households. The costs
estimated through the primary survey have been extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that overall
20% of households located in eastern and western suburbs were affected by floods in July 20052. It
must be noted here that in the absence of insurance coverage, the huge costs calculated here to the
2001 census data show the total population of around 8.5 million in eastern and western suburbs of
Mumbai. Assuming the average of 4 members per family, this translates to about 2.1 million households.
We make a rough estimation that 20% of these households (about 420,000) were directly affected due to
floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and calculate the costs accordingly. It must be
noted here that we are considering households who are located at the ground level and first storey of
residential buildings. Hence 20% seems a reasonable estimate for directly affected households. This
exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs that households have had to bear in
the absence of insurance coverage.
2
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In case of households, During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of flooding was 5 feet and the
houses remained flooded for average 3 days. 59% said that the effect of floods on their families was
high. Most surveyed households (69.35%) were in the lower middle-income category of INR 500015000 followed by 16.52% earning less than INR 5000 per month and 10.62% earning INR 1500030000. On an average, the income loss due to floods was INR 5000 (84% respondents) and amount
spent on repair/ rebuilding of house was INR 15000 (86% respondents). On an average time, it took
the households around 8 days to complete the repair/reconstruction of the house.

12

tune of INR 12,000 million (US$ 267 million) are the out-of-pocket expenses borne by the city
residents on account of floods.
Table 3: Cost of repairs/replacement in households

Item

Average cost of
repairs/replacement
per household (in
INR)

% of
households
reporting
these costs
in survey

Estimated
number of
households
affected by
floods

Estimated costs of
damage in INR
million

Income loss

5000

84

352800

1764

Reconstruction of
house

15000

86

361200

5418

Stove

1500

57

239400

359.1

Electric Fans

1000

35

147000

147

TV

7000

42

176400

1234.8

VCR/VCD

2700

7

29400

79.38

Music System

3000

1

4200

12.6

Motorcycle

8000

13

54600

436.8

Refrigerator

7000

30

126000

882

Washing Machine

6000

8

33600

201.6

Furniture

5000

31

130200

651

Wardrobes

4000

32

134400

537.6

Utensils

3000

38

159600

478.8
12202.68
(US$ 267 million)
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Total Estimated costs

]

13

The primary survey also covered commercial establishments like retail shops, IT centres, Jewellery
stores, dairy, etc. and small industries such as manufacturing units and warehouses. Most of these
are either located on the ground level in industrial parks or along the roadside and get affected by
floods with heavy precipitation. During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of flooding reported
by commercial establishments was 4 ft. The average time taken by them to get back to normal
business was 3.5 working days. Once again, in the absence of insurance coverage (only 7% of the
respondents claimed to have insurance coverage of any kind including life insurance), these
establishments had to bear the burden of repairs and/or replacements for different physical assets
damaged/destroyed during the July 2005 floods as seen in Table 4 below. The costs have been
extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that overall 40% of such establishments located in eastern
and western suburbs were affected by floods in July 20053.

MCGM records show around 400,000 registered retail shops and other commercial establishments in
the city out of which 60% or 240,000 are located in the suburbs. We make a rough estimation that 40% of
these establishments were affected due to floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and
calculate the costs accordingly. This exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs
that such establishments have had to bear in the absence of insurance coverage.

3

Table 4: Cost of repairs/replacement in commercial & industrial establishments in Mumbai

Item

Average cost of
repairs/replacement
per establishment (in
INR)

% of
establishments
reporting these
costs in survey

Estimated
number of
establishments
affected

Estimated
costs in
INR million

Grounds and
fences

40000

48

46080

1843.2

Walls

11000

26

24960

274.56

Windows

5000

4

3840

19.2

Doors and
mouldings

6000

18

17280

103.68

Electrical wiring
and switches

10000

28

26880

268.8

Heating

10000

1

960

9.6

Air conditioning

14000

1

960

13.44

Machine tools

15000

25

24000

360

Finished products

24000

28

26880

645.12

Raw materials

20000

13

12480

249.6

Inventory

24000

13

12480

299.52

Total Estimated costs

4086.72
(US$ 90
million)

In addition to this, there are a number of indirect impacts like non-availability of essential supplies,
price rise due to shortages and disruption of essential services that the respondents have reported.
Some of the major problems faced by both households and commercial and industrial
establishments are flood waters entering the premises, non-availability of local transportation,
disruption of electricity and supply of clean drinking water. 70% households and 82% establishments
reported that their premises were flooded with water. More than 80% households and
establishments also reported non-availability of local transportation and disruption of electricity.
62% households said that there was non-availability of food and other supplies. Data on daily octroi
collections and daily electricity supply also show a major dip in the aftermath of floods. In fact, in
case of electricity, it took the private utility nearly two weeks to restore the power supply back to its
normal levels.
The devastating floods of July 2005 became a real eye opener for the local administration and led to
the formulation of the Disaster Management Plan for the city and other short to medium term
measures to improve the coping capacity of the city to floods in future. Along with the local
government, citizens – households and commercial/industrial establishments –also responded to the
threat of recurrent floods and undertook a variety of measures in the aftermath of July 2005 floods.

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

Source: Calculated based on primary data
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The following are some of the important response measures:
•

•

•

•

•

•

In the immediate aftermath of the July 2005 floods, a Fact Finding Committee was appointed
to look into the causes and to recommend activities to reduce the future risks of flooding in
Mumbai. The committee came up with several recommendations, such as, upgradation of
storm water drainage system, disaster management, river development and so on to
improve the existing environment and upgrade and improve the governance and
management to achieve sustainable development of Mumbai.
Accordingly, the Brihanmumbai Stormwater Disposal System (BRIMSTOWAD) is now being
implementing at the cost of INR 1200 crore (approx. US$ 266 million). This project is
doubling the capacity of the existing drains from 25 mm rainfall per hour to 50 mm per hour
of rainfall.
A fully-equipped Disaster Management Cell (DMC) was made operational at MCGM
headquarters in Mumbai after 2005. This cell has been given the responsibility of
coordinating with different stakeholders and agencies for the rescue and relief operations in
the event of floods during monsoon. 31 rain gauges have been installed and they feed
rainfall data of 15-minute interval to the disaster control room. Alert is issued to the control
rooms in each ward whenever the hourly rainfall exceeds 40 mm.
Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan (DMAP) came into existence in 2007.
Under this plan, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with floods, earthquakes, landslides,
cyclones, etc., have been identified. The plan envisages specific roles for different
stakeholders including government agencies and community organizations.
As part of private responses, households and commercial and industrial establishments have
undertaken steps like increasing height of the surrounding plot, reconstruction with stilt
parking, repairing and elevating electrical meters, repairs to elevate and protect inventory,
etc.
It must be noted that all private initiatives and responses in the absence of insurance
coverage are direct out-of-pocket expenses for the individuals or establishments.

3.2 Findings of Bangkok study
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Estimating the full extent of the 2006 flooding in Bangkok and its impact requires a detailed and
wide-ranging assessment of its effects. Even among the four districts selected in the case study, the
proportion of inundated area and the accompanying damage varied considerably. Reflecting the
mixed character of these districts, as formerly agricultural regions now undergoing rapid
suburbanization, the damage extended to national infrastructure such as roads and rail lines,
community buildings, businesses, fisheries and farms, along with other less tangible dimensions,
such as mental health, may not always be readily measurable.
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Table 5 gives an overview of the reported damage in each of the four case study districts on October
5, just after the flooding. In particular, it gives an idea of the physical damage to communal
infrastructure and the associated impacts this has on education, social life and mobility for residents.
The damage to the rice growers was also substantial at 84 million baht, which shows the importance
of agriculture in Bangkok, particularly in suburban and peripheral areas such as the study districts.
Similarly, table 6 shows the impact of 2006 floods compared to the impacts of a ‘normal’ flood event
of 2010 and the substantial damages in 2006.

Table 5: Damage to national infrastructure and associated costs in 2006
Infrastructure

Damage

Costs

Highways

286 routes on 757 roads: 31 roads 1,735 million baht ($58
with no access.
million): 1,650 million baht to
rebuild damaged roads and 85
million baht to restore
accessibility to obstructed
roads.

Rural roads

496 routes: 12 roads with no access.
467.6km of roads and 1,337m of
bridge to be rebuilt.

1,257.7 million baht (around
$42 million)

102 pipe and 49 land erosion projects.
Railways

6 projects, all in northern Thailand.

Waterways
and dykes

496 routes requiring protection from 226 million baht (around $7.5
erosion/deterioration. 12 roads with million)
no access.

300 million baht (around $10
million)

Table 6: Flood related impacts in 2006 compared to ‘normal’ floods in 2010
Total flooded area
District
(rai)

Total flood-affected
farmers

Total compensation
(Baht, millions)

2006

2010

2006

2010

2006

2010

Khlong Samwa

14,254

494

772

47

7.259

1.269

Minburi

5,877

464

441

54

1.891

1.278

Lad Krabang

14,826

410

325 &

32

4.377

0.987

52

7.090

2.129

Nong Chok

16,817

1,010

672

This provides a fuller picture of flood-related costs to individuals and the community. Table 7 below
summarizes the average loss for each household, business and farm in the sample communities.
While it includes repair costs to housing, vehicles and other equipment, it also extends to the
intangible or indirect losses that result from illness, work absence or additional transport costs
caused by flooding. Revenue shortfalls or unpaid leave create an added burden that conventional
measurements of costs and losses often fail to capture. As Table 7 shows, these indirect costs are
substantial for households, businesses and agriculture. In the case of businesses, the indirect costs of
lost customers, work absence and the ‘invisible’ cost of flood prevention in fact exceed the direct
costs of repairs and physical damage.
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671 (inland
fisheries)
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Table 7: Flood related costs calculated based on primary survey
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
Sub-proxies

Proxy
variables
Loss
Incurred
Work
absence

Food and
utilities
15,000

Transportat
ion
600

Daily
income
300

Day (s)
absent
3

Repairs
25,000

Total
Flood
prevention
5,000

44,400

900

Medication

Health

300

300
45,600

BUSINESS SECTOR

Proxy
Variables

Sub-Proxies

Loss
Incurred

Lost
customers
15,000

Stock
damage
5,000

Work
absence

Expenses
(workers)
300

Day(s)
absent
3

Repairs
5,000

Total
Flood
prevention
5,000

30,000

900
30,900

Proxy
Variables
Loss
Incurred
Work
Absence

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Sub-Proxies

Total

Field
damage
30,000

Flood
prevention
12,000

42,000

Daily
income
500

Day(s)
absent
30

15,000
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57,000
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The results highlight the importance of a localized analysis of the impacts of flooding, as both the
intensity and the nature of its effects vary considerably from district to district. Of the four, Minburi
was the worst affected in 2006 and 2010. The impact was particularly pronounced in September and
October, as residents suffered loss of livelihood as a result of economic disruption and health risks.
Work absence is also an important indirect cost in the flooding. Nevertheless, work attendance
remained relatively unaffected through the flooding, suggesting a comparatively high level of
adaptation. However, within the agricultural sector work absence was a major problem as fields and
land were inundated, in the worst cases potentially extending into weeks. Interestingly, the
relatively low impact of work absence on poor and affluent households was in fact similar for the
lowest income (<10,000 Baht/month) and the highest income (>50,000 baht/month) households.

From these results, it would seem that low income households demonstrated a relatively high level
of adaptation to the flooding. There are probably a number of dimensions to this that need to be
explored further: for example, the limited ability of low income households to shoulder the costs of
work absence, especially when they lack the security of formally salaried employment.
With regards to flood preparedness, the results were poor at the household level in 2006: for
instance, only 26% of households had stocked food and only 31% drinking water before the flood.
However, this proportion rose substantially for the 2010 flood (to 37% and 41% respectively),
suggesting that many households had learnt important lessons from the previous event. And when
respondents were asked if in future they would be willing to stock up on supplies before flooding,
for both goods around 75% of households answered positively. This suggests that local communities
have the capacity to develop better preparation strategies and that there is still further potential to
improve on these responses.
Health care costs, whether for minor pharmaceutical purchases or more serious referrals, are
another important indirect cost that is often overlooked in damage assessments. These costs are
often not insubstantial. In Nong Jork, where much of the area is farmland, parts of the district
experienced protracted flooding, with some areas submerged in over a foot of water for more than a
month. As a result, the generally low income population was faced with a variety of health issues,
such as dengue fever and foot-and-mouth disease.
The costs of the flooding, through lost income and damaged infrastructure, were generally more
severe for the community as a whole than individual households. If the impacts at a community level
are more severe, as these results suggest, then this would reinforce the importance of collective
adaptation and mitigation strategies at a community level.
Table 8: Intensity of flood impact by sector and income level
Household Sector (300HH)
Community

Agricultural Sector(50)

Business Sector(30)

Home

10,00030,000

30,00050,000

>50,000 <10,000

10,00030,000

30,00050,000

>50,000

Farm

Livestock

Fishery

Consumer Goods

Services

Flood Level
57.14% 54.07%
No. of Days Flooded 62.50% 47.41%
Loss Incurred
44.64% 43.70%
Work Absence
*
*
Health
*
*
Production Price
*
*
Stock
*
*
Customer
*
*

52.22%
52.00%
45.56%
*
*
*
*
*

63.16%
52.63%
31.58%
*
*
*
*
*

41.48%
38.52%
28.15%
87.41%
59.26%
*
*
*

47.78%
44.44%
28.89%
85.33%
74.44%
*
*
*

42.11%
42.11%
36.84%
84.31%
68.42%
*
*
*

45.45%
78.79%
42.42%
90.91%
*
75.76%
*
*

66.67%
75.00%
50.00%
91.67%
*
58.33%
*
*

60.00%
80.00%
40.00%
80.00%
*
100.00%
*
*

68.75%
56.25%
43.75%
56.25%
*
*
31.25%
43.75%

57.14%
57.14%
50.00%
42.86%
*
*
*
64.29%

High
Medium
Low
No Impact

<10,000

Flood Level
30 cm
15 cm
5 cm
No impact

32.14%
57.14%
30.36%
80.36%
66.07%
*
*
*

No.of flood days
> month
1-4 week
< week
No impact

Loss Incurred
>10,000
5,000-10,000
<5,000
No impact

Work Absence
> week
3-5 days
1-2 days
No impact

Health
Admission
District Officer
Store Purchases
No impact

Within the agricultural sector, farmland was the worst affected by flooding in both 2006 and 2010,
with levels in excess of a foot lasting over a month. Therefore, from one perspective, farmland is
arguably the most vulnerable to flooding. Nevertheless, it is important to note that fisheries were
the most affected by the increasing cost of production in 2006. As for small businesses, the impact is
less straightforward and depends in particular on the product of the enterprise. For instance, while
the service sector was weakened by flood-related disruption, demand for basic consumer goods
actually rose among residents who were more reliant on local shops to provide them with food and
other provisions. The government therefore must factor these different effects into its assessments
and compensation strategies to reflect the varying costs to different agricultural sectors.
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Large areas of Bangkok were inundated in 2006 floods and this led to further measures in the
aftermath of the event to strengthen the existing network to protect the city from runoff. The
strategic focus since 2006, such as the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) master plan, is largely
infrastructural, with an emphasis on creating and enhancing drainage and pumping. In partnership
with the Department of Drainage and Sewage, the RID developed a 450 km2 protected area in the
eastern suburbs beyond the King’s Dike, supported by a system of monitors and flood walls along
the main canals to restrict inflows of floodwater from nearby. Three pumping stations have been
constructed at Hok Wah Sai Lang, Saen Saeb and Pravetburirom to provide the system with an
additional CMS of drainage capacity. These have been accompanied by strengthening the city’s
retention and drainage capacity.
Further, flood protection for the Chao Phraya Basin encompasses a broad range of different actors
with a variety of specializations and institutional mandates. This includes sector-specific agencies,
such as the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the Royal Irrigation Department
(RIG) and the Public Works Department (PWD), and administrative bodies with localized governance
remits such as the BMA and the Local Administration Department (LAD).
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The BMA’s strategies focus primarily on three approaches:
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•

Flooding prevention – achieved through both structural measures (such as polders, pumps and
sewerage) and non-structural approaches (such as planning regulations, public communications
and improved information gathering). While the former is typically employed in dense, inner city
districts, the latter is often favored in low density residential and agricultural areas. This
potentially suggests that in suburban areas, such as the case study districts, full prevention may
not be achievable, but the negative effects of inundation can be substantially reduced.

•

Post-flood disaster recovery – focused on immediate mitigation through operating and
maintaining pumping and drainage capacity, as well as developing a short term action plan. In
2006, this included the installation of additional pumps in high risk areas, the release of surplus
water into irrigation areas and upstream water retention.

•

Medium-term post-flood disaster recovery scenario – maintaining existing infrastructure and
constructing additional capacity to sustain and enhance protective capacity, accompanied by
measures to prevent and resolve flooding. Careful coordination, monitoring and evaluation is
necessary to achieve this.

As for the involvement of private sector and community in responding to flood threats, the BMA has
already undertaken some projects to promote partnerships along these lines, such as the 2007 BMA
Declaration of Cooperation on Alleviating Global Warming Problems, with 36 private and public
sector signatories. In addition, in 2008 it implemented a ‘canal water quality improvement’
campaign to raise awareness of the importance of canal environments, with the participation of
local canal side communities. Independent institutes such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center
have also launched community-based disaster preparation programs.

3.3 Findings of Manila study
The study carried out in Metro Manila selected two study areas, Marikina and Pasig City. Household
and commercial surveys, key informant interviews, FGDs and secondary data sources have revealed
the following impacts of 2009 floods on the households in the two cities:
•
Majority (90 percent in Marikina City; 71 percent in Pasig City) asserted that they suffered
highly from the Ondoy floods in 2009. On the average, the flood waters in their homes
reached an average of 20 ft., while in some it reached the maximum height 30 ft. in 2009.
But of the two cities, Marikina had suffered more with 75 percent of their dwelling
structures fully or partially damaged while only 35 percent of Pasig had suffered the same.
•
Most (81 percent) of their major repairs and reconstruction were concentrated on adding
and repairing/repainting the floors, walls, and roofing of their homes while the rest (19
percent) either constructed a new home, fixed their plumbing, drainage system and toilets.
•
On the average, it took them 30 days to complete the repair and reconstruction of their
homes, with a small minority (10 percent) unable to do so because of not having the
resources to do it or were prevented by the authorities to reconstruct their homes as these
were located in danger zones.
•
In Marikina, affected residents spent an average of (Pesos) P141,000 compared to P12,000 in
Pasig City to repair their damaged homes and appliances. The disparity is due to the fact that
extreme flooding in Marikina hit more upper/middle-income households while in Pasig City
the extreme floods (in terms of height and length) devastated mostly low and middleincome households.
•
In terms of losing household assets, almost half (45 percent) of the surveyed households
reported having lost severely, while 30 percent lost mildly and 16 percent had negligible
losses.
•
On the average, 30 man-days were lost by the residents in 2009 because of the flood
damage to their homes, basic services, and infrastructure (roads, bridges and water
channels). Water supply was interrupted for 22 days and electricity could not be delivered
for about a month (Marikina) and 14 days (Pasig).
•
Children’s schooling also suffered with about 70 percent of the households unable to send
their children to school.
•
In terms of income loss, the respondents averaged losing P21,000 per household (average
salary of public school teacher is P10,000) with some reaching P500,000 income loss due to
Ondoy floods.

Most (almost 80 percent) of the respondents suffered from coughs/colds and fever
due to the floods. About 40 percent complained of diarrhea and stomach ailments.
On the average, they spent P6,517 for medical expenses, with some families
spending a maximum of P70,000 during the Ondoy floods.

Below is a comparative summary of costs and losses (Table 9 and 10) incurred prior, during, and
after the Ondoy floods based on the recollection of respondents during FGDs.
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Table 9: Costs due to floods in Marikina and Pasig city during 2009 floods

Summary of Costs/Losses Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy

Ondoy Period

Post-Ondoy

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women
HH

Absences from school

6

8

14

17

6

7

Number of workdays lost
from sickness due to flood

5

7

9

10

5

8

Number of work days lost
due to flood

6

8

20

22

6

9

Average income loss due to
floods

P1,715

P3,250

P7,250

P6,450

P2,750

P3,400

Average amount of spent on
medicine

P300

P400

P3,200

P3,000

P500

P450

P25,000

P20,000

-

-

P6,500

P4,200

Average losses (appliances,
etc.)
Average income

P6,250

P5,000

Table 10: Costs of basic needs in Marikina and Pasig city during 2009 floods

Summary of Costs of Basic Needs/Services (in pesos,
monthly, US$ 1=P43)
Pre-Ondoy

Food

Ondoy Period

Post-Ondoy

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women
HH

P6,000

P5,800

P2,500 + relief
goods

P2,000 +
relief goods

P6,500

P6,000

P50

P45

P240

P240

P60

P50

P80 (well)
P500
(piped)

P80 (well)
P550
(piped)

P80 (well, long
lines)
P1,500 (piped)

P80 (well,
long lines)
P1,500
(piped)

P80 (well)
P740 (piped)

P80 (well)
P700 (piped)

P2,000

P1,800

P5,000

P4,500

P2,000 (wet)
P3,000 (dry)

P1,800 (wet)
P2,500 (dry)

P300

P310

P2,000

P2,000

P360

P320

P1,500 –
P15,000

P1,000 –
P8,000

Water
• Drinking
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utensils
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Energy/electricity

Sanitation/Laundry
(mud, waist deep;
cleaning – 2 weeks – one
month)

House repair

In case of commercial establishments, the survey targeted 100 establishments (50 in each city) but
processed only 85 research protocols. With regards to damages to their buildings and properties, the
respondents reported an average of P85,316, while damages to equipment, appliances and furniture
amounted to a median average of P100,000. Their expenses for repair for buildings amounted to
median average of P10,500. Meanwhile, their expenses on repairs of equipments/appliances
amounted to a median average of P50,000. After the floods, other costs involved disinfecting,
sanitation and rehabilitation. The respondents reported spending a median average of P5,000. Flood
fighting/control costs on the other hand, yield a median average of P37,500. Costs of removing
debris from the premises amounted to a median average of P8,000. Meanwhile, the respondents
reported a median average loss of net income due to flood interruptions of P50,000. Total annual
revenue lost to floods had a median average of P225,000. Majority (96 percent) of the
establishments stopped work or closed operation because of damage to physical structures,
equipment and/or their places remaining inaccessible due to the floods. The average time needed to
recover was 1-2 months.
Most of the responses coming from households can be categorized into the following: 1) physicalstructural adjustments, and 2) changes in lifestyles and habits. About one-third added a floor or
raised the floor and strengthened the foundation of their homes. They also moved the storage of
goods, valuables, and irreplaceable goods to a higher level so these won’t get wet or damaged. They
also become more diligent in cleaning their surrounding canals/drainage channels for
garbage/debris.
Overwhelming 83 percent surveyed households claimed to have been assisted by the local/city
government with food and clothing. In case of manufacturing sector, many relocated their activities
to other parts of the city where flooding is less likely to occur. This was a strategy adopted by large
commercial and industrial establishments in the city. For those who remained or did not relocate,
they just strengthened their buildings or build upper floors where they conduct their business.
Meanwhile in Pasig, most of the factories were compelled by the City Environment Office (CENRO) to
follow safety standards.

Given the challenges and learnings from the disastrous events of 2009, several policies and programs
were enacted by the Congress. Two overarching frameworks for adapting to climate change were
crafted, the 2010 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and the 2011 National
Framework Strategy on Climate Change. Each was drafted in compliance with the law by virtue of
the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” and the “Climate Change Act
of 2009”. The first provides for the creation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Council; the second, for the Climate Change Action Plan approved for implementation
by President Benigno Aquino III towards the end of November 2011.
Similarly, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 was signed, amending the 30-year
old Presidential Decree 1566. This law mandated that each city/municipality must have a disaster
risk reduction and management plan. Meanwhile the Climate Change Action Plan made the first law
more actionable by specifying the programs to be implemented by the Climate Change Commission
and the other agencies of the Aquino government.
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As regards the immediate and medium-term responses of the city/local government are concerned,
these can be summarized into: 1) evacuation, 2) restoration of basic services and 3) rebuilding of
infrastructural support. Also, in Marikina City, communicating the risk of city flooding is now very
much institutionalized in their early warning system, indicated by the siren signals according to the
water level in the Marikina bridge. Meanwhile, Pasig City has also installed an early warning system
communicated through the city’s disaster risk reduction management (DRRM) council and to the
barangay/community DRRM counterpart bodies.
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3.4 Enhancing adaptation through response measures
As seen in the previous sub-sections, both government and citizens have responded to the threat of
floods by undertaking a variety of short to medium-term measures in the three cities. The important
issue to be discussed here is whether and how far do these response measures add to the existing
adaptation capacity and would they succeed in enhancing the adaptation capacity in the long-term.
We discuss here the important issues related to adaptation capacity in the three cities.
As for Mumbai, there are a number of issues related to public and private response measures that
need to be highlighted here:
•

•

•

•
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•

•

BRIMSTOWAD is a major policy initiative that is expected to improve the existing and age-old
storm water drainage system in Mumbai and replace it with the one that will be much more
effective in dealing with greater intensity rainfall. Once the project is implemented completely, it
is expected to improve the flood situation in Mumbai as the new system is being designed for 50
mm rainfall per hour instead of 25 mm per hour design currently in place. Also, the project has
been designed for the runoff coefficient of 1 instead of 0.5 due to the land use changes that
have occurred in the city in past few decades. Thus BRIMSTOWAD is expected to increase the
adaptation capacity of the city for flash floods caused by heavy intensity rainfall in future.
However, if an extreme weather event like July 2005 were to occur again in the next few
decades, even the design criteria used under BRIMSTOWAD will not be enough to cope with the
ensuing floods in low-lying areas. Thus, we need to note this that the residual impacts of the
weather events would still be faced by the city and cannot be done away with completely.
In addition to revamping the storm water drainage network, MCGM has started clearing clogged
drains every year before monsoon. Regular widening and desilting of drains is undertaken.
However, there are multiple agencies involved in this, such as, MMRDA, Public Works
Department, Railways, Mumbai Port Trust and Airport Authority of India. Unless there are
coordinated and well synchronized efforts undertaken by these agencies, isolated efforts will not
help in the long-run to cope with floods.
As regards the disaster management plan formulated by the local authorities, the plan is quite
comprehensive and defines the role of different stakeholders as seen in the earlier discussion.
However, the plan is generic in nature and has less operational value as pointed out by the fact
finding committee. Also various planning and implementing agencies in Mumbai often operate
as islands making it difficult to have a well coordinated response in case of disasters or weather
events.
There are a number of steps taken up by the civic authority, MCGM in recent years based on the
recommendations of the fact finding committee, to improve the disaster response and
management. Accordingly, the rainfall data are now available with the automatic weather
stations for 15-minute interval which can be used to issue early warning to ward control rooms.
This will improve the response and coping capacity in the long-run. The 15-minute interval
rainfall data over a number of years in future can also be used to analyze the intensity and
pattern of rainfall in the city and early warning systems and response measures can be
improvised accordingly.
The early warning system currently being used by the control room looks effective on paper.
Regular information regarding rainfall intensity and traffic diversion is given to the general public
through the website maintained by the MCGM. Yet, the awareness levels regarding such
systems are very poor. For example, our primary survey reveals that 91% households did not
even know about the DMC and 99% were not aware of the website that gives out such
information. 88% were not aware of the emergency contact number. Thus, awareness-building
is the key to making early warning systems effective and add to the coping capacity in future.
Measures related to infrastructure improvements would require a longer time frame given the
socio-economic and political dynamics in the city. Also, the land use policies and planning will
not be effective unless they are coupled with strategies to deal with slum settlements and

•

•

migrants into the city. The experience of the city dwellers in the aftermath of 2005 floods only
shows that the city administration and other stakeholders would need more specific strategies
and an integrated approach to build resilience of the city to climate risks.
As for the planning process, development planning takes environment into consideration at the
generic level. But climate risks and associated impacts of heavy precipitation, sea level rise and
storms are uncertain and varied in nature. What is needed is more scientific knowledge base
related to such risks, their impacts on the city and technical knowledge related to how we can
mitigate and adapt to such risks. This would increase the possibility of mainstreaming climate
risks and adaptation into the planning process.
As regards the efficacy of private response measures in enhancing the adaptation capacity to
deal with floods in the long term, it is too early to evaluate this given the information we
received through the primary survey. It must be noted that these responses are strictly private in
nature with individual initiative and without any public or government intervention in it. As such
there are no benchmarks to evaluate how efficient these responses are.

•

•

•

•

•
•

Given different strategies adopted by the authorities for flood control in the aftermath of 2006,
the unprecedented flooding in 2011 have clearly shown that much more needs to be done to
enhance adaptation capacity of the city in the long-term. As the fieldwork for this study was
concluding, the city was presented with one of the worst extreme flood events. According to the
Federation of Thai Industries, the cost to the seven hardest hit industrial estates could reach $13
billion, involving 891 factories and 460,000 workers.
While there is no room in this study to examine the extreme flood event of 2011, it is worth
noting a number of elements that highlight the persistence of many key issues.
o The official response to the flooding was sharply criticized for its lack of institutional
coordination, the divisive relationships between different agencies and the strong
degree of politicization that accompanied relief efforts.
o While some institutional reforms have been made since 2006, the overall challenges of
fragmented governance were still apparent.
o In today’s context, when Bangkok is a sprawling metropolis with much of its population
and industry concentrated in the suburbs outside its core, the strong focus on securing
the city centre does little to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of the city’s
residents.
o The protection of inner Bangkok was regarded as coming at the expense of other
neighborhoods that were forced to suffer deeper and more prolonged bouts of flooding
as a result.
To be effective, adaptation strategies must be supported by adequate and multidimensional
data. Previous risk assessments have been hampered by information shortfalls, ranging from a
lack of baseline climate data to the marginalization of non-technical considerations such as
socioeconomic vulnerability, water security and health profiles. Data gathering should also
include a localized focus, as in this study, on the specific circumstances of individual districts.
The dysfunctional nature of the city’s flood management must be addressed through national
and municipal governance reform. This should resolve a broad range of ongoing challenges,
including poor institutional coordination, deficient city planning, funding constraints, povertyrelated vulnerability and building code development.
The flood protection strategy will also necessarily require a site-specific perspective and
potentially the decentralization of some authority to districts and communities.
Meaningful stakeholder participation is essential, drawing on the widest possible range of
actors. This should include not only the various responsible public sector bodies, but also local
communities and the private sector.
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In case of Bangkok, the following issues need to be highlighted here:
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•

•

•

•

Flood protection measures must develop a long term planning vision. Too much effort is
expended on reactive measures once flood events have already occurred, with limited
preparation or anticipation of projected future trends. Furthermore, strategic directions are
often only partially or inconsistently implemented, as with development restrictions in the
eastern areas of Bangkok where the study districts are located.
Flood protection strategies must consider not only the technical and economic implications of
flooding, but also the social and human dimensions. Flooding has been widely regarded in the
past as a water management issue, rather than a complex phenomenon that impacts livelihoods,
urban development and other fields.
Even in the aftermath of the 2011 flood, the BMA’s flood prevention plan still appears to
concentrate primarily on infrastructure development in both the short and long term. Yet the
risks of flooding are not only environmental, but socioeconomic in nature.
Flood prevention therefore requires an integrated approach that spans health, waste
management and the dynamics of agglomeration economies.

For Manila, the following issues regarding adaptation need to be highlighted here:
•

•

•

•

•

•
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•

Floods and storms continue to cause severe economic damage to Philippines as evident from
repeated flood events, the latest one in December 2011. Thus, the fundamental lesson that has
to be inscribed into people’s life-ways and institutions is the urgent need to develop a culture of
disaster prevention, mitigation, adaptation and safety behavior.
But Philippine society, especially government institutions, is not able to effectively fulfil the
responsibility in implementing the required engineering, land zoning, infrastructure planning and
sustainable relocation of people.
Commercial and other private sector interests and informal settlers continue to build over,
across, beside waterways or in mountain slopes/hills that obstruct, constrict and deflect
water/river flows.
As far as relocation as a strategy is concerned, majority of commercial establishments who
refuse to follow safety standards imposed by the city have moved to cities that are not so strict
in imposing restrictions. Overall, this poses problems when considered at the macro level,
because local government units (LGUs), in order to attract business often relax the compliance
standards.
In case of households, making people move constitutes the most challenging task for LGUs as
most residents do not want to leave their homes because of theft/loss of belongings. They
would rather climb up to the ceilings/roofs of their houses than move.
It is apparent from the focused group discussions that the design of the recovery and
reconstruction program must be transparent, accountable and must deliver evidence-based
results and outcomes. Also, the approach must be community-based, people-centred and
equitable and should focus on reduction of future risks in recovery and reconstruction.
The crafting of local risk reduction and management plans at the barangay (community), city,
and provincial levels provide a very promising scenario. These local plans drawn locally and
elevated to the city level make design strategies contextually-specific and more appropriate,
responsive and effective for local needs.
The findings of this study suggest the need for a bottom-up process where the particular
environmental and social-political-economic vulnerabilities of the affected communities are
integrated in the “Local Climate Action Plans” and the “Local Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Plans” which builds into an integrated “Municipal/City Climate Action Plans” and
“Municipal/City Disaster Reduction and Management Plans”.
These vulnerabilities should also be calibrated well at the governance level, thus moving towards
water-based urban design, vertical urbanism and green economy, technologies and architecture
can be programmed or mainstreamed into urban development.

4.0 Conclusion
As stated earlier, this research project undertakes an analysis of the immediate to medium-term
post-disaster recovery scenario in the aftermath of extreme weather events of flooding faced by
vulnerable cities in three Asian developing countries, namely, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand)
and Manila (Philippines). The project has developed three case studies for the selected cities. Each of
the studies have measured the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather
events of flooding, identified the public and private responses in the short to medium-term and
explored their policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity, city resilience and investment
and development plans.
Each study is based on the analysis of primary and secondary data pertaining to the selected events
of flooding and their resultant physical, economic and social impacts. The impacts considered here
include loss of life, injuries, damage to property and infrastructure, damage to economic stocks like
physical capital, inventory and indirect impacts on flow variables like income, investment,
employment and disruption of essential services. After measuring these impacts, the analysis has
focused on the immediate to medium-term post recovery scenario, wherein, we have examined the
responses of the civic administration as well as citizens themselves to cope with future floods. The
findings have significant policy implications for integrating adaptation strategies with long-term
investment and development plans for the cities at risk. This exercise is particularly relevant to these
cities belonging to the developing world, where natural disasters have long-term implications for not
only economic development but poverty alleviation as well.
The main objectives of the research project are:
1.

2.
3.

Analysis of immediate to medium-term impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme
events of flooding faced by three coastal cities, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and
Manila (Philippines)
Examine the effects of short to medium-term responses to extreme events on enhancing the
long-term adaptation capacity of these cities

Explore the policy implications of the findings for long-term disaster management,
city resilience and long-term development plans

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Developing a common methodology in the inception workshop held in December 2010 to
identify and measure the immediate to medium-term impacts of selected weather events
resulting in flooding in the three cities.
Measuring physical, economic and social impacts of floods with particular focus on stock and
flow variables using primary and secondary data
Examining the short to medium-term responses of local government institutions and the
community at large including households and private sector
Exploring the linkages of the response measures to adaption capacity in the long-term and
policy implications for development planning and city resilience
Initiating the process for integrating post event recovery strategy with investment and
development plans through stakeholder workshops that would lead to long term reduction
in vulnerability and enhancement of adaptive capacity in the three cities

The project findings in the three cities highlight their vulnerability to climate risks due to their
geographic location, flood prone topography, large population with a major percentage living a life
of poverty in informal settlements, changing land use pattern, rapid infrastructure development
often by reclaiming land from sea (as in case of Mumbai) and inadequate civic amenities. The study
has examined the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events leading
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In order to achieve the objectives, the following activities were carried out under the project:
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to flash floods in the three cities. An important finding is that the huge monetary costs of these
impacts are the uninsured losses borne by households belonging to poor strata of society and the
private sector mostly engaged in informal activities. The study also examines the responses of local
government institutions as well as people to cope with flooding. There are a number of public and
private adaptation strategies that have been identified in this report. A significant finding is that all
private initiatives and responses are a direct out-of-pocket expense for the concerned individuals or
establishments. There is virtually no insurance cover that helps them to deal with the adverse
impacts of floods and bring about changes or improvements in the existing infrastructure. Some of
the public and private responses have the potential to enhance the medium to long-term adaptation
capacity of the city to cope with future floods. However, there is a need to address the larger issues
of climate risks and adaptation in the long-term development planning for the cities
Overall, the project has achieved its stated objective of analyzing the short to medium-term impacts
and responses in the aftermath of extreme weather events leading to floods in the three cities. The
case studies developed here further examine if the response measures undertaken by both local
administration and communities has the potential to enhance the adaptation capacity of the city in
the long-term. There are critical policy implications of the findings of this study, in particular, the
huge monetary burden of the impacts of floods which is borne by the community in the absence of
insurance coverage and other compensation or aid. Responses also mean the cost related private
adaptation. Such private costs, especially the costs borne by the poor and vulnerable sections in
these cities and informal sectors often go unaccounted for in usual damage impact assessment
studies.
This research project in a way highlights the cost of inaction if very little is done in future to enhance
the coping capacity of the cities for future weather events and climate risks in general. The project
puts forth a convincing argument that adaptation strategies need to become a part of mainstream
planning while devising strategies of developing infrastructure, housing, transport network and
other facilities and services in the city. Although adaptation is costly, the costs of inaction can prove
to be costlier. Hence, there is a need for integrated and coordinated efforts from all agencies
including local government, planners, public utilities and community at large to work towards
greater adaptation to future climate risks for the city.

5.0 Future Directions
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The findings of the project are quite relevant for the three cities which are in transition and on a
development path. It is extremely important that these findings are shared with the larger audience
of policy makers, academia and local community to initiate a meaningful dialogue on climate risks,
general perceptions about the adaptive capacity and how adaptation can be mainstreamed into
policy processes. Therefore, the project should culminate in journal articles as well as be presented
in different forums to make it more relevant.
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We envisage the following logical steps to take this research theme further:
• There is a need to study the policy processes further, especially the formulation of development
and investment plans in the cities to understand how climate risks and adaptation can be
incorporated into these plans.
• There seems to be a communication gap among scientific community, technocrats and designers,
urban planners, disaster management specialists and public representatives as far as future
climate risks faced by cities, their potential impacts, required defense mechanism and
preventive actions. We need an integrated project where these stakeholders are brought
together as a part of a capacity-building exercise and their perspectives are shared to decide the
future course of action as far as mainstreaming adaptation is concerned.
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1. Introduction
Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay) is one of the largest mega cities in the world in terms of
population and is currently ranked 4th after Tokyo, Mexico City and New York1. The city is the
financial capital of India with a large commercial and trading base. It plays host to a number of
industries, multinational companies and important financial institutions. With per capita income
thrice that of the national average, Mumbai makes huge contribution to the total tax revenues of
the country. The city is an important international sea port and strategic for the country from
defence perspective. Unfortunately, Mumbai is also acutely vulnerable to climate risks due to its
location on the sea coast, flood prone topography and the landmass composed largely of reclaimed
land. Also, the most vulnerable section among the residents is the slum dwellers and squatter
communities in the city that comprise more than 60% of the total residents as per the preliminary
estimates of the 2011 census. Therefore, it is critical for the city to assess the vulnerabilities and
devise adaptation strategies to cope with future climate risks.
In recent years, Mumbai has been experiencing many weather events, including the extreme
weather event in July 2005 that led to unprecedented floods, massive damages, loss of life and
property and affected the economic and social activities adversely. Such loss of physical, economic
and financial capital, while important in itself, leads to a loss of economic and social services over a
longer-term. Extreme weather events tend to have long-term consequences for economic
development and poverty alleviation in the city and can potentially alter the development trajectory
permanently. Accompanied by physical, economic and social vulnerabilities in cities like Mumbai is
their low adaptive capacity due to constraints on physical, financial and human resources.
It is now widely accepted that impacts of future climate change will often be observed through
changes in the magnitude and frequency of existing climate-related hazards in the form of extreme
weather events. Therefore, disaster risk reduction and disaster management is an important context
for integrating or mainstreaming adaptation into decision-making for the cities at risk. With this in
view, the present study has been undertaken to assess the vulnerability of the coastal city of
Mumbai to climate change in general and heavy precipitation events in particular. The study seeks to
understand the impact that such precipitation events and resultant flash floods tend to have on the
households and commercial establishments in the city. It further seeks to evaluate the community
and institutional responses to floods and current adaptation efforts. The ultimate aim of the study is
to understand the implications of short-term responses and adaptation efforts for long-term
development planning of the city.
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Coastal megacity of Mumbai

Mumbai is located on the western seacoast of India on the Arabian Sea at 18053’ N to 19016’ N
latitude and 720 E to 72059’ E longitude. Mumbai is an island outside the mainland of Konkan in
Maharashtra State and is separated from the mainland by a narrow creek known as Thane Creek and
a Harbour Bay. The city is surrounded on three sides by the sea: Arabian Sea to the West, Harbour
Bay in the West and Thane Creek in the East. The height of the city is just 10-15 meters above the
sea level in most parts. The city occupies an area of 468 square kilometres (sq. km.) and its width is
17 km. east to west and 42 km. north to south2. The entire region encompasses rich natural
heritage, such as, hills, lakes, coastal water, forests, and mangroves, alongside built areas.
Greater Mumbai Region (GMR, referred to as Mumbai in the text) consists of 7 islands in the city
area and 4 islands in the suburbs. The present day city is divided into two revenue districts, Mumbai
City District, i.e, the island city in the South and Mumbai Suburban District comprising the Western
and Eastern suburbs. As the original cluster of seven islands was joined to form the present city, a

large part of the City and Suburban District is built on the land reclaimed from the sea. The coastline
of Mumbai has been reclaimed for development purposes; e.g., areas like Cuff Parade and Mahim
creek were wetlands, later reclaimed for residential and commercial uses. The new industrial,
commercial and residential settlements have also developed along the reclaimed coastal areas
which are low-lying and flood prone.
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) is the primary agency responsible for
governance of the GMR or Mumbai city. The city is divided into different administrative zones known
as ‘wards’ to facilitate the day-to-day functioning of the civic authority. The map of Mumbai city,
including the location of different administrative wards is shown in Figure 1 below. MCGM has a long
history in urban governance. It was the first municipal corporation established in India in the year
1882. Since then, the civic body has been responsible for the provision of civic amenities, education,
public health, art and culture and heritage conservation in the city. MCGM holds the distinction of
being one of the largest local governments in the Asian continent3. For administrative purposes,
Mumbai Metropolitan region (MMR) has been designated to combine GMR and the surrounding
areas of Thane, Navi Mumbai, Ulhasnagar, Mira Road, Vasai, Virar, Bhayandar, Bhiwandi, Karjat,
Alibaug, etc. Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), set up in 1975, is
responsible for planning and coordination of the development activities of this region. The total area
of the MMR, excluding Mumbai city, is 3887 sq. km., with a population base of 5.90 million as per
2001 census4. These surrounding areas are significant for the economy and transportation services in
Mumbai, as thousands of people travel everyday from these areas into the city for employment.

1.2

Description of the study

The study uses both primary data collected from communities and primary and secondary data
collected from government institutions pertaining to July 2005 floods, their resultant physical,
economic and social impacts and response strategies taken up since then. The impacts include stock
variables like loss of life, injuries, damage to property and infrastructure, damage to physical capital
and inventory and health impacts as well as flow variables like loss of income, investment,
employment and disruption of essential services like water and electricity. Similarly, response
strategies are identified at both the institutional and community level. The study then focuses on the
policy implications of the response efforts for disaster management, city resilience and adaptive
capacity in the long-term. The study aims to bring out the long term policy implications for
integrating adaptation strategies into long-term investment and development plans for the city.
The methodology used in the study is outlined here:
•
Primary data collected from households and commercial and small industrial establishments
in Mumbai by administering a detailed questionnaire Six flood prone wards in Mumbai – F North, F
South, H East, K East, L and P North –selected for the survey and questionnaires administered to
1168 households and 791 commercial and small industrial establishments spread over the six wards.
The sample selected from the six wards is given in Table A1 in the annexure. Further, the six ward
maps with details like flooding spots, landslide prone areas, location of slums, etc. are given in the
annexure.
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The present study analyzes the immediate to medium-term post-disaster recovery scenario in the
aftermath of flooding caused by heavy intensity precipitation in Mumbai in July 2005. The study
identifies the developmental impacts of this extreme weather event and explores their policy
implications for long-term disaster management, city resilience and adaptation strategies. The study
identifies the adaptation efforts undertaken by the local government and communities in the
aftermath of July 2005 floods and assesses the potential for these efforts to enhance the adaptation
capacity of the city in the long run.
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•
Survey questionnaires pertain to impacts of July 2005 floods, community and administration
response, costs of damage and repairs/replacements, response measures undertaken in the
aftermath of July 2005 and experience of subsequent flood events
•
Special section on awareness of climate change added to the questionnaire to understand
the climate risk perception among people
•
Information collection through Unstructured interviews of selected local government
officials working at the ward level, with Disaster Management Cell (DMC) and key planners. Details
of the interviews are given in Table A2 in the annexure.
•
personal interviews carried out based on open ended questions to understand their views
on flooding events in Mumbai, climate risk perception, current adaptation events, level of
preparedness and enhancing long-term coping capacity through short and medium-term measures
undertaken by the local government
•
Secondary data collected from the DMC and other sources within MCGM as well as a private
sector electricity utility to understand the magnitude of impact on city infrastructure and provision
of services, relief and recovery efforts, disaster management priorities and practices and overall
development planning process

1.3

Outline of the report
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The outline of the case study presented here is as follows. Section 2 takes an overview of reviews
the physical, economic and social vulnerabilities in Mumbai city from the perspective of heavy
precipitation and risk of flooding. This section presents the historical data on the rainfall pattern and
resultant flash floods and takes an overview of weather/climate risks for Mumbai city. Section 3
describes the catastrophic event of July 2005 which witnessed unprecedented rainfall and flooding
in Mumbai. The focus of the section is on the physical and economic impacts during the July 2005
floods. The information gathered through the primary survey of households and commercial and
industrial establishments as well as secondary data from government sources is used here to
understand the impacts on stocks and flow variables. The responses to floods including efforts taken
up by local government institutions and communities are reviewed in Section 4. This section once
again uses primary and secondary data to identify the response measures. Section 5 seeks to
understand the efficacy of response measures in increasing the coping capacity of the city for future
floods in the long-term and looks at the possibility of mainstreaming adaptation to climate risks into
the development planning of the city. Section 6, the concluding section, summarizes the overall
findings of the case study.
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Source: http://www.mcgm.gov.in
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Figure 1: Map of Greater Mumbai Region
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2. Vulnerability and climate risks
The geographical location of the city and its physical, economic and social characteristics make the
city more vulnerable to the threats posed by climate risks, such as, sea level rises, storms and floods.
This section looks at each of these vulnerabilities in detail. The rainfall pattern as recorded by the
weather stations since 1970s and the risk of flooding in the city is also described here. A number of
studies have tried to project the climate risks for Mumbai, a review of which is brief undertaken
towards the end of this section.

2.1

Physical and socioeconomic vulnerability

Mumbai, being on the seacoast, experiences a tropical savanna climate5,6 with a heavy southwest
monsoon rainfall of more than 2100 millimetres a year in the monsoon season between June and
September. The City District receives the average total annual rainfall of 2146.6mm, whereas, it is
2363.0 mm in the suburbs. The flash floods that led to the complete disruption of normal life in
Mumbai in July 2005 were the result of an unprecedented rainfall of 944.2 mm on July 26th in the
Suburban District7. Further, most parts of the present day city are built on the reclaimed land. The
city is about 10-15 metres above sea level in many places8. The airport area is only 7.5 metres above
sea level. Similarly major commercial and residential areas like Bandra-Kurla Complex, Wadala and
Worli are low-lying areas. Thus, heavy precipitation often causes flash floods. There are 40 chronic
flooding locations identified in the Greater Mumbai Disaster management Action Plan (DMAP) that
are spread over the island city and eastern and western suburbs. These flooding spots are a worry
for the civic administration as heavy precipitation often causes flooding in the local settlements and
disrupts traffic and normal city life.
Being a coastal city, Mumbai is also prone to cyclones and gusty winds. There are a number of wards
along the coast (Arabian Sea and Thane Creek) that are vulnerable to cyclonic impacts. For instance,
in wards A – D, G-North, G-South, S and T, the (DMAP) has identified settlements that are acutely
vulnerable to cyclones. There settlements were originally fishing communities, but are now home to
many slums along the coast. Given the poor quality of construction material used by these homes,
they are extremely vulnerable to cyclones and winds9.
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As per 2001 census, Mumbai has over 276,000 dwellings (residential, industrial and commercial) of
which 60% are non-engineered constructions, which correspond with the large presence of slum
settlements10. Such constructions are more vulnerable to extreme weather events. Many slum
settlements, generally located on the hill slopes, bottom of hills or near abandoned quarries, face
the risk of landslides usually occurring during heavy rains with gusty winds. DMAP identifies 117 such
settlements which are extremely vulnerable to landslides, loss of life and damage to property in case
of heavy precipitation.
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Perhaps the most important factor enhancing the vulnerability of the city to climate risks is the ever
growing population of Mumbai. The city population has grown steadily in the last 5 decades. There is
a consistent growth from about 3 million in 1951 to 8 million in 1981 to 12 million in 2001 as per the
Census figures, with the population density of about 30,000 per sq. km. 11. As the financial capital of
the country, Mumbai attracts a large workforce, which adds to the pressure on basic infrastructure,
civic amenities and housing. It also leads to congestion, heavy vehicular traffic, growth in illegal slum
dwellings, unhygienic living conditions and the problem of solid waste disposal.
Mumbai, with a large population to cater to, requires basic infrastructure in the form of a large
transport network of railways and roadways. Thousands of people avail of this huge network every
day. However, this massive network is not sufficient for a large population moving in a single
direction during peak business hours. Most commercial activity is concentrated in the island city in
the south. The movement between south and north for business purposes in the peak hours places a

huge burden on the transport network. The road network has become very congested over the years
with increasing number of vehicles and more people traveling to and from the city. For instance,
people residing in surrounding areas of Mumbai, known as the MMR, use the railways and roads
network to come to the city everyday for employment or business. In addition to this, Mumbai has
an international airport located in the middle of the city, catering to more than 4 million
international travelers and 4.2 million domestic travelers12. The massive transportation network is
extremely vulnerable to weather events, as was apparent during the July 2005 floods and would
suffer from massive damages and costs from flash floods, storm surges and sea level rises.
The preliminary estimates of Census 2011 suggest that 60% population in Mumbai lives in slums.
Due to increasing costs of land and material, it has become virtually impossible for the poor and lowincome households to acquire residential property in the city. As a result, the base of slum-dwellers
has increased tremendously. Slums have mushroomed in almost all the wards of Mumbai, along the
coast, on the hill slopes, along the highways, railways and in low-lying areas. Many settlements lack
basic infrastructure like water, sanitation and legal electricity connections. They are non-existent on
city’s development plans. None of the 2335 settlements are recognized on the developmental plan
of Mumbai and the land under slums has development plan reservations, even though some
settlements have existed before development plans were formulated13. Further, regular
displacements prevent slum-dwellers from settling in safe and secure localities and they move
towards landslide prone areas, low-lying regions, and unsafe dumping sites.

As regards economic vulnerability, Mumbai has a pre-eminent position in the country as the
commercial and trading base. The per capita income of city residents is twice that of Maharashtra
State and thrice that of the national average16,17. Mumbai is also an important source of tax revenue
for the country. In recent years, the share of tertiary sector in Mumbai’s income has increased,
whereas, the share of secondary sector has remained almost stagnant. Most industries in Mumbai
are located in eastern and northeastern corridor with a few in the western region. The industrial
units are in mixed areas as no buffer zone is provided for them. In fact, Mumbai was the first City
Corporation to adopt the concept of a development plan under which industrial zones were allowed
to be used for residential and commercial purposes18. Therefore, there is no clear distinction
between residential, commercial and industrial zones for the city. The land use pattern in the city
has also undergone major changes in recent years with the conversion of industrial areas into
residential and commercial complexes. The climate vulnerability of Mumbai, therefore, means a
threat to the life and property within the city, impact on the entire development trajectory and the
economic loss for the entire nation.
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Given the increasing population and majority living a life of poverty and destitution, health
vulnerabilities are imminent. As the Mumbai Human Development Report 2009 indicates, the overall
life expectancy in Mumbai is much lower at 52.6 years for males and 58.1 years for females14.
Tuberculosis (known as a poor man’s disease), HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Jaundice are some of the
major killers in the city. Infant mortality is 36.66 per 1000 live births and malnourishment is rampant
among slum children. The city boasts of enviable health infrastructure compared to other Indian
cities, yet the public health facilities are grossly insufficient to cater to such a huge population and in
the event of a disease outbreak, the civic machinery does not have adequate infrastructure to deal
with the health emergency. 75-80% population depends on relatively expensive private healthcare
facilities for treatment and coverage of health insurance negligible15.
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2.2

Rainfall pattern and risk of flooding

As mentioned earlier, Mumbai receives an average of 2129 mm of rainfall per year during the
monsoon season between June and September. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) records
the cumulative rainfall for 24 hours at two weather stations, Colaba (located in island city) and
Santacruz (Western suburb) and reports it through its weather bulletin every day19. The annual
recorded rainfall at both weather stations between 2000 and 2008 is shown in Figure 2. As seen in
the figure, in most years, especially after 2005, annual rainfall has exceeded the average. Since 2006,
MCGM has installed 34 automatic rain gauges spread across all the wards, out of which 28 currently
transmit rainfall data to the Disaster Control Room (DCR) with 15-minute interval20. However, the
current database of 15-minute interval rainfall is not adequate enough as regards the time horizon
to understand the precipitation pattern across different areas within the city.
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Figure 2: Annual recorded rainfall in 2000-2010 in Mumbai
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Source: India Meteorological Department, www.imd.gov.in
As per the IMD criteria, forecast of ‘heavy’ rainfall is issued if the precipitation is more than 65 mm
in a day and warning of ‘very heavy’ rainfall is issued if it is more than 135 mm during the day21. The
number of days of heavy and very rainfall between 2001 and 2008 is shown in Table 1 below. As the
table indicates, heavy to very heavy rainfall is not uncommon during the monsoon season in the city.
The days when the daily rainfall is above 65 mm are critical from the point of view of flooding in the
city. In fact, very high rainfall of greater than 200 mm per day is also not uncommon during the
onset phase of monsoon. The historical data going back to 1886 for Colaba and 1957 for Santacruz
reveals that in any year, the probability of 24-hour rainfall exceeding 200 mm is 50% for Santacruz
and 33% for Colaba22.

Table 1: Intensity of rainfall in Mumbai (Number of days in a year)
Year

No rainfall

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

23
40
18
30
32
17
19
31

Below 65mm

65-135mm

135-200mm

94
6
77
4
92
9
82
11
79
7
93
7
92
8
78
9
Source: MCGM, Disaster Management Cell

2
1
3
4
4
1
4

Above
200mm
1
3
2
2
3

As discussed in the previous section, many low-lying and reclaimed parts of Mumbai are prone to
flooding. The chronic flooding spots in the city have been identified by the civic administration
depending on the past experience. They are shown in Figure 3 below. There are 55 chronic flooding
spots spread over the island city and the suburbs. The flooding spots correspond to the low-lying
areas, reclaimed areas and areas in the river flood plains. For instance, the flooding spots in the
island city are low lying areas and also on reclaimed land with no natural drainage outlet. The central
area is barely two to three meters above sea level and surrounded by hills. It is, thus, prone to
flooding in monsoon. In the western and suburbs, major flooding spots are in the river flood plains.
There are four main streams or rivers in Mumbai suburbs – Mithi, Dahisar, Poisar and Oshiwara.
When the rainfall exceeds the retention capacity of their basins, floods occur in Mumbai suburbs.
Mithi river has the largest catchment area and is the natural drainage system in the suburbs.
Flooding caused by overflowing of this river can create major floods in Mumbai as seen during the
extreme precipitation event of July 26, 2005.
The instances of flooding over the last decade are shown in Table 2 below. Flooding is believed to be
dependent on the following factors23,24:
•
•
•
•

Intensity and duration of the rainfall per hour,
Timing of high hide
Topography of the area, in particular, the height compared to the mean sea level
Percentage of runoff and carrying capacity of storm water drainage (SWD) system
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In recent years, DCR at MCGM has been recording rainfall from 28 rain gauges in different wards for
a 15-minute interval. However, the time horizon of this database is as yet not sufficient and reliable
enough to investigate the causal relationship between flooding and intensity and duration of rainfall
and time of the high tide.
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Figure 3: Chronic flooding spots in Mumbai
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Source: MCGM (2010), Flood Preparedness Guidelines 2010, www.mumbaimonsoon.com

Table 2: Recorded instances of flooding in Mumbai
Year

Island city

Eastern suburbs

2000

55

49

Western
suburbs
106

2001

85

46

93

2002

86

50

106

2003

86

41

123

2004

56

56

88

2005

90

91

190

2006

107

137

339

2007

66

25

70

2008

60

24

53

Source: MCGM, Disaster Management Cell
Compared to the other cities in the country, Mumbai has a well-designed but age old storm water
drainage (SWD) system in place. This system was designed for the rainfall intensity of 25 mm per
hour and a coefficient of runoff of 0.50. With rapid urban development and encroachment on
natural water ways, the carrying capacity of the system has substantially reduced and the runoff has
increased considerably. Therefore, the city has been getting flooded frequently. A number of studies
and committee reports from Natu Committee Report in 1975 to IIT Bombay study to abate flooding
at Milan Subway and Grand Road/Nana Chowk (two chronic flooding spots) in 2005, have tried to
suggest remedial measures for flood abatement in the city25. The BRIMSTOWAD Report of 1993 has
been an important study to identify potential improvement of SWD system in the city. The
recommendations of this report are currently being implemented at least partially in the aftermath
of the catastrophic event of July 26, 2005. The implementation of this report and implications for the
SWD system in the city are discussed in detail in Section 4 of the study.

Future climate risk projections

The coastal location of Mumbai puts it at greater risk of sea-level rise, flooding, high winds, cyclones
and coastal erosion. The city has regularly been facing weather events of heavy precipitation leading
to floods and landslides during the monsoon season. On many occasions, heavy rains over the city
have been the result of tropical storms or cyclones that hit the city or pass nearby. Studies carried
out over the past decade indicate that Mumbai is likely to be highly vulnerable to climate risks with
majority of its population living on the flood prone and reclaimed land. Estimates obtained in 2001
from the Goddard Institute for Space Studies26 suggest that in the Canadian Climate Centre’s
business-as-usual emissions (A2) scenario and sustainable path (B2) scenario, the average annual
temperatures in the city would increase by 1.750C and 1.250C respectively. Mumbai is also predicted
to have an average annual decrease in precipitation of 2% for the A2 scenario and an increase of 2%
in the B2 scenario. Perhaps, the most damaging scenario for the city is the predicted sea-level rise of
50cm by 205027. Flooding along coastal and low-lying areas would increase dramatically endangering
the slums located there. Vulnerability assessment undertaken by Schiller et al. (2007)28 further
suggests that a ‘bundle’ of stresses, such as, Mumbai’s flat topography, geology, wetlands and flood
prone areas, projected sea-level rise, building conditions including not meeting building codes,
squatter settlements, flood-ravaged buildings, poor sanitation and waste treatment and low
incomes reducing the ability for disaster preparedness will create an enhanced vulnerability for the
city.
An OECD study29 has analyzed the recurrence of an extreme weather event like July 2005 for
Mumbai. Its findings suggest that in the current scenario, the return period for an event of this
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magnitude is greater than 200 years. However, with imminent climate change, today’s extreme
events could become more frequent. For instance, a 1 in 10 event could occur every other year.
Using the Storm Water Management Model of USEPA, the study further explores the future flood
footprints for Mumbai. By 2080, the study finds extended flood footprints in the city with deeper
flooding in more vulnerable areas. The total costs of such an event by 2080 would dramatically go up
to US$ 2300 million from the present-day costs of US$ 650 million.
Yet another OECD study30 has done a global screening of 136 coastal cities to identify their exposure
to storm surges and high winds. The study has also investigated how climate change is likely to
impact these cities through coastal flooding by 2070s. For the present day conditions (reference year
2005), Mumbai is ranked the first among top ten coastal cities in terms of exposed population. The
total exposed population to weather events resulting from current climate conditions in Mumbai is
estimated at 2.787 million. Under the future climate conditions, the population exposed to weather
events like storm surges and flooding will go up to 11.418 million. Similarly, the value of exposed
assets is currently US$ 46.20 billion, which would dramatically increase to US$ 1598.05 billion by
2080. Further, the city is ranked 2nd in terms of population exposure to future climate conditions by
2080, second only to another vulnerable coastal city in India, Kolkata (formerly Calcutta). Mumbai is
also among the top 20 cities with greatest exposure to extreme sea-level and with greatest exposure
to wind damage from tropical cyclones. The city is also expected to have a high exposure to coastal
flood risk in the 2070s. The study further emphasizes that exposure will not necessarily translate into
impact if effective adaptation and risk management strategies are in place. However, for a city like
Mumbai with far lower standards of adaptation and risk management or flood defences, the impacts
of extreme weather events are likely to be large in future.
A recently concluded OECD study (2010)31 has demonstrated an approach to assess the future risks
from extreme weather events and quantify the benefits of different adaptation options on a cityscale. The study focuses on applying this approach to flood risk in Mumbai. The findings of the study
suggest that by 2080, in a SRES A2 ‘upper bound’ climate scenario, the likelihood of a 2005-like
event will more than double. The total direct and indirect losses from such an event would also triple
to around US$ 1890 million. The study specially looks at the marginalized population comprising a
large number of households in the city (engaged in the informal sector) who would suffer from the
total losses of US$ 250 million. The analysis further shows how the adaptation efforts could
significantly bring down the costs of extreme flooding events in future.
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3. Extreme floods of July 2005: Impact assessment
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On July 26, 2005, Mumbai suburban district and the entire MMR region were struck with a heavy
storm. India Meteorological Department (IMD) weather station located at Santacruz (suburb in the
west), recorded 944mm rainfall (45% of the annual average rainfall in Mumbai) between 8.30 am on
July 26 and till 8.30 am on July 2732, with the highest precipitation for a few hours between 2.30 pm
and 7.30 pm as can be seen in Figure 4 below. The IMD forecast had predicted heavy to very heavy
rainfall for the day which meant 65–125mm in 24 hours. The actual rainfall was so huge in
magnitude that the administration had no guidance or prior experience to react to such a situation33.
This unprecedented rainfall coinciding with the high tide brought the city to a standstill. The heavy
flooding on this day was on account of the very heavy downpour 380 mm for 3 hours between 14.30
and 17.30 as seen in Figure 3. This intensity was 5 times more than the intensity of rain for which the
old SWD system had been designed (25 mm per hour) and also 2.5 times more than the system
being designed under BRIMSTOWAD (50 mm per hour)34.

Figure 4: Rainfall in mm on July 26-27, 2011

The following would give an idea of the magnitude of the deluge and the impact on the city35,36:
• Excluding hilly areas of forest and lakes, 22% of the city land was submerged in rainwater on July
26-27, 2005.
• Around 2 million people were stranded in transit or took shelter in different transportation
modes. Another 2.5 million people were under water for hours. Around half of them were the
poor living in the slums of Dharavi, Sion, Kurla, etc.
• Civic amenities such as electricity, water supply and transportation and communication
networks were completely shut down.
• 150,000 people were stranded at the two main train stations, CST and Churchgate and
thousands more had to wade through the dirty and contaminated water for 24-48 hours to
reach their destination. The air traffic had to be suspended for 2 days due to submergence of the
airport.
• It took 1-4 weeks for the train and bus services to start normal functioning between Mumbai
and surrounding MMR region. Road and train services to other areas within and outside the
state were also disrupted for 3-10 days.
• The worst-hit were the low-lying areas and the poor living in slums or squatter settlements along
the pavements and near railway tracks.
• Floods claimed more than 700 lives in the city. More than 14,000 houses were completely
damaged and more than 357,000 houses were partially damaged.
• The total cost of damages has since been estimated at Indian Rupees (INR) 306 crores (US$ 68
million @ 1US$ = Rs.45).
• The most extensive loss was suffered by trade and commerce as a large number of shops,
commercial establishments and warehouses suffered heavy losses due to flooding. The Indian
Merchants Chamber has estimated these losses to the tune of INR 5000 crores (US$ 1100
million).
• In the immediate aftermath, Mumbai also saw 3000 hospital admissions due to gastroenteritis,
malaria, hepatitis, dengue and so on.
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Source: MCGM (2006), Fact finding committee on Mumbai floods, Final Report
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3.1

Direct and indirect impacts

From the impacts perspective, an extreme weather event (often termed as a natural disaster),
implies a combination of losses in physical, financial and human capital and reduction in economic
activities of investment, consumption, production and employment37. This combination of losses in
stocks and reduction in flows due to extreme events may be so severe that they may actually alter
the medium to long-term trajectory or development path of a region38.
However, most impact assessment studies tend to measure the economic losses in terms of the
most easily measured direct losses, i.e. the financial costs of visible physical damage to existing
infrastructure and property. Indirect or secondary impacts such as the effect on provision of goods
and services, provision of public utilities like water and electricity, transportation and mobility and so
on are typically not measured due to practical difficulties39 arising out of data availability and
absence of measurable variables. This can be overcome by the use of proxy variables to some
extent, although these variables may not be able to measure the exact indirect impacts.
From the perspective of cities in the developing world, there is further caution that needs to be
exercised when we interpret the measured impacts of extreme weather events. Such impact
assessments tend to focus on insured losses and mortality as these can be measured easily and
directly. However, a major part of the local economy is in the informal sector, where the prevalence
of insurance for physical assets is minimal. Hence, the losses of the informal sector are not captured
when impact assessments are done. The ground reality for such cities is that insured losses and
mortality are just a fraction of the total losses that communities suffer. Most of the losses are outof-pocket expenses that do not get accounted for when direct impacts are measured.
To overcome some of these aspects of impact assessments, the present study does not rely only on
the insured physical and financial losses measured by the authorities in the aftermath of the July
2005 event in Mumbai. An extensive primary survey has been carried out in six wards of Mumbai
which have many chronic flooding spots. These wards are the most affected when flash floods occur
in Mumbai during monsoon. This section describes and measures the impacts of the extreme
weather event of July 2005 in Mumbai based on the government reports on damage assessment as
well as the primary survey. The focus of this section is on the impacts on both stocks and flows, i.e.,
direct impacts on physical infrastructure and economic losses and indirect impacts on services and
provisions.
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3.1.1 Direct impacts: stock variables
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MCGM undertook damage assessment exercise in the immediate aftermath of July 2005 floods and
submitted the report to seek financial assistance from the central government under the CRF
(Central Relief Fund). Table 3 and 4 below outline the overall impacts assessed by the MCGM and
the cost of damages to municipal infrastructure including municipal buildings, water supply systems,
roads and storm water drains for which the relief was sought to the tune of INR 2475 Million or US$
55 million7 under the CRF40. In addition to this, the health impacts of the severe floods, while
accounting for the incubation period for most diseases up to two weeks after the floods have been
estimated as shown in Table 541.

7

For conversion of INR to US Dollars, the exchange rate used throughout this study is 1 US$ = INR 45.

Table 3: Overall impacts of July 2005 floods as assessed by MCGM
Item
Estimated loss of life
Names of roads
blocked/congested
Estimated number of
establishments/vehicles
damaged
Effect on train services

Effect on air services

Effect on power supply
Water supply

Sewerage

Storm Water Drains

Approximately 6 bridges, 154 major roads, 229 minor roads and
10 cement concrete roads have been damaged.
Source: MCGM report on relief measures and damage assessment
Table 4: Cost of damages to Municipal infrastructure during July 2005 floods
Item

Amount in INR million

Health
MCGM Medical Colleges
4.73
Peripheral Hospitals
11.46
Muni Properties & Buildings
8.28
Water Supply System
251.81
Utilities
Abttoir
35.45
Education
1.30
Garden
1.86
Roads
1911.36
Waste Management
Sewerage Operations
13.67
Solid Waste
90.44
Strom Water Drains
144.90
Total Cost
2475.27 (US$ 55 million)
Source: MCGM report on relief measures and damage assessment
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Roads

Impact
As per Government records 445 people lost their lives
Most arterial roads and highways in the suburbs severely
affected due to waterlogging and traffic jams resulting from
vehicle breakdown in deep waters
– Residential establishments - partly damaged: 50,000
– Residential establishments - fully damaged: 2,000
– Commercial establishments: 40,000
– Vehicles: 30,000
Heavy rains led to railway tracks being submerged and
consequent stoppage of services on central (main and harbour
lines) and western railways
Heavy rains led to airport being flooded. Additionally there was
extremely poor visibility as a result of which flight services in and
out of Mumbai stopped on the night of the 26th July 2005
Electricity supply stopped in most parts of Mumbai’s Western
Suburbs in the night of 26th July 2005
Pumping stations at Deonar, Chunabhatti and Shiv Tekdi
submerged in flood water affecting pumps, motors and control
panels.
Severe damage caused to 11 pumping stations and surrounding
structures. These included STP’s at Versova, New Versova,
Goregaon, Saki naka, Malad, Kherwadi and Khar.
Water entrances, flood gates, manholes, and nallahs at several
places were damaged
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Table 5: Health impacts as on August 12, 2005 in Mumbai

Source: Govt of Maharashtra (2005), Maharashtra Flood Damage 2005
However, the damages and costs estimated by the government agencies reflect only a fraction of the
total costs of damages to physical infrastructure and assets as the damages suffered by households
and commercial establishments are not accounted for in the absence of insurance coverage and
unavailability of data. To overcome this limitation of impact assessment, this study carried out
survey of households and commercial and small industrial establishments in six wards which were
severely affected by floods in July 2005 and continue to get affected by flash floods each monsoon
season. The ward-wise breakup of the sample size in the primary survey is given in Table A1 in
Annexure.

3.1.1.1

Households
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The primary survey covered randomly selected households in six flood affected wards of Mumbai.
The households selected by the survey are located on the ground level or first storey of a building as
these are likely to be most affected by floods. During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of
flooding was 5 ft and the houses remained flooded for average 3 days. 59% also said that the effect
of floods on their families was high, while 24% reported that there was medium impact of floods on
them. Most surveyed households (69.35%) were in the lower middle-income category of INR 500015000 followed by 16.52% earning less than INR 5000 per month and 10.62% earning INR 1500030000. On an average, the income loss due to floods in 2005 was INR 5000 (84% respondents) and
amount spent on repair/ rebuilding of house was INR 15000 (86% respondents). On an average time,
it took the households around 8 days to complete the repair/reconstruction of the house.
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Table 6 shows the total costs of repair/replacement for the flood affected households. The costs
estimated through the primary survey have been extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that overall
20% of households located in eastern and western suburbs were affected by floods in July 20058. It
must be noted here that only 6.8% (80 out of the surveyed households) have any form of insurance
cover. Furthermore, only 3.59% (41 out of the surveyed households) have claimed insurance for
damages due to flooding. Thus, the huge costs calculated here to the tune of INR 12,000 million (US$
267 million) are the out-of-pocket expenses borne by the city residents on account of floods.
2001 census data show the total population of around 8.5 million in eastern and western suburbs of
Mumbai. Assuming the average of 4 members per family, this translates to about 2.1 million households.
We make a rough estimation that 20% of these households (about 420,000) were directly affected due to
floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and calculate the costs accordingly. It must be
noted here that we are considering households who are located at the ground level and first storey of
residential buildings. Hence 20% seems a reasonable estimate for directly affected households. This
exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs that households have had to bear in
the absence of insurance coverage.
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Table 6: Cost of repairs/replacement in households

Item

Average cost of
repairs/replacement
per household (in
INR)

% of
households
reporting
these costs
in survey

Estimated
number of
households
affected by
floods

Estimated costs of
damage in INR
million

Income loss

5000

84

352800

1764

Reconstruction of
house

15000

86

361200

5418

Stove

1500

57

239400

359.1

Electric Fans

1000

35

147000

147

TV

7000

42

176400

1234.8

VCR/VCD

2700

7

29400

79.38

Music System

3000

1

4200

12.6

Motorcycle

8000

13

54600

436.8

Refrigerator

7000

30

126000

882

Washing Machine

6000

8

33600

201.6

Furniture

5000

31

130200

651

Wardrobes

4000

32

134400

537.6

Utensils

3000

38

159600

478.8
12202.68
(US$ 267 million)

Total Estimated costs
Source: Calculated based on primary data

In case of households, impacts that need special consideration are the health impacts in the
aftermath of July 2005 floods. The most prevalent diseases during monsoon in the city as reported
by households are Malaria (86.5%) followed by fever (82%) and other diseases like typhoid, jaundice
and diarrhoea as seen in Table 7 below.

Malaria
Dengue
Typhoid
Jaundice
Fever
Diarrhoea
Stomach Infection

86
54
61
61
82
42
38

There was a reported increase in the incidence of diseases after the July 2005 floods as seen in Table
8. 87% responded that there was an increase in the incidence of malaria followed by typhoid (50%),
jaundice (47%), dengue (41%) and diarrhoea (37%).

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

Table 7: Diseases prevalent during monsoon
Prevalent diseases during monsoon
% of respondent
households (n=1168)
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Table 8: Increased incidence of diseases after July 2005 floods
Increase in incidence of diseases after floods
% of respondent
households (n=1168)
Malaria
87
Dengue
41
Typhoid
50
Jaundice
47
Diarrhoea
37

3.1.1.2 Commercial and small industrial establishments
The primary survey covered commercial establishments like retail shops, IT centres, Jewellery stores,
dairy, etc. and small industries such as manufacturing units and warehouses. Most of these are
either located on the ground level in industrial parks or along the roadside and get affected by floods
with heavy precipitation. During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of flooding reported by
commercial establishments was 4 ft. However, 30% reported the average depth of 5-8 ft. The
average time taken by them to get back to normal business was 3.5 working days. However, 15%
reported spending between 1 to 2 weeks before the business operations could resume once again.
In the absence of insurance coverage (only 7% of the respondents claimed to have insurance
coverage of any kind including life insurance), these establishments had to bear the burden of
repairs and/or replacements for different physical assets damaged/destroyed during the July 2005
floods. In addition, they also had to spend on account of clean-up, loss of income, operating costs
and other emergency expenses when flood waters entered their establishments.
Table 9 and 10 show the total costs of repair/replacement and other flood related expenses. The
costs estimated through the primary survey have been extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that
overall 40% of such establishments located in eastern and western suburbs were affected by floods
in July 20059.This allows us to arrive at rough and indicative estimates for the costs of damage faced
by the largely informal private sector in Mumbai that includes small retail shops based on the
ground level and small industrial establishments.
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Table 9: Cost of repairs/replacement in commercial & industrial establishments
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Item

Average cost of
repairs/replacement
per establishment (in
INR)

% of
establishments
reporting these
costs in survey

Estimated
number of
establishments
affected

Estimated
costs in
INR million

Grounds and
fences

40000

48

46080

1843.2

Walls

11000

26

24960

274.56

Windows

5000

4

3840

19.2

Doors and
mouldings

6000

18

17280

103.68

MCGM records show around 400,000 registered retail shops and other commercial establishments in
the city out of which 60% or 240,000 are located in the suburbs. We make a rough estimation that 40% of
these establishments were affected due to floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and
calculate the costs accordingly. This exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs
that such establishments have had to bear in the absence of insurance coverage.

9

Electrical wiring
and switches

10000

28

26880

268.8

Heating

10000

1

960

9.6

Air conditioning

14000

1

960

13.44

Machine tools

15000

25

24000

360

Finished products

24000

28

26880

645.12

Raw materials

20000

13

12480

249.6

Inventory

24000

13

12480

299.52
4086.72
(US$ 90
million)

Total Estimated costs
Source: Calculated based on primary data
Table 10: Costs incurred on account of floods (in INR)

18000

% of
establishme
nts
reporting
these costs
in survey
58

13000

22

21120

274.56

16000

36

34560

552.96

10000

23

22080

220.8

26000

8

7680

199.68

22000

20

19200

422.4

Average cost per
establishment (in
INR)

Item

Disinfecting premises
Clearing debris and damaged
items
Loss of income due to
business interruption
Increased alternative
operating costs
Emergency expenses during
floods
Loss due to suspended
production

Estimated
number of
establishmen
ts affected

Estimated
costs in INR
million

55680

1002.24

Total estimated costs

2672.64
(US$ 59
million)

3.1.2 Indirect impacts: Flow variables
Besides the damages to physical assets and economic losses on account of that, there are a number
of indirect impacts that households and commercial and industrial establishments suffered from
during the floods. The survey questionnaire tried to capture some of these impacts by asking them
about the other problems they faced on account of non-availability of essential supplies, price rise
due to shortages and disruption of essential services. The problems faced during the 2005 floods by
the respondents are described in Table 11 below.
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Source: Calculated based on primary data
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Table 11: Major problems faced during July 2005 floods
Problem
House/office flooded with water
Non-availability of local transportation
Price rise of essential commodities
Non-availability of food and other
household supplies
Non-availability of raw materials
Disruption in communication services
Disruption of electricity
Non-availability of clean drinking water
House flooded with sewerage/garbage
Non-availability of fuel

70
87
67

% among surveyed
commercials & small
industries (n=792)
82
82
65

62

-

61
83
75
80
51

56
66
88
79
46.5

% among surveyed
households ( n=1168)

Some of the major problems faced by both households and commercial and industrial
establishments are flood waters entering the premises, non-availability of local transportation,
disruption of electricity and supply of clean drinking water. 77% of households reported that on an
average, during the floods water was available for about 15 hours. 43% further reported that on
average water supply was discontinued for 3 days while electricity supply was discontinued for 5
days.
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As discussed earlier, although indirect impacts of weather events are critical in terms of disrupting
the normal life of the affected residents, they often cannot be assessed properly due to difficulties of
measurement and unavailability of sufficient data. The nature of these impacts is such that there is
often a qualitative or subjective element attached to them which also makes the measurement
difficult. In the present study, we have tried to capture the impact of provision of essential
commodities and services like electricity supply during the extreme event of July 2005. As directly
measuring the shortages of essential commodities in the city during floods is difficult, we have used
octroi collections done by MCGM at 5 entry points into the city as proxy for provision and availability
of essential supplies of goods including fuel for the residents. Figure 5 shows the average collections
at the five entry points for the month of July 2005 and a visible dip in the collections from July 27 to
July 31 when the city was coping with floods. The strong dip in octroi collections at all the entry
points are an indication of supplies of essential commodities getting affected for a number of days
after the heavy precipitation occurred on July 26. Also, the dip in octroi collections is also a net
economic loss to the civic authority, which needs to be considered when assessing the monetary
losses on account of floods.
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Another important service affected by floods was electricity supply in the suburbs. Figure 6 shows
the daily distribution of power supplied to the households in the western suburbs by the private
utility, Reliance Energy. The time period of July 11-August 20, 2005 is plotted here to show a
substantial dip in the daily power drawn by households and commercial and industrial consumers.
As the figure shows, it took the private utility nearly two weeks to restore supply back to normal.
The disruption of electricity supply affects the normal life for households and also causes direct
economic losses to the commercial and industrial consumers who are dependent on power supply to
conduct their business. Although we have tried to capture the economic losses to these consumers,
it is difficult to separate the losses on account of disruption in power supply. Another important
point to be noted here is that reduction in the daily drawal of electricity is a net loss to the utility as
well and it needs to be accounted for when calculating the monetary losses due to floods.

Figure 5: Octroi collections at entry points during July 27-31, 2005

Source: Octroi Department, MCGM

Source: Reliance Energy Daily Drawal Data
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Figure 6: Daily power supply between July 11 and August 20, 2005
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4.

Response measures

The deluge of July 26, 2005 caught the civic administration as well as residents unawares and in the
absence of an early warning system and near-total collapse of communication and transportation
network, the administration faced the tough task of responding to the situation and implementing
the rescue and relief measures.
The civic administration, without prior experience or guidance in managing a disaster of this kind,
responded to the situation by undertaking the following rescue and relief measures42:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Organized safe evacuation of people through boats & buses & providing shelters in public
buildings, schools & transit shelters
Community kitchens started & free food grains provided.
Traffic police & Fire brigade cleared 26,000 stranded vehicles by 2.30 pm on 27th July
Power & water supply restored and train services resumed on 28th July
24,000 animal carcasses disposed & more than 200,000 metric tonnes of garbage removed
The rescue teams of MCGM & the Fire Brigade undertook 282 major & minor rescue operations
which included rescuing school children & around 3,700 stranded people from 140 marooned
buses
Post flood sanitation measures like extensive spraying of disinfectants ( in open spaces & waste
collection areas) & insecticides undertaken
Restoring supply of drinking water to affected areas using additional tanks, repair of damaged
pumps & repair of pipelines
Comprehensive healthcare services, health camps, outreach program & 130 specially constituted
medical teams helped treat over 300,000 patients. Additional doctors, admission capacity &
significant drug reserves made available to the affected people
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Role of NGOs and individuals in providing relief during the devastating floods needs a special
mention here. MCGM coordinated relief work at many places with the help of social service
organizations (such as Nirmala Niketan College of Social Work and Tata Institute of Social Science).
Over 20 NGOs including Akanksha, Yuvak Pratishthan, Apnalaya and industry houses (e.g, Tata Group
through Dorabjee Tata Trust) also volunteered their help38. Coordination mechanism was set up
through the DMC to coordinate the continuing relief operations by individuals, industry houses and
NGOs. Food packets and drinking water was arranged for the stranded people with the help of NGOs
and Social Organizations. Individuals or common people also played a major role in relief & rescue
measures. Community kitchens were started and free food grains were provided by the Government
of Maharashtra (GoM) and MCGM as well as voluntary NGOs and individuals. Common people threw
open their doors to welcome anyone affected by floods. Stranded people who had nowhere to go
were welcomed & were allowed to stay till the floods ceased. People came out wholeheartedly to
help in co-ordination & relief operations.
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The devastating floods of July 2005 became a real eye opener for the local administration and led to
the formulation of the Disaster Management Plan for the city and other short to medium term
measures to improve the coping capacity of the city to floods in future. Along with the local
government, citizens – households and commercial/industrial establishments –also responded to the
threat of recurrent floods and undertook a variety of measures in the aftermath of July 2005 floods.
This section takes an overview of the response measures implemented by the civic authorities and
citizens including households and the private sector. The important question to be addressed here is
how effective are these response measures in enhancing the adaptation capacity of the city in the
long-run. A discussion on this question is done towards the end of this section.

4.1

Local government institutions

In the immediate aftermath of the July 2005 floods, a Fact Finding Committee was appointed to look
into the causes and to recommend activities to reduce the future risks of flooding in Mumbai. The
committee was asked to analyze the short-term and long-term factors responsible for the floods that
created havoc on July 26-27, understand the present status and limitations of the storm water
drainage network, development of river basins in the city and factors that impede their natural flow
and finally suggest guidelines for preparing long-term development plans that would overcome
future flood situations. The committee came up with several recommendations, such as,
upgradation of storm water drainage system, disaster management, river development and so on to
improve the existing environment and upgrade and improve the governance and management to
achieve sustainable development of Mumbai. Specifically the committee is of the view that a
measured, well thought out plan and interventions should address the issues of frequently
encountered floods in Mumbai region, land use planning, encroachments, population density,
sustainability of present-day exploitation of water and natural resources.
The two most important recommendations of the committee pertain to the improvement of the
disaster management system (DMS) in the city and risk zoning. The specific suggestions regarding
both are highlighted in Box 1 below.
The fact finding committee further suggested some activities as given below:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Restore the existing degraded rivers and river-banks to initiate recovery of the urban ecosystem
Provide river flushing system to initiate rejuvenation of river channels
Rejuvenate degraded urban ecosystems including lakes / ponds, rivers, creeks, and costal zones
Restore the Mangrove-Ecosystem and rejuvenate the coastal zones
Rejuvenation and environmental upgradation of hills, slopes, and lakes / ponds in Mumbai
Region
Improve municipal solid waste management systems
Upgrade the sewage treatment plants and sewerages
Construct detention basins and infiltration zones for flood control and provide spaces for people
to escape to in case of disasters and calamities
Remove encroachments and strictly adhere to the Development Plan (DP)
Demarcate potential flood-zones on DP sheets. Develop a policy for management of
development in those areas and amend DC rules suitably
Strengthen monitoring, assessment and auditing of environmental and ecological status-related
activities in Mumbai Region
Empower the “Disaster Management Authority” to monitor, assess and audit environmental and
ecological status after any disaster
Set up the “environmental cess” for providing targeted O & M budget to sustain environmental
services
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•
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Box 1: Suggestions of the fact finding committee
Important suggestions of the Fact Finding Committee on Mumbai Floods
Improving disaster management system (DMS):
• Revamping the disaster management plan as the plan document looks more generic rather than
an operational one
• Vulnerability analysis should be carried out for the city
• Disaster analysis should be based on probabilistic approach and relevant data should be
available with all the agencies providing essential public services to the city where the data are
compiled and analyzed systematically during the disaster free periods
• It is the intensity of the rainfall rather than average rainfall that needs consideration for floods in
the city
• Disaster Management Plan (DMP) needs analytical approach to consider the 5 rivers and other
water courses in the city and surrounding areas to manage storm water flows
• Issues like low levels of Mumbai’s coastal areas, evacuation plan for the city, shelter places, etc.
need special consideration in the DMS
• DMP needs scientific back-up, proper risk assessment and vulnerability analysis to become more
effective
• Roles and responsibilities of different officers should be specified in the standard operating
procedures (SOPs) for different categories of disasters
Risk zoning:
• Reclaimed lands have the tendency of settling which needs to be considered for long-term
projections of submergence while doing vulnerability analysis
• More than 50% population lives in slum colonies which are highly vulnerable to floods and other
risks. Hence, risk zoning is required to plan for preventive measures like infrastructure provisions
and post disaster rescue and relief
Early warning mechanism:
• Daily rainfall record has little relevance for precipitation analysis as intense precipitation does
not occur uniformly over longer time period
• There is a need to develop a well coordinated rainfall analysis and forewarning system as IMD’s
forecasting for day’s occurrence is not effective
• MCGM should develop its own system of recording 15-minute interval rainfall data and issuing
alert signal if rainfall exceeds 40 mm in an hour
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(Source: MCGM (2006), Fact Finding Committee on Mumbai Floods , Final Report, Volume I, March
2006)

]

53

The committee also recommended conducting the following studies for Mumbai:
A) Comprehensive study of Mithi River ecosystem, environmental impact of Worli-Bandra sea link
project & investigating the hydrology of the bay area with 3-D model for long-term prediction
B) Comprehensive study of environmental impacts of MUIP/ MUTP’s reclamation and building
projects in Mumbai.
C) Ecosystem health indicators
D) Study to estimate the “carrying-capacity” of Mumbai’s urban ecosystem vis-à-vis the issue of
transportation, housing, sanitation, and drinking water
Some of the recommendations of the fact finding committee, especially those pertaining to the
improvement in the DMS have seen been partially implemented as can be seen from the ensuing
discussion.

4.1.1 BRIMSTOWAD Project
The Brihanmumbai Stormwater Disposal System (BRIMSTOWAD) is a project planned to
overhaul Mumbai's storm water drainage system. The estimated budget for implementing the
project was INR 1200crore (approx. US$ 266 million) as of August 2005. Mumbai has a drainage
network, which in many places, is more than 100 years old, consisting of 2,000 km of open drains,
440 km of closed drains, 186 outfalls and more than 30,000 water entrances. The capacity of most of
the drains as per the original design is around 25 mm of rain per hour during low tide, which is
exceeded routinely during the monsoon season in Mumbai, which witnesses more than 1400 mm
during June and July. The drain system works with the aid of gravity, with no pumping stations to
speed up the drainage. Most of the storm water drains are also choked due to the dumping of
garbage by citizens. Portions of Mumbai like Bombay Central and Tardeo remain below sea level.
Reclamation of ponds and obstructions in drains due to cables and gas pipe exacerbate the problem.
The final report for the upgradation of the storm water network was submitted in the year 1993. The
project was not acted upon due to lack of funds till the catastrophic floods in 2005. The work started
only after the floods of July 2005 and subsequent recommendations of the fact finding committee.
Following are the recommendations suggested by BRIMSTOWAD project report and subsequent
studies. There is a consensus in all studies regarding the action plans, including:
•

To provide storm water pumping stations

•

To increase capacity of drains wherever necessary

•

To improve flood gates at various places

•

To repair dilapidated drains and augment the capacity wherever necessary

•

To remove obstruction of water pipelines and cables

•

To widen, deepen and extend the nallahs/drains and rehabilitate as per govt. policy

•

To desilt and maintain SWD during rainy season by various equipments.

Some important points of the BRIMSTOWAD are worth considering:

 A proposal was submitted in 1993 for a project which involved replacement of drains, setting up
of pumping stations at Worli, Haji Ali and Cleaveland Bandar,construction of a five-metre wide
road alongside major drains for desilting, removal of obstructions from the drains and
rehabilitation of slum-dwellers .
 The initial estimated cost of the project was around INR 600 crores. Around INR 143 crores was
spent on the project till 1998. By 2005, the project cost had gone up to INR 1200 crores.
 Consultants used the software named “Wallrus” which has been developed by Hydraulics
Research Station of Wallingford, Oxon, U.K. which simulates mathematical model of a catchment
for a particular storm (rainfall) hydrograph and verifies results against the tide curve.
 As of now out of 20 works of Phase-I, 11 have been completed and 9 are in progress. Out of 38
works of Phase-II, 27 are in progress and 11 tenders are under preparation.
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 The project was conceived after major floods in Mumbai in 1985. Watson Hawksley was
appointed as consultants to design the drainage system from Sandhurst Road to Milan subway in
1989.
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 BRIMSTOWAD report could not be fully implemented because of financial constraints. However
much better gains could have been achieved with whatever amount has been spent, if proper
priorities were followed systematically.

4.1.2 Disaster Management Action Plan
In December 2005, in the aftermath of the unprecedented Mumbai floods, Government of India
enacted the Disaster Management Act, following which National Disaster Management Authority
and State Disaster Management Authorities were set up in India. The Act also sought to constitute
Disaster Response Fund and Disaster Mitigation Fund at national, state and district levels. It was post
July 2005 floods that a fully equipped Disaster Management Cell (DMC) was made operational at the
BMC headquarters. Many recommendations of the fact finding committee as outlined in Box 1
above were brought into practice since then to improve the response to disasters. Accordingly,
Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan (DMAP) came into existence in 2007. Under this
plan, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with floods, earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, etc., have
been identified. The plan envisages specific roles for different stakeholders as outlined in Table 12
below. Also, the plan envisages specific relief and mitigation measures for Mumbai43:
 Infrastructure improvements: The mitigation strategy under the plan seeks to improve the
transport, services and housing infrastructure. These include improvements in road and rail
networks, sanitation and sewer disposal system, storm water drainage systems, slum
improvements, housing repairs and retrofitting programmes.
 Contingency plan: This strategy includes plans to provide extra transportation if the major
transport systems fail, transit camp arrangements, improvements in wireless communication
and public information systems and NGO volunteers’ assistance.
 Land use policies and planning: The Draft Regional Plan for MMR Region 1996-2011 provides a
basic framework for the land use policies for the city. This plan includes strategies like protection
of landfill sites, control on land reclamation, shifting of hazardous units from residential areas
and decongestion.
Table 12: Role of different stakeholders to tackle flood risks
Stakehol der

Current / Expected roles
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 Prepare po licie s, plans and guide lines for disaster
management
 National Disaster Management Authority to declare nation-wide
policies
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National, st ate and
district disaster
management authorities

 Constituting National Institute of Disaster Management that
imparts training and research and develops nationwide
database on policies and prevention mechanisms
 Constituting National Disaster Response Force
 State Disaster Management Authority to prepare the state-level
plans
 District Authority as district planning, coordinating and
implementing body for all disaster management functions
 District Authority functions include mitigation and

preparedness, response, relief and rehabilitation
 Impart training to employees to cope with disasters
 Maintenance of resources for managing any extreme events
Local aut hority (MCGM
– specific to Mumbai)

 Ensuring that all construction activity conforms to prescribed
standards and specifications (building codes, earthquake and
fire proof construction, coastal zone regulations, FSI regulations,
etc.)
 Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activity in affected
areas
 Infrastructure improv ement in terms of transport,
services and housing
 Projects like MUTP and MURP to work towards these objectives

MCGM and MMRDA

 Constructing flyovers, additional roads and road over bridges to
reduce the traffic density and congestion in identified spots of
high traffic density
 Road improvement programme to improve the conditions of
roads particularly before monsoon
 Slum Rehabilitation Scheme to improve the quality of housing
for slum dwellers and scatter communities
 Regular de-silting (cleaning) of nallahs (narrow waterways) to
reduce the tendency of flooding or choking during heavy
precipitation

MCGM – storm water
drainage de partment

 Augmenting the capacity of the present storm water drains
 All flood gates manned to operate them during high and low
tides

 Automatic weather stations with rain gauge monitoring system
to be installed across city to monitor rain intensity to facilitate
early warning
 Anti-flood control rooms in all wards with equipped staff,
wireless equipments, etc.
MCGM – early warning
system

 A list of days when there is a hide tide of 4.7 mtrs and above to
be prepared and distributed to railways, police and the district
collector
 Nodal officer of MCGM to brief print, audio and visual media to
provide timely and clear information and put a stop to rumours
 Electronic information display monitors controlled to be
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 Chronic flooding spots management by deploying special sqauds
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installed at different places in city
 Booklet of all important contact numbers to be distributed
widely
 Police departments to work with municipal authorities to
respond quickly and effectively to extreme events
 Identify and get equipped with specific equipments and facilities
required to respond to extreme events
Police and fire brigade
departments

 Commissioned six command centres of fire brigade capable of
acting independently
 Three highly trained search and rescue teams to be deployed
and each team equipped with enhanced equipments
 Preventive measures to stop the spread of water, food borne
and vector borne diseases
 Information to be disseminated to the general public about
prevention and cure of such diseases

MCGM – public healt h
department

 Keep stock of essential medicines, vaccines and pest control
chemicals and equipments
 Provide immediate and urgent health services through primary
health centres and hospitals run by the civic authority
 Each ward to identify five schools as temporary transit camp
during disasters

MCGM – contingency
plan

 BEST (transport authority in Mumbai) to put in service extra
buses in case of transport failure
 Disaster management Cell to be equipped with all state-of-art
communication equipments and networks to control the rescue
and relief operations
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 Role in setting up an effective communication and public
information system
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NGOs

 Role in rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities by providing
volunteers
 To create awareness among people and educate them about
extreme events and level of preparedness

Communities

 Based on past experience, perhaps the most crucial role
performed by communities and individual people in helping
with rescue and relief work

Source: Govt. of Maharashtra, (2007), Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan

4.1.3 Disaster Management Cell, MCGM
It was post July 2005 floods that a well equipped Disaster Management Cell (DMC) became
functional at MCGM headquarters. This cell has been given the responsibility of coordinating with
different stakeholders and agencies for the rescue and relief operations in the event of floods during
monsoon. As per the recommendations of the fact finding committee, 31 rain gauges have been
installed and they feed in rainfall data of 15-minute interval to the disaster control room. The rain
gauges are set up at the fire station of each ward to. Alert is issued to the control rooms in each
ward whenever the hourly rainfall exceeds 40 mm. In addition to this, the IMD also provides regular
forecasts and issues warnings of heavy to very heavy rainfall when necessary. The response
hierarchy in case of rainfall exceeding 40 mm per hour or a warning coming from the IMD is shown
in Figure 7 below.

Source: Based on information in MCGM (2010), Flood preparedness guidelines 2010,
www.mumbaimonsoon.com
The Disaster control room works 24x7 and has hotlines connected to each ward, major hospitals,
news channels and other agencies and is well equipped with a standard operating protocol (SOP)
with a set of priorities to tackle emergency situations. Each ward is given SOPs to follow which are
updated regularly. Each ward has its own inventory of telephone numbers and contacts such as
blood bank, medical staff, NGOs and so on, to be contacted for help. Rescue measures and capacity
building have been polished since 2005 and there are few NGOs identified which can be called for
help in case of emergency. NGOs are deployed only for extending the manpower depending on the
intensity of the situation. DMC plans to include GIS surveillance in future to quicken the response
time. The whole idea of improvisation in the system is to “minimise the response time”. Also, certain
structures are identified, e.g., municipal schools, which can act as shelters in case of any untoward
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Figure 7: Hierarchy of response to flood alert
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incident. Boats and trained swimmers have been kepi in contacts in case of emergency. In addition
to this, the general public can access ward specific updated information on the website maintained
by the DMC www.mumbaimonsoon.com. This website provides information to the citizens about
real time rainfall data, tidal data and traffic diversions, etc.

4.2

Households

In addition to the response measures undertaken by the local civic authority, citizens have
responded to the threat of flooding by undertaking different measures in the aftermath of July 2005.
We have captured some of these measures through the primary survey. The households have
undertaken repairs on their own to prevent flood waters from entering their premises as shown in
Table 13.
Table 13: Major repairs undertaken by surveyed households since 2005
Item

% of households
(n=1168)

Increasing height of surrounding ground

42

Reconstruction of house with stilt parking

11

Repairing & elevating electrical meters

27

Repairs inside house to elevate furniture

31

Repairs inside house to elevate electronic gadgets

33

Repairing/ modifying toilets

11

In addition to these repairs, the households have reported the following measures undertaken every
year to prepare for monsoon in general and floods in particular. The percentages of respondents are
given in the brackets.
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Repairing roof/ terrace (60%)
Cleaning surrounding ground/ compound (41.5%)
Start using boiled water for drinking (65%)

It must be noted here that only 6.8% surveyed households (80 out of the total respondents) have
any form of insurance cover. Further, only 3.5% claimed insurance after 2005 floods. Again a
negligible percentage received financial assistance from the authorities for house damage, vehicle
damage, food and clothing and disability. This indicates the extent of private costs borne by citizens
on account of floods.

4.3

Private sector

The primary survey of commercial and industrial establishments throws light on how these
establishments have responded to the threat of floods in the aftermath of the July 2005 event and
have undertaken measures to cope with floods in subsequent years. We asked these respondents
about the agencies they contact during floods when the water enters their establishments. An
overwhelming 75.5% said that they did not contact anyone and only 15% reported contacting the
local ward office of MCGM. 7% contacted the police and 4% contacted the local fire brigade. These

establishments have undertaken repairs on their own after their experience of the July 2005 floods
to prevent flood waters from entering their premises and/or reducing the damage indoors as shown
in Table 14 below.
Table 14: Major repairs undertaken by surveyed establishments since 2005
Item
Increase the height of the surrounding plot
Reconstruction with stilt parking
Repairing and/or elevating electrical meters
Repairs inside the office premises
Repairs outside the office premises
Repairs done to elevate and protect inventory

% of commercial & industrial
establishments (n=792)
72.9
12.5
50.1
42.6
17.2
7.3

The most important aspect to be highlighted here is the fact that only 7.3% (58 out of the total
respondents) have any form of insurance cover to assure them financial assistance against the
damage done to the building, inventory and other assets during floods. Further, only 3% received
financial assistance from the MCGM and state government after the July 2005 floods on account of
office and asset damage. Hence, all the repairs undertaken by these respondents to reduce the
impact of floods in subsequent years have been out-of-pocket expenses borne entirely by these
establishments.
In addition to these repairs, these establishments have reported the following measures undertaken
every year to prepare for monsoon in general and floods in particular. The percentages of
respondents are given in the brackets.

5.

Repairing the roof (64.4%)
Cleaning and clearing the surrounding area/ground (57.7%)
Overhauling of vehicles (10.5%)
Overhauling of machinery (24.9%)

Enhancing adaptation through response measures

As seen in the previous section, both government and citizens have responded to the threat of flash
floods during monsoon by undertaking a variety of short to medium-term measures. The important
issue to be discussed here is whether and how far do these response measures add to the existing
adaptation capacity and would they succeed in enhancing the adaptive capacity in the long-term.
Adaptation measures are usually classified as
either public or private. Planned adaptation is
public adaptation usually undertaken through
a deliberate public policy decision, e.g.,
BRIMSTOWAD being implemented in Mumbai
in the aftermath of July 2005 floods.
Autonomous or spontaneous adaptation is
private adaptation undertaken by households
or communities on their own without
intervention from the authorities. We have
discussed a number of such steps taken up by
households and commercial and industrial
establishments in Mumbai. This section looks
at how the public and private adaptation measures add to the adaptation capacity for which the
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data gathered from citizens through primary surveys, government reports and personal interviews
carried out with government officials are being used.
As for the public adaptation measures undertaken in Mumbai, there are a number of issues that
need to be highlighted here:
•

•

•

•

•
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BRIMSTOWAD is a major policy initiative that is expected to improve the existing and age-old
storm water drainage system in Mumbai and replace it with the one that will be much more
effective in dealing with greater intensity rainfall. Once the project is implemented completely, it
is expected to improve the flood situation in Mumbai as the new system is being designed for 50
mm rainfall per hour instead of 25 mm per hour design currently in place. Also, the project has
been designed for the runoff coefficient of 1 instead of 0.5 due to the land use changes that
have occurred in the city in past few decades. Thus BRIMSTOWAD is expected to increase the
adaptation capacity of the city for flash floods caused by heavy intensity rainfall in future.
However, if an extreme weather event like July 2005 were to occur again in the next few
decades, even the design criteria used under BRIMSTOWAD will not be enough to cope with the
ensuing floods in low-lying areas. Thus, we need to note this that the residual impacts of the
weather events would still be faced by the city and cannot be done away with completely. But
the magnitude of such impacts is likely to reduce given the new design of the storm water
drainage network.
In addition to revamping the storm water drainage network, MCGM has started clearing clogged
drains every year before monsoon. Regular widening and desilting of drains is undertaken.
However, there are multiple agencies involved in this, such as, MMRDA, Public Works
Department, Railways, Mumbai Port Trust and Airport Authority of India. Unless there are
coordinated and well synchronized efforts undertaken by these agencies, isolated efforts will not
help in the long-run to cope with floods.
As regards the disaster management plan formulated by the local authorities, the plan is quite
comprehensive and defines the role of different stakeholders as seen in the earlier discussion.
However, the plan is generic in nature and has less operational value as pointed out by the fact
finding committee. Also various planning and implementing agencies in Mumbai often operate
as islands making it difficult to have a well coordinated response in case of disasters or weather
events.
The DMAP looks comprehensive on paper, yet does not provide any specific timeframe for
achieving the mitigation measures. Again, no specific attention is given to adaptation strategies
which may be more important in the short to medium-term to deal with the climate risks of
flooding, storms and cyclones.
There are a number of steps taken up by the civic authority, MCGM in recent years based on the
recommendations of the fact finding committee, to improve the disaster response and
management. Accordingly, the rainfall data are now available with the automatic weather
stations for 15-minute interval which can be used to issue early warning to ward control rooms.
This will improve the response and coping capacity in the long-run. The 15-minute interval
rainfall data over a number of years in future can also be used to analyze the intensity and
pattern of rainfall in the city and early warning systems and response measures can be
improvised accordingly.
The early warning system currently being used by the control room looks effective on paper.
Regular information regarding rainfall intensity and traffic diversion is given to the general public
through the website maintained by the MCGM. Yet, the awareness levels regarding such
systems are very poor. For example, our primary survey reveals that 91% households did not
even know about the DMC and 99% were not aware of the website that gives out such
information. 88% were not aware of the emergency contact number. Thus, awareness-building
is the key to making early warning systems effective and add to the coping capacity in future.

•

•

•

The disaster control at the central level is found to be well managed, but there are shortcomings
at the ward level like the shortage of trained staff and often the junior engineers have to
manage the control rooms at wards on rotational shifts. Also, the ward officers have stated that
the approach is essentially top-down and they have very little say and flexibility in implementing
response measures. Many affected wards that we interviewed have also complained of
BRIMSTOWAD getting delayed and work slowing down as memories of July 2005 fade fast.
Further, there are delays in sanctioning projects at ward level and knowledgeable officers are
frequently transferred before such projects are underway.
Measures related to infrastructure improvements would require a longer time frame given the
socio-economic and political dynamics in the city. Also, the land use policies and planning will
not be effective unless they are coupled with strategies to deal with slum settlements and
migrants into the city. The experience of the city dwellers in the aftermath of 2005 floods only
shows that the city administration and other stakeholders would need more specific strategies
and an integrated approach to build resilience of the city to climate risks.
As for the planning process, development planning takes environment into consideration at the
generic level. But climate risks and associated impacts of heavy precipitation, sea level rise and
storms are uncertain and varied in nature. Therefore, the planners feel that it is not feasible to
include climate risks into the planning process per se. What is needed is more scientific
knowledge base related to such risks, their impacts on the city and technical knowledge related
to how we can mitigate and adapt to such risks. This would increase the possibility of
mainstreaming climate risks and adaptation into the planning process.

As regards the efficacy of private response measures in enhancing the adaptation capacity to deal
with floods in the long term, it is too early to evaluate this given the information we received
through the primary survey. This is the only study carried out so far in Mumbai that has tried to
capture private responses. It must be noted that these responses are strictly private in nature with
individual initiative and without any public or government intervention in it. As such there are no
benchmarks to evaluate how efficient these responses are. Many responses like repairing the
premises are essentially short-term in nature, whereas responses like raising the plot level, raising
other infrastructure like electric meters to protect them from flooding would be expected to have
medium-term impact on the adaptation capacity. What must be highlighted over here is that all
private initiatives and responses are a direct out-of-pocket expense for the concerned individuals or
establishments. There is virtually no insurance cover that would help them to deal with the adverse
impacts of floods and bring about changes or improvements in the existing infrastructure.

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

Given the public response measures like revamping the storm water drainage network and
improving the disaster response strategies plus the regular cleaning and desilting of drains, it is
pertinent to examine what has been the experience of the citizens as regards intensity and depth of
flooding post 2005 event. In subsequent years, the intensity of flooding has not reduced as reported
by 65% respondents. However, the depth of flooding on average since the 2005 event has been
around 2 ft. But some areas have reported 3-4 ft. water levels inside their homes and
establishments. 42% households also reported that their house has experienced flooding for about 4
days in recent years. Further, 85% respondents are of the opinion that the local government
authorities are not doing enough to prevent flooding in the city. 87% feel that it is the primary
responsibility of MCGM to prevent floods in the city, but 60% also feel that the state government
should also actively take this responsibility. It is further interesting to note that 85% of the
respondents are aware of climate change and most consider the problem as either very serious or
serious. Majority of them (84% of respondents) also feel that the authorities should have better
infrastructure in place to deal with climate risks and more than 42% are of the opinion that quick
response is the key to dealing with the adverse impacts of climate change.
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6.

Conclusion

To summarize, the study carried out for Mumbai assesses the impacts and responses to the July
2005 catastrophic flood event in Mumbai. Unlike the impact assessments which focus on insured
losses to property and infrastructure, this study has tried to capture physical and economic losses
suffered by households and commercial and small industrial establishments that are essentially
uninsured in nature. We have also tried to identify the short to medium-term responses coming
from the local government as well as citizens themselves. The study also looks at how and if at all
these responses add to the adaptation capacity of the city in the long run and what are the policy
implications of the findings for the long-term development and investment planning. Some of the
highlights of the study are given below:
•

•

•

•

•

•
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The extent of vulnerability of the city to climate risks, in particular, heavy precipitation and
flooding is assessed here. We find that the city is vulnerable to climate risks due to its proximity
to sea, flood prone topography, large scale reclamation done for further development, huge
population with more than half staying in informal settlements or slums and inadequacy of basic
civic services for water, sanitation, solid waste and public health.
The review of scientific literature further highlights how the city is at great risk from sea-level
rise, heavy precipitation and flooding, high winds, cyclones and coastal erosion. Further, with
imminent climate change in future, an event like July 2005 could become more frequent, the
flood footprints might deepen in more vulnerable areas and the costs of such events would also
go up dramatically.
The catastrophic event of July 2005 with unprecedented heavy rainfall of 944 mm in a single day
disrupted the life in the city completely with millions affected due to near shut-down of
electricity, water supply, transportation and communication services.
There was massive damage to municipal and private infrastructure with costs of damages
estimated at US$ 68 million. The private sector establishments suffered massive losses as it took
1-2 weeks for the city to back to normal. There are some estimates which show that the losses
might have been as high as US$ 1100 million.
When damage or impact assessments for such events are undertaken, the focus is largely on
insured and direct physical and economic losses which are easily measurable. However, out
study shows how insured losses are only a fraction of the total loss that citizens suffer from in
the event of extreme weather events
As seen from the extrapolated costs, there are huge costs that city residents have to bear. For
example, our estimates indicate that the households might have spent around US$ 267 million
on account of repairs or replacements of damaged assets. There is increased incidence of health
impacts such as malaria, dengue and typhoid as well in the aftermath of the floods. But we have
not been able to estimate the costs of health impacts due to inadequacy of data.
For the commercial and small industrial establishments, we have estimated US$ 90 million spent
on account of repairs or replacements and US$ 59 million on account of flood water entering the
premises, subsequent clean up, loss of income and emergency expenditure.
It must be noted however that these are only rough and indicative estimates for the costs of
damage faced by the households and largely informal private sector in Mumbai. The actual costs
may be much higher as our assumptions are quite moderate. For cities in the developing world,
these findings are quite relevant as there is a large presence of informal sector whose losses do
not get accounted for, although they form a substantial part of the overall costs.
Further, for a city like Mumbai with more than 50% population living a destitute life in slums
with unsafe and unhygienic conditions, weather events mean substantial costs on account of
physical, economic, social and health impacts. In our primary survey, for majority of the
households, the average family incomes are in the lower middle-income category of INR 500015000 per month (US$ 100-300). For such households, the physical and economic losses as
indicated in Section 3 earlier are substantial.

•

•

•

•

The most important issue here is that for almost all the households and private sector
establishments, the costs of damages are out-of-pocket expenses due to the absence of
insurance cover or aid or financial assistance coming from the government.
Besides the direct losses, there are a variety of indirect impacts which are difficult to measure
but are equally important. This study has tried to capture some of the impacts like nonavailability of food and other essential supplies, disruption of electricity services by using proxies
like daily octroi collections at entry points to the city and daily electricity supplied by a private
utility.
The study has further looked at responses from the local government institutions, households
and private sector. Some of the public and private responses have the potential to enhance the
medium to long-term adaptation capacity of the city to cope with future floods. However, there
is a need to address the larger issues of climate risks in the development planning for the city.
As of now, planning looks at these issues in a generic manner. Given the uncertainty associated
with climate risks in future and given the lack of scientific and technical knowledge base
regarding these issues at the local level, planning process is not equipped to integrate
adaptation to climate risks into mainstream planning and substantial efforts in this direction are
required in future.
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The findings of this study in a way highlight the costs of inaction if very little is done in future to
enhance the coping capacity of the city for future weather events and climate risks in general.
Mumbai is currently in the process of drafting the new development plan that is expected to be
implemented in the near future. The findings of this study put forth a convincing argument that
adaptation strategies needs to become a part of mainstream planning while devising strategies of
developing infrastructure, housing, transport network and other facilities and services in the city.
Although adaptation is costly, the costs of inaction can prove to be costlier. Hence, there is a need
for integrated and coordinated efforts from all agencies including local government, planners, public
utilities and community at large to work towards greater adaptation to future climate risks for the
city.
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Annexure
Table A1: Ward-wise details of the sample selected for primary survey
Wards

Total population

Households

F North
F South
H East
K East
L Ward
P North

5,24,393
3,96,122
5,80,835
8,10,002
7,78,278
7,98,775

177
103
176
241
231
240

Commercial &
Industrial
102
149
98
139
204
100
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Table A2: Details of personal interviews
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Name of THE Officers

Designation

Org. / dept

Mr. Minesh Pimple

Asst. Municipal Commissioner

MCGM

Mr. Palwe

Asst. Shift In- charge

MCGM

Mr. Mahesh Narvekar

Chief Officer, DMP & CCSRS

MCGM

Mr. A.A. Pawaskar

Asst. Engineer (Repairs &
Maintenance)

MCGM

Mr. H.A. Kale

Asst. Municipal Commissioner

MCGM

Uma Adusumilli

Chief Urban Planner

MMRDA

Mr Kamble

Asst Engineer

MCGM

S.Y.Kurhade

Asst Commissioner

MCGM
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Figure A1: Ward map of F South
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Figure A2: Ward map of F North
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Figure A3: Ward map of H East
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Figure A4: Ward map of K East
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Figure A5: Ward map of L Ward
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Figure A6: Ward map of P North
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Introduction
Bangkok is not only Thailand’s political, economic and administrative capital, but also a regional and
global hub. In recent decades, it has transformed from a compact urban core into a sprawling
megacity. Today, in addition to the original centre, the city also extends into its five neighboring
provinces and forms a single agglomeration, the Bangkok Metropolitan Region: around 15% of the
country’s population resides here. However, alongside its economic and demographic vitality,
Bangkok is highly vulnerable to climate change and other environmental issues. In particular, due to
the ‘three waters’ of runoff, rain and sea rise, together with its low-lying topography of 1.0-2.0
meters, much of the capital is prone to inundation. Section 1, Bangkok: An overview, summarizes
these issues and presents some of the key data.
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Despite the city’s extensive flood-protection system, comprising not only the historic network of
canals but also the more recent development of the King’s Dyke and additional drainage and
pumping infrastructure, it is clear that Bangkok is still vulnerable to major flooding. Floods have been
a regular occurrence in Bangkok throughout its recent history, with major events occurring in 1942,
1978, 1980, 1983, 1995, 1996, 2002 and 2006, the year of the case study in this report. During the
field research in 2011, however, the city experienced its worst flooding in more than fifty years. Yet
this vulnerability will only increase in the future, when it has been projected that the city will be
unable to withhold more than a 1-in-10-year flood event, due to the expected effects of climate
chance and land subsidence. Combined, these environmental factors are forecast to increase the
costs and coverage of flooding substantially: in an A1F1 climate scenario, the costs of a 1-in-30-year
flooding event are estimated to rise from $1.059 billion in 2008 to as much as $4.454 billion in 2050.
The city’s exposure, both in assets and population, will also be substantially increased by its forecast
levels of growth in its built up area and its spatial extension. According to the OECD, by 2070
Bangkok will be the seventh most vulnerable coastal city in the world to flooding in terms of
population, and the tenth most vulnerable in terms of assets.
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Section 2, Case study: The 2006 flood, presents the background to Bangkok’s flooding in 2006. The
2006 flood was precipitated, as with other major flood events, by several factors. Heavy continuous
rain brought on by a tropical depression in the region led to intense localized rainfall in the city at
the beginning of October. At the same time, large volumes of runoff were flowing in from the north:
85% of the annual rainfall as concentrated in September and October, while much of the upstream
dam capacity was strained to its limits. Finally, at critical moments in late October and early
November, the sea level rose to a peak of 2.22MSL: the maximum threshold before the Chao Phraya
riverbank begins to flood is 2.5MSL. The city centre was protected, but the areas north of the city
were allowed to flood, with flood flows also directed to the east of Bangkok. This report profiles the
effects in four case study districts in the eastern suburbs of Bangkok: Minburi, Nong Jork, Lat
Krabang and Klong Samwa. All of them are in Bangkok’s traditionally agricultural hinterland and
located at a very low land elevation of 0.8-1.5 MSL. Each of them has distinct physical, social and
economic characteristics, yet all were impacted to varying degrees by the flooding and reflect
Bangkok’s rapid urbanization in their mix of agricultural, industrial and residential uses. Importantly,
the areas also illustrate the experience of the many residents living outside the inner city’s
established polder system.
Section 3, Impact assessment of the flood, begins with an overview of the available secondary data
on the impact of the flooding. Damage assessments should be holistic, reflecting not only the
economic costs but also the environmental, social, psychological and health effects. Yet the official
data is generally technical in nature, concentrating on infrastructure damage and compensation
disbursements, and national in focus with little disaggregation at the district or community level. As

a result, the local and non-physical impacts of the flooding are largely overlooked. Consequently, the
research team on this study selected a total of 380 sample households, businesses and industrial
estate to develop a more comprehensive picture of the flood. Using semi-structured surveys in
sample communities within the districts, the team employed a series of sub-proxies, including
physical damage, health costs, transport and work absence, to assess the direct and indirect floodrelated costs to communities, businesses and individuals in the 2006 flood. This was with the aim of
developing a more fine-grained understanding of the true costs of the flooding, particularly to
socially vulnerable groups. The team also analyzed the flood protection measures of Bang Chan
Industrial Estate, Minburi, and hosted a community workshop with stakeholders, researchers and a
hydrological expert from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment.
The results highlight the importance of a localized analysis of the impacts of flooding, as both the
intensity and the nature of its effects vary considerably from district to district. Of the four, Minburi
was the worst affected, particularly as residents suffered loss of livelihood as a result of the
economic disruption and health threats. As with the other districts, the indirect costs of the flooding
at times exceeded the direct physical damage, though this is not generally recognized in official
assessments. The research findings highlighted the significance of work absence as a major indirect
cost: while the impact on individual households was relatively moderate, the agricultural sector was
severely affected. Medical care was another indirect expense for inundated communities with the
spread of diseases such as dengue fever and foot-and-mouth disease.
Another important finding was that that the costs of the flooding, through lost income and damaged
infrastructure, was generally more severe for the community as a whole than individual households.
If the impacts at a community level are more severe, as these results suggest, then this would
reinforce the importance of collective adaptation and mitigation strategies at a community level.
Currently, preparedness in the event of extreme flooding is generally undertaken privately by
individual households, with government encouragement focusing on self-reliance and personal
initiative. But to minimize the very substantial community-wide costs of the flooding, there needs to
be a platform for collective action.

The results also highlight the varying impacts on different business and occupational sectors.
Farming, according to the survey results, was the worst affected within the agricultural sector, with
levels in excess of a foot lasting over a month. Fisheries, on the other hand, though less vulnerable to
direct physical damage, was most exposed to the rising production costs as a result of the flooding.
As for small businesses, the impact was less straightforward and depended in particular on the
product of the enterprise. While the service sector was weakened by flood-related disruption,
demand for basic consumer goods actually rose among residents who were more dependent on local
shops to provide them with food and other provisions. Again, these nuances potentially have
important implications for how post-disaster economic recovery strategies should be targeted.
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The research also disaggregated its findings by income group and occupation to develop a clearer
picture of the effects of the flooding on different groups. One significant finding was that the work
absence levels of the poorest households were, as for more affluent households, relatively low. This
suggests that, contrary to what might be expected, the poorest households demonstrated a relatively
strong adaptive capacity. Economic insecurity may be a significant element in this, however, and
further research is required to ascertain the nature of their adaptation strategies.
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Section 4, Adaptation Responses, outlines the recent adaption responses in Bangkok, particularly
since 2006. These responses have been largely structural in nature and focused primarily on
mitigation. Yet Bangkok’s future will depend in great part on its capacity for long term adaptation to
its flood risk: the city should be aiming for a state of ‘safe failure’ where in the event of major
flooding exceeding the capacity of its protective infrastructure, the effects are minimized. This can
only be achieved if efforts are infrastructure is supported by non-structural measures, such as better
land use regulations. Another persistent issue is the fragmented and divisive nature of governance in
Bangkok, particularly its flood management structures. In addition to the complex and often
conflicting mandates of different ministries, tensions exist between national and municipal
authorities, and even within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) the different provinces have
autonomous administration with limited coordination between them. Furthermore, there is also
very limited participation, between the authorities the private sector and local communities, making
collective adaptation a remote possibility.
Section 5, Conclusion: Mainstreaming adaptation into long-term planning, drawing on the findings
of the research team, highlights some of the main policy directions the city’s future strategic
framework should follow. A long term adaptation strategy that is collective and participatory, guided
by adequate data and a deeper recognition of the complex social dimensions of flooding, is crucial.
Together with substantial national and municipal governance reform, this approach will help to
address these challenges and preserve Bangkok’s immense social and economic vitality.

1. Bangkok: an overview
1.1 City Demographics and Urbanization trends
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Bangkok, the capital of Thailand since 1782, is not only the country’s political centre but also its
administrative and economic heart. Located on the lower plain of the Chao Phraya River Basin, the
city is now a sprawling urban agglomeration and one of Asia’s emerging megacities. The sheer pace
of its spatial and demographic growth has meant that Bangkok itself has had to be continuously
redefined. The city is now classified as the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), an area of around
1,569 km2 that includes the five adjacent provinces of Samut Sakon, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi,
Pathum Thani and Samutprakarn.
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Bangkok’s status as the country’s largest demographic concentration is unquestioned, with an estimated
15% of Thailand’s population located in the greater Bangkok metropolitan area. This reflects a long
historic trend, going back to the late nineteenth century, of disproportionate demographic growth in
Bangkok. By 1937, for instance, the BMA’s population was already 15 times that of Chiang Mai, its
closest urban competitor and the country’s largest urban settlement after Bangkok. By 1991,
Bangkok was 41 times the size of Nakhon Ratchasima, at that point the country’s second largest city,
ahead of Chiang Mai. The exact number of Bangkok’s rising demographic remains unclear, however,
and estimates vary considerably. According to the National Statistics Office (NSO), Bangkok’s
population in 2009 was at 5.701 million – but UN DESA data puts it considerably higher, at 6.902
million. Other figures put the population at almost 10 million or even more, once unregistered
migrants are factored in. In part, these discrepancies may reflect different perspectives on what
constitutes Bangkok geographically: Bangkok City, the BMA or the BMR. Furthermore, for a number
of reasons the official data may underestimate the true extent of the population: in 2000, for
instance, while the number of registered residents was only 6.3 million, the actual population was
thought to be closer to 8.9 million. The capital’s demographic boom is projected to continue into

the future. By 2050, according to one projection, the population will have reached 10.55 million in
Bangkok City, and almost 16 million in the BMR as a whole.
This consolidation has been sustained by a long period of accelerated economic growth in the
capital: much of Thailand’s industrial and commercial capacity is concentrated within metropolitan
Bangkok, as well as the bulk of its communications and transport infrastructure. In 2006, the year of
this case study, the BMR generated 43% of Thailand’s GDP. As a result, given its accelerating growth
and status as Southeast Asia’s main business hub, the capital continues to act as a population
magnet, both nationally and globally, for migrants in search of employment opportunities. While
Thais from other parts of the country, particularly areas where traditional livelihood opportunities
such as agriculture have been contracting, have migrated to the capital in growing numbers,
Bangkok also continues to attract large volumes of international migrants from adjacent countries
and other regions.
This economic primacy, together with the expanding population that it attracts, are major
dimensions in the city’s increasing vulnerability and exposure to flooding. When a major flood event
affects Bangkok, it not only threatens the political and administrative functioning of the capital, but
also puts much of the country’s factories and industrial parks at risk - and by extension, the homes
and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of the city’s residents. The nature of Bangkok’s
development is also significant: the various symptoms and side effects of urbanization in Thailand
are particularly pronounced in the capital. This is particularly evident in the rapid pace of Bangkok’s
urban growth. In recent years this growth has been particularly intense throughout the metropolitan
region: the BMR saw a 74% increase in urban development between 1998 and 2003 alone.

A second important element in Bangkok’s development is its transition from water-based urban
form, when the city fabric was designed sympathetically around natural climate and hydrology, to an
impermeable “concrete pad”. For instance, until recently Bangkok benefitted from a complex
network of canals and water catchments to assist flood drainage. However, with dramatic
redevelopment of the city, much of this system has disappeared beneath highways, factories and
housing. This has substantially weakened its capacity to cope with heavy rain. Furthermore, the
fabric of the capital has moved away from traditional “amphibious” structures that were designed in
response to environmental threats, in particular its low-lying topography and flood-prone hydrology
(described in section 1.2), to modern urban forms often less adaptive to local environment.
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However, it is not just the speed but also the nature of this change that poses serious challenges for
Bangkok’s future, particularly with regards to flooding. One of the city’s most visible characteristics,
driven by the growing population and other factors such as rising car ownership and weak planning
regulations, is the accelerating spatial expansion towards its periphery – the ‘suburbanization’ of
Bangkok. Economically, this is already clear from the spread of industrial development into what is
termed the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region (EBMR), an extended region comprising the
BMR and the Eastern Seaboard, a total of 19 provinces: in 2001, it accounted for 68% of the
country’s nominal GDP. But it is also reflected in the relocation of the city’s residents in increasing
numbers to the margins of the metropolis. In Nonthaburi Province, for example, the population grew
by 47% during 2002-2007. Within the city centre, on the other hand, population density has
declined. Though it increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this trend reversed sharply in the
1990s and by 1998 was only 155 persons/ha, compared to 222 persons/ha in 1970. While the
population of inner Bangkok decreased from 3.25 million in 1978 to 2.86 million people in 2000, the
population in the outer areas of Bangkok increased from about 670,000 to 1.12 million people
during the same period. It is likely that the majority of its future growth will be in satellite
developments in its metropolitan areas, rather than the city centre.
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1.2 Climate and Coastal Vulnerability
1.2.1 Natural Environment and Hydrology
Bangkok spans a total of 1,569 km2 in the lower part of the Chao Phraya River Basin. This is the
largest basin in the country and at 159,000 km2 amounts to around 35% of the country’s entire land
mass. Four main tributaries converge at Nakhon Sawan, a province north of Bangkok, and become
the Chao Phraya River. This continues to flow south through the capital and out into the Gulf of
Thailand. The river’s flow capacity varies considerably from as much as 4,000 CMS in NakornSawan
and Chainat, to 1,500 CMS in Ayutthaya and 3,000 CMS in Bangkok. The average annual discharge of
the river is 770 m³/s, but can reach significantly higher at certain times, particularly during a flood. In
1995, for instance, it reached a peak of 4,560 m³/s.
Bangkok itself is located in a low-lying area of the basin, with an average ground elevation of only
1.0-2.0 meters above sea level. Some parts of the city are in fact at sea level as a result of land
subsidence. Furthermore, the city is only 33km north of the coast. Its geography therefore makes it
naturally susceptible to flooding, both from large volumes of runoff from the north of the country
and tidal inflows from the sea. The volume of these floods can be immense: 31,000 million cubic
meters for a flooding event with a 1-in-30-year probability. Given its location at the bottom of the
alluvial plain, near the mouth of the Chao Phraya, in these conditions Bangkok runs the risk of
becoming a ‘bottleneck’ as the water drains into the Gulf of Thailand, resulting in over 30 days of
flooding in many parts of the city.
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Bangkok’s flood vulnerability is determined by three major water sources – rainfall, river runoff and
tidal flows. Consequently, the capital is sometimes known as the “city of three waters”. The worst
cases are most likely to occur when these three sources combine to make the conditions necessary
for a major flooding event.
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•

Rainfall: Estimates of Bangkok’s annual rainfall are wide-ranging of rainfall every year, though
this varies greatly from year to year: according to one set of figures, rainfall within the Chao
Phraya River averages 1,099mm, but may range between a minimum of 354mm and a maximum
of 2,471mm. Rainfall also varies greatly from month to month, from as little as 5mm in
December to 305mm in September. Peak rainfall patterns typically occur twice yearly, in MayJune and September-November. However, the great majority (88%) of this rainfall occurs during
the wet season between May and October, particularly in the peak period of September and
October, when tropical cyclones occur. Generally, the impact of the rainy season is cumulative
and spread out over several months. However, at its most intense, when a heavy spell exceeds
the city’s drainage capacity, excess rainwater may result in intermittent, localized flooding in
low-lying areas.

•

River Runoff: During the rainy season, water runoff plays a vital role in irrigating the paddy fields
and agricultural plains to the north of Bangkok. The surplus runoff then passes through the city’s
canal network and into the Chao Phraya River, from where it travels through Bangkok down to
the Gulf of Thailand. However, though on average the Chao Phraya has a flow capacity of 2,5003,000 CMS, larger volumes may result in flooding. For example, runoff in excess of 3,500 CMS
will raise its water level to 2.1 metres above sea level – high enough to inundate the lowest lying
areas of the riverside.

•

Tides: At certain times, the Chao Phraya River is also strongly affected by the incoming tide from
the Gulf of Thailand. The tide levels are cyclical and vary during the day, between -0.5m and
1.5m, though they may rise considerably higher: in 1995, for instance, levels reached 2.5m.
However, tidal levels are also affected by seasonal variation, generally peaking in November and
December, just after the rainy season has come to an end. The tidal rises are particularly evident

in the lower stretch of the Chao Phraya river, between 23 km and 57 km from its mouth. Higher
tides, combined with peak river flow from runoff and rainfall, may lead to flooding.

1.2.2 Bangkok’s flood protection system
Bangkok’s drainage system has been constructed around its extensive 2,606 km network of canals.
These khlong, 1,655 of them in all, vary greatly in size with the largest spanning a width of 50
meters. Given Bangkok’s susceptibility to flooding, the canals play an essential role in draining and
conveying storm water through the city to the Chao Phraya River. While much of this infrastructure
is a historic legacy from the days when Bangkok was a water-based city and dubbed ‘the Venice of
the East’, the conduits and canals are supported by well-developed technologies including U-shaped
boxes, round type drains, pumping stations, movable pumps and gates. However, as discussed in
section 1.1, the effectiveness of this infrastructure has been weakened by the city’s rapid
development, submerging many of its canals and drainage channels beneath concrete.

Today, a substantial polder system encloses inner Bangkok, with 10 sub-polders supported by
drainage tunnels and pumps to redirect the water into the river. The main roads and rail lines within
the protected area serve as the polder’s primary dykes. Polder systems have also been developed in
the eastern and western areas of the city. In the west, this is supported by a series of dykes by the
river and fortified by two khlong, the Mahasawas and Bangkok Noi canals, to protect the areas inside
the dykes flooding. On the eastern side of the city, the King’s Dyke is supported by around 20
retention ponds with a combined capacity of 6 million cubic meters. An additional retention pond in
the south has an additional 6 million cubic meters in storage. 7 supersized drainage tunnels have
also been constructed to accelerate drainage. These tunnels lie 15-22 meters underground and have
a current operational capacity of 95.50 CMS, with another 60 CMS under development. Pumping
stations speed the water through them and into the river10. During the wet season, a total of 15 subpolders covering 168 km2 are in operation to support the drainage of surplus water on either side of
the river.
Within the city, then, Bangkok’s flood management essentially works through three main methods.
Firstly, it prevents the flow of water from outside, through the construction of dykes and
embankments. Secondly, it evacuates the water from within the polder with pumps and drainage
tunnels. Thirdly, it temporarily stores water in retention ponds or ‘monkey cheeks’.11 Yet Bangkok’s
Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA (2009). Flood Protection in Bangkok. Paper revised from Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007).
Flood protection in BMA 2006.

10

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP

11
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As the city has intensified and expanded, thus becoming more exposed to the risk of flooding,
further measures have been put in place to manage and mitigate the potential effects. However,
much of the investment for this has been granted reactively, in the wake of a major disaster.
Following the catastrophic floods of 1983, when the Rangsit irrigation areas suffered four months of
flooding, the King’s Dyke was constructed at the northern and eastern boundaries of Bangkok to
prevent water in the eastern flood plain from inundating the city centre. Submersible equipment
was also installed in several pumping stations on the Chao Phraya River. Later on, in the wake of the
devastation of the 1995 floods, the BMA received government funding to construct 77km of barriers
along the river, still ongoing when the 2006 flood hit Bangkok and finally completed in 2010. A
Second Master Plan for the Chao Phraya Delta was also developed by a consortium of specialists and
the Thai government, with support from the World Bank. This involved a major macro-level review
of the causes and consequences of the flood, with a focus on both immediate and long term flood
alleviation strategies.
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relative exposure to flooding is also determined by ‘manmade’ factors, such as the operation of its
dams12. In terms of the upstream management of the runoff, much of the monsoon rain is stored in
around 3,000 dams and then strategically released for agricultural irrigation during the dry season.
The two largest, the Bhumibol and Sirikit dams, together manage the runoff from 22% of the area of
the Chao Phraya Basin13. The construction of these dams, in 1964 and 1971 respectively, has
generally helped reduce flooding risk. Nevertheless, extreme weather events are still capable of
exceeding their capacity, to devastating effect: for instance, in 1995, when storms in the upper
watershed led to the release of 2,900 million cubic meters of runoff14.
Despite these considerable investments, funding constraints have nevertheless prevented the city
from fully realizing its flood protection strategy. For instance, one important element of the post1995 Second Master Plan was the construction of a river diversion to eastern Bangkok along the
Praong Chaiya-Nuchit canal. However, the high costs of land around Suvarnbhumi airport and
associated expenses such as heavy pumping of floodwater at low elevations proved prohibitive,
although the scheme was proposed again after the 2006 flooding15. Furthermore, as extreme
flooding events demonstrate, the existing system is not sufficient to protect large areas of Bangkok
from the potential threat of flooding. Though its protective infrastructure has been strengthened
greatly in recent decades, Bangkok is still becoming increasingly vulnerable to flooding16. Nor is this
infrastructure necessarily capable of withstanding major events: for instance, the King’s Dyke is
designed primarily as a solution to the city’s regular low level flooding rather than low frequency,
high impact flooding events such as 1-in-50 year events17. The projected risks relating to climate
change and other environmental and developmental factors, and the implications these may have
for the city’s future, are examined in greater detail in section 1.3.

1.3 Past food events and future risks
1.3.1 Past events
The particular circumstances of every flood event in Bangkok is unique. Nevertheless, the city’s
chronic vulnerability is reflected in its long history of flooding, with major events in 1942, 1978,
1980, 1983, 1995, 1996, 2002 and 2006. The floods of 1983 and 1995 were especially intense, with
both serving as landmarks that led to substantial investments in mitigation and protection strategies.
The latter, estimated to have a 1-in-30-year frequency, flooded 65% of the BMA with depths of up to
2 meters, with some districts still inundated in December18. The flooding killed over 400 people and

Sapphaisal, C. (2007). Planning and Flood Mitigation for the Chao Phraya River Basin. Retrieved at:
http://www.rid.go.th/thaicid/_5_article/2550/chukiat.swf
12

UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme (2003), Chapter 16: Chao Phraya River Basin, Thailand. In UN World Water
Development Report 1: Water for People, Water for Life.

13

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.25. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
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Vongvisessomjai, S. (2007). Flood Mitigation Master Plan for Chao Phraya Delta. Paper presented at the 4th INWEPF Steering
Meeting and Symposium. Retrieved at: http://web.rid.go.th/ffd/papers/Paper-Session%201/p104%20Flood%20Mitigation%20Master%20Plan.pdf
15

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
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Whereas major urban centres in the Netherlands, for example, have typically designed to withstand a 1-in-10,000-years flood.
IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319
17

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.25. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
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impacted on almost 4 million others in the country19. More recently, in 2011, Bangkok experienced
one of the worst flood events in its history. Hundreds of lives were also lost and as of December 1,
2011, according to World Bank calculations, the total cost economic damages and losses in the
country amounted to $45.7 billion20.

1.3.2 Future risks
Bangkok’s vulnerability to flooding and other environmental challenges, such as heat waves, is
projected to increase substantially in the coming decades. Some of the likely impacts, such as shifts
in sea, temperature and precipitation levels, will result from climate change. There are other
significant environmental issues beyond this, however, including the spatial pattern of future urban
development and the accumulating effects of land subsidence.
In terms of climate change, Bangkok is already one of the most vulnerable areas in Southeast Asia21
and has been identified by the IPCC as a future ‘hotspot’ due to the destabilizing effects projected
on the city’s hydrometeorology22. Much of Thailand’s 2,615 km coastline is at risk, including
Bangkok, with areas such as the district of Bang Khuntien especially vulnerable23. Global warming
has already resulted in Thailand’s rivers becoming increasingly unpredictable: flows are already
becoming lower in the dry season and higher in the rainy season24.
One of the most authoritative reviews of the projected effects of climate change within the BMR is
the assessment undertaken on behalf of the IPCC by the University of Tokyo’s Integrated Research
System for Sustainability Science, who modeled potential impacts for Bangkok in 2050 in ‘low’ (B1)
and ‘high’ (A1F1) emissions scenarios. In addition to temperature rises of between 1.2 (B1F1) and
1.9 (A1F1) degrees Celsius25, climate change would have increase both sea levels and precipitation,
with serious implications for Bangkok’s future vulnerability.
Mean precipitation in the basin is projected to rise by 2 (B1F1) to 3 (A1) percent26. However, while
the consequent increase in net flood volume will be more or less proportionate to this, the effect on
peak river discharge in the Chao Phraya will be substantially greater due to the staggered flow
patterns of the floodwater from the catchments upstream27. It will also have a significant impact on
IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319
19

World Bank. The World Bank supports Thailand’s post-floods recovery efforts. December 13, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.worldbank.or.th/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/THAILANDEXTN/0,,contentMDK:2306744
3~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:333296,00.html
20

Yusuf, A. and Francisco, H. (2009). Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia. Economy and Environment Program
for Southeast Asia.

21

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.2. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
23 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
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Cited in Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.x. Retrieved
at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/58263661248255995902/full-report.pdf
25

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xii. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
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World Bank (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.xi. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/58263661248255995902/executive-summary.pdf
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the size of the flood-prone area, rising in the context of a 1-in-30-year flooding event by 30% in the
high (A1F1) emissions scenario28. Furthermore, a large part of Bangkok’s increased future risk will
result from the growing frequency of extreme weather events, such as high intensity flash
precipitation and very wet years with strong La Nina conditions29.
At the same time, while sea levels are rising at the relatively modest rate of 25mm annually at
present30, these gradual changes will accumulate in the coming decades. Sea levels in the Gulf of
Thailand are projected to rise between 0.19 (B1) and 0.29 (A1F1) meters31. Given Bangkok’s lowlying elevation, the impacts of higher sea levels could intensify the negative impact of flooding
substantially. For instance, a simulation of the effects of future flooding in Bangkok according to the
worst-case SLR scenarios used the baseline conditions of the 1995 flood as a comparator. It found
that, in the event of a 0.32 SLR by 2050, the total flooded area would increase by 26% compared to
1995. With an SLR of 0.88 meters by 2100, the increase would be as much as 81%32.
But the impacts of climate change to Bangkok in terms of flood vulnerability are likely to be
exceeded by the costs of non-climate-related factors – in particular, the city’s chronic land
subsidence. Bangkok is naturally at risk due to the soft clay layer in its ground surface and low lying
topography, but these problems has been greatly exacerbated by the excessive groundwater
extraction33. However, stronger government regulation has slowed the rate of land subsidence and
is expected to result in further reductions in the rate of subsidence, by 10% annually. According to
official estimates, from a peak of 10cm a year in 1978, subsidence has since slowed to 1-2cm by
2007, averaging 0.97 cm a year between 2002 and 200734. However, other estimates suggest a much
faster rate of 5-10mm a year, with some outlying parts of the city in the southeast and southwest
reaching as much as 30mm annually. What is certain is that land subsidence and sea level rises will
have a combined impact. For example, if sea levels are assumed to rise by 12.3cm between 2009 and
2050, with land subsidence during this period totaling another 20cm, then the relative sea level rise
will total 32.2cm35. Another study estimated that, due to the effects of subsidence and sea level rise,
Bangkok could potentially find itself submerged in 50-100cm of floodwater by 202536.

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xii. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
28

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
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Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
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Cited in Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.x. Retrieved
at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/58263661248255995902/full-report.pdf
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32 Dutta, D. (2011). An integrated tool for assessment of flood vulnerability of coastal cities to sea-level rise and potential socioeconomic impacts: a case study in Bangkok, Thailand. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(5).
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Nevertheless, the consensus is that the future costs associated with land subsidence will be very
substantial. A report commissioned by the World Bank, working with the first set of figures,
extrapolated a cumulative subsidence rate of 5-30cm between 2002 and 2050. The economic cost of
this subsidence, in the context of a 1-in-30 year flood in an A1F1 climate scenario, nearly doubles
between 2008 and 2050. Almost 70% of the total increase in the costs of a 1-in-30 flooding event in
Bangkok in 2050 is due to increased land subsidence37. In addition to the increased flooding, land
subsidence also reduces the effectiveness of the city’s dyke system and its underground sanitation38.
Finally, as Bangkok’s rapid urbanization is expected to continue, with a larger population and a more
developed city fabric, the city’s exposure is therefore forecast to be substantially higher even
without climate change, land subsidence or other major environmental issues. Over 70% of floodrelated costs in the future will relate to building damage39 and flood-affected buildings are to
increase, according to one projection, by a factor of 1.5 times between 2025 and 210040. The city’s
continued development will therefore increase its vulnerability, even before climate change and
other environmental impacts are factored in. For instance, a study by the OECD estimated that at
present 0.907 million persons and $38.72 billion in assets were potentially exposed in the event of a
1-in-100-years extreme flooding event. By 2070, in the same environmental conditions but with the
city’s predicted future population and development, the exposure would rise to 2.392 million
persons and $520.23 billion in assets41. In addition, the growing expanse of built-up area in and
around the city, if not carefully planned, may conflict with the increasingly unstable weather
patterns brought about by climate change. In particular, the rising frequency and intensity of ‘flash’
precipitation events will require effective storm sewage maintenance and substantive measures to
improve the water-absorbing capacity of the city’s urban landscape42.
Projections for Bangkok’s future flooding exposure therefore factor in the likely effects of different
climate change scenarios alongside non-climate-related environmental changes, in particular land
subsidence. They also have to model the transformation of the city itself, in terms of populations
and infrastructure, and the difference this will have on the overall cost of a major flood event. A
detailed forecast of the capital’s vulnerability and exposure in 2050 for a World Bank report43, using
various possible climate scenarios, illustrates the very substantial effects that global warming, land
subsidence and continued urbanization will have. Firstly, it is estimated that while the current
flooding area of a 1-in-30 year flooding event is 550 km2, by 2050 this will have risen to 719 km2 in a
B1 and 734 km2 in an A1F1 scenario respectively. While a 625 km2 flood is currently expected to
occur every 50 years, by 2050 will be 1/15 years in an A1F1 scenario. Similarly, the total exposure of
Bangkok’s population to more than 30 days of flooding in a 1-in-30 year flood event will rise from
546,748 persons at present (2008) to as much as 805,055 persons in a B1 and 954,389 persons in an
ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xv. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
37

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xv. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
39

40 Dutta, D. (2011). An integrated tool for assessment of flood vulnerability of coastal cities to sea-level rise and potential socioeconomic impacts: a case study in Bangkok, Thailand. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(5).
41 Nicholls, R.J., Hanson, S., Herweijer, C., Patmore, N., Hallegatte, S., CorfeeMorlot, J. Chateau, J. and Muir-Wood, R. (2008). Ranking
Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 1.

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP

42

43

The calculations used here were for Bangkok and Samut Prakarn provinces, the two most urbanized provinces in the BMR.
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A1F1 scenario in 2050 - a 47% and 75% increase respectively. Importantly, the costs are not only the
direct costs of damaged housing and infrastructure, but the indirect costs of work absence, loss of
revenue and so on44 . The costs of a 1-in-30-year flooding event also rise from the current (2008)
$1.059 billion to as much as $4.454 billion in an A1F1 scenario by 2050, with the impacts land
subsidence, sea level rise and storm surge included in the calculations. A large portion of this
increase is directly attributable to land subsidence: the cost in 2050 with only land subsidence
factored in, in current climactic conditions, is $2.982 billion – 67% of the total increase between
2008 and 205045.
The combined effect of these various factors is that not only will Bangkok be increasingly floodprone in the future, due to climate change and other environmental issues, but it will also have more
to lose as the city continues to develop and expand. A global assessment of port cities, conducted by
the OECD, estimated that by 2070 Bangkok would be the seventh most vulnerable city in the world
to coastal flooding in terms of population, and the tenth most vulnerable in terms of assets. In 2005,
a 1-in-100 years flooding event would involve a potential exposure of around 0.907 million persons
and $38.72 billion in assets. By 2070, factoring in climate change, anthropogenic land subsidence
and the substantial changes to its population and urban fabric, the total exposure would come to
5.138 million persons and an extraordinary $1,117.54 billion in assets46.

2. Case study: the 2006 flood
2.1 Case study areas
This study examines the impact of the 2006 floods, with a focus on four districts in the eastern
region of Bangkok: Minburi, Nong Jork, Lat Krabang and Klong Samwa. As rapidly developing
suburban settlements in a traditionally agricultural region, they provide a vivid illustration of the
city’s most challenging symptoms, particularly with regards to flood vulnerability. Furthermore,
during the 2006 flood, these districts were among the worst hit. The rapid urbanization of these
districts, and their experience of the 2006 floods, highlight the very serious consequences Bangkok
may face in the future if these current trends continue unchecked.
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The low-lying topography that characterizes much of the city is especially evident in eastern
Bangkok. In the case study districts, the average land elevation is just 0.8-1.5 MSL, compared to 1.02.0 for Bangkok as a whole. The terrain slopes down from east to west and north to south, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Consequently, Nong Jork, the district with the highest elevation (2.0MSL), is
northwest to Lat Krabang, the lowest (0.5MSL) and the most southwesterly of the four districts.
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Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.4-1. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/58263661248255995902/full-report.pdf
As defined in the World Bank estimates, ‘direct’ damage is ”measurable and often relates to the replacement value of destroyed
immovable assets and stocks“. This type of damage occurs during or shortly after the natural disaster. ‘Indirect’ damage on the other hand
is not physical but nevertheless has associated costs for individuals and communities. This includes lost revenue and unpaid work absence.
The latter is particularly associated with informal employment and non-salaried workers, and so imposes an added dimension of social
vulnerability to the costs.
45 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, pp.28-29, 30, 52-54. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
46Nicholls, R.J., Hanson, S., Herweijer, C., Patmore, N., Hallegatte, S., CorfeeMorlot, J. Chateau, J. and Muir-Wood, R. (2008). Ranking
Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 1.

Figure 1: Topography of eastern Bangkok

Figure 2: Topographic map of eastern Bangkok. Low-lying areas susceptible to flooding are shaded
blue48
Since then, much of the landscape has been transformed by ill-advised or irresponsible construction.
Megaprojects such as Suvarnabhumi Airport have been constructed in the floodplain and much of

Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice
47

48Royal

Thai Survey Department.
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Eastern Bangkok is therefore naturally suited to serve as a flood plain for the large volumes of runoff
heading from the north towards the Gulf of Thailand, as shown in Figure 2. A large portion of
Bangkok’s most flood-prone territory, shaded blue, is visibly concentrated in the east. Until the mid20th century, this was reflected in the land use of the area, with much of it protected as an officially
designated drainage corridor for the regular flows of floodwater through the city. However, the
publication of the first National Economic and Social Plan reconfigured the area as an industrial
zone, with profound spatial and environmental effects47.
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the planning regulation that has belatedly been put in place has been ignored49. All of these districts
to varying degrees now reflect the mixed character of suburban Bangkok, where the city’s rapid
outward growth has transformed formerly agricultural settlements into morcellated landscapes
where traditional livelihoods such as farming still persist alongside industrial and residential uses.
Some of the key demographic, environmental and developmental characteristics of each district are
summarized in Table 1 below.
District

Area
(km2)

Pop.
density
(persons/
km2)

Employment
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Developmental
characteristics

Khlong
Sam Wa50

110.7

1,398.2

Largely
agricultural:
paddy fields,
farming.

56 canals: one, Khlong
Saw Wa, used for
transport and the
remainder for
agricultural irrigation.

Minburi51

63.6

2,092.0

Largely
agricultural:
rice farming,
livestock,
fisheries,
produce, turf
grass.

The most densely
populated of the
districts.
Environmental
damage, including
increased flooding,
from transport
infrastructure and
other development is
threatening
agriculture, an
important livelihood in
the area.

Increasing
housing
development in
response to city
expansion.
Construction of
Suvarnabhumi
Airport has also
resulted in
improved
transport links.

Nong
Chok

236.3

625.0

Agriculture:
80%

The largest and least
densely populated
district in Bangkok.
Also the most easterly
of the four districts
and the furthest from
central Bangkok.

Relatively
undeveloped,
given its distance
from the city, and
still largely
agricultural as a
result.

Government
Officer: 10%

]

Environmental
Characteristics

Petty
trader/SME:

Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice
49

Klong Samwa District Office. Retrieved at:
http://203.155.220.239/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001003&strSection=aboutus&intContentID=498%00 )
50

Minburi District Office. Retrieved at: http://www.bangkok.go.th/minburi/. For an overview of the effect of development on
agricultural livelihoods, see Sitheechoke, N. and Napompech, K. (2010). Impacts of Minburi District Development on the Turf Grass
Businesses of Bangkok, Thailand. International Journal of Arts and Sciences, 3(13): 82-94.

51

6%
Other: 4%
Lat
Krabang52

123.9

1227.0

Mainly
business and
agriculture

Southernmost of the
four districts, with the
lowest elevation.
Located in the
catchment area
outside the King’s
Dyke. Has a total of 42
canals.

International
airport and
warehouses in
close proximity,
hence the
primarily business
and agricultureoriented
employment. One
major industrial
park: the Lat Kra
Bang Industrial
Park.

Table 1: Profile of case study districts

Lat Krabang District Office. Retrieved at:
http://203.155.220.239/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001013&strSection=aboutus&intContentID=131%00 )
52

Sitheechoke, N. and Napompech, K. (2010). Impacts of Minburi District Development on the Turf Grass Businesses of Bangkok,
Thailand. International Journal of Arts and Sciences, 3(13): 82-94.

53
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While the districts have many shared features, including the ongoing importance of agriculture to
their local economies, there are also significant differences in terms of their size and demographics.
These in turn are strongly determined by the specific environmental and developmental
circumstances of each district. For instance, Minburi has experienced rapid residential development
as transport links in the district have improved with the construction of Suvarnabhumi airport. This
has helped accelerate its population density to 2,092 persons/km2, the highest of the four districts
by some margin. The intrusion of residential and industrial development has transformed the
district’s agricultural landscape into an incohesive mix, with damaging side effects such as
subsidence, drainage problems and disconnected ‘islands’ of land development53. The more outlying
district of Nong Chok, on the other hand, retains a relatively low population density and its
agricultural character is more pronounced.
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2.2 Causes of the 2006 Flooding

Figure 3: Satellite Image of 2006 Flooded Area in the Chao Phraya River Basin54
As with other instances of flooding in Bangkok, the circumstances that led to the city’s inundation in
2006 were both predictable and unique. Heavy precipitation, large volumes of runoff from the north
of the country and significant sea level rises due to seasonal high tides were all contributing factors.
In response, the floodwater was managed by allowing the agricultural land north of the city to flood
and also channelling the water to the east of the city, where the case study districts in this report are
located. The center of the city was protected by its embankments and drainage infrastructure,
though large parts of the surroundings areas (in particular, the case study districts) were
inundated55.

2.1.1 Continuous Heavy Rainfall
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In 2006, Thailand was affected by a number of tropical depressions between the months of August
and October. These resulted in short periods of intense precipitation across Thailand during this
period, on 27-31 August, 9-12 September and 18-23 September. The last, the ‘Xangsane’ typhoon,
occurred on 1-3 October. As Figure 4 shows, the typhoon travelled through Southeast Asia towards
the end of September, devastating large parts of the Philippines and Vietnam before reaching
Bangkok on October 2.
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GISTDA. Summary Report on Satellite Imagery of Flooding in 2006. Retrieved at:
http://www.deqp.go.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11969%3A2006-10-24&catid=7%3A2010-02-04-06-1410&Itemid=43&lang=th
54

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.25. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
55

Figure 4: the Xangsane typhoon, 25 September -2 October, 200656
This triggered intense flash precipitation in Bangkok. Though overall rainfall in the BMA during 2006
was not much lower than both the 30 year average and the total in the previous year (Figure 5),
when no major flooding occurred, 24 hours of heavy localized rain caused the city to be inundated as
its drainage system was unable to cope with rainfall exceeding 60mm/hour. Total cumulative rainfall
in Bangkok came to 317.3mm in September and 336.8mm in October. By way of comparison, rainfall
totalled just 71.1mm in August and 42.9mm in November57.

This is reflected in the very high monthly rainfall in October 2006 (Figure 6). While the total rainfall in
2006 (1,598.7mm) was only slightly larger than in 2010 (1,500mm), in October 2006 the rainfall
came to 336.8mm compared to just 241mm for the same month in 2010. In fact, excluding October,
the rainfall in the remaining 11 months is almost identical in both years. On the other hand, due to
the typhoon, rainfall in October 2006 was 40% higher than the total in October 2010.

56

Thai Meteorological Department. Retrieved at: http://www.tmd.go.th/index.php

57 Marome, W.A.(2011). Improving the Characterization of Impact Variables to Extreme Flood Events: A Case Study of the Flood 2006 in
Bangkok. CARII: Building Adaptive Capacity for Managing Climate Change Risks in Coastal Cities. Retrieved at:
http://start.org/download/car2/1-marome.pdf
58

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration.
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Figure 5: Total rainfall in the BMA, 2004-200658
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Figure 6: Rainfall in Bangkok, October 2006 and October 201059

2.2.2 High levels of runoff in the Chao Phraya River Basin
A second contributing factor to the 2006 floods was the large volume of runoff from the Chao
Phraya River Basin. While 30% of the rainfall is stored in dams and catchment basins, the remaining
70% is released into the alluvial plain and passes through Bangkok in October-November. Typically
runoff from the north of the country ranges between a minimum of 1,000-2,000m³/s and a
maximum of 4,000-5,000 m³/s. The capacity of the Chao Phraya River, on the other hand, is 2,5003,000 m³/s60.
In 2006, as Table 2 shows, over 85% of the annual runoff occurred in September and October.
Average Monthly Runoff (mcm)
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River
Basin
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Apr
.

Ma
y

Jun.

July

Aug.

Sept

Oct.

Nov
.

Dec
.

Jan.

Feb
.

Ma
r.

Total

Ping

126
.5

341
.9

511
.8

660.
0

132
6.6

199
7.6

184
9.6

904
.5

440
.8

277
.6

160
.7

127
.7

8723.
3

Wang

15.
4

74.
7

89.
9

107.
8

302.
4

477.
0

322.
4

120
.4

48.
2

31.
0

15.
3

12.
9

1617.
5

Yom

45.
7

171
.2

277
.8

290.
3

687.
5

115
4.6

635.
5

208
.3

88.
6

51.
1

26.
5

19.
7

3656.
6

Nan

153
.9

344
.1

781
.5

1558
.8

296
1.8

325
1.0

157
7.5

587
.7

313
.6

220
.3

143
.8

121
.2

1201
4.8

Pasak

38.
2

106
.3

180
.2

244.
3

502.
7

928.
3

557.
2

145
.5

76.
8

50.
7

33.
6

33.
4

2897.
3

Sakae

8.7

32.

57.

49.2

72.3

252.

429.

137

40.

21.

15.

8.5

1124.
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Meteorological Department.

60

http://dds.bangkok.go.th/News_dds/magazine/plan50/plan02.pdf

Krang

3

0

2

4

.9

2

8

3

8

Thachin

3.9

33.
3

19.
2

18.6

67.5

609.
5

501.
7

70.
1

20.
6

11.
2

5.6

3.2

1364.
4

Chao
Phraya

1.7

42.
4

20.
7

22.4

91.4

871.
7

608.
4

37.
5

17.
8

13.
4

3.6

0.8

1731.
8

Table 2: Average monthly runoff in Thailand’s rivers, 2006

Water volume,
Water volume, Chao Phraya
Water volume, Rama VI
Nakorn Sawan Dam
Dam
Dam
Month
(m³/s)
(m³/s)
(m³/s)
May
1,364
1,357
80
June
1,364
1,343
175
July
1,332
1,365
277
August
1,157
741
154
September
3,092
2,426
333
October
5,960
4,188
759
November
3,228
3,183
254
December
629
450
51
Table 3: Monthly water flow in Nakorn Sawan, Chao Phraya and Rama IV dams, 200661
The accumulated floodwater had also strained the capacity of its upstream catchment ponds and
dams to the limit. By September 25, the storage of the Bhumipol, Sirikit and Pa Kan dams was already
at 91.9%, 92.0% and 103.7% respectively, with a 3,112 m³/s rate of flow into the Chao Phraya River62,
more than its maximum capacity. As Table 3 shows, the water flow through Nakorn Sawan, Chao
Phraya and Rama IV dams rose sharply in September and peaked in October.

2.2.3 Sea Level Rise
A third factor in the 2006 flood was high sea levels. In October 25 and November 7, it peaked at 2.22
MSL: the maximum capacity of Bangkok is only 2.5 MSL. This sea level also severely reduced
Bangkok’s drainage capacity, thus exacerbating the effects of the runoff and heavy rain63. This
worsened the effects of the heavy rainfall and large volumes of runoff.

Estimating the full extent of the 2006 flooding and its impact requires a detailed and wide-ranging
assessment of its effects. Even among these four case study districts, the proportion of inundated
area and the accompanying damage varied considerably. Reflecting the mixed character of these
districts, as formerly agricultural regions now undergoing rapid suburbanization, the damage
extended to national infrastructure such as roads and rail lines, community buildings, businesses,
61

Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA.

62 Marome, W.A.(2011). Improving the Characterization of Impact Variables to Extreme Flood Events: A Case Study of the Flood 2006 in
Bangkok. CARII: Building Adaptive Capacity for Managing Climate Change Risks in Coastal Cities. Retrieved at:
http://start.org/download/car2/1-marome.pdf

Department of Environmental Quality. Retrieved at:
http://www.deqp.go.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11969%3A2006-10-24&catid=7%3A2010-02-04-06-1410&Itemid=43&lang=th
63
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3. Impact assessment of the 2006 flood
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fisheries and farms, along with other less tangible dimensions, such as mental health, that though
significant are not always be readily measurable.
Consequently, the full impacts of flooding and other natural disasters on communities is often
difficult to capture. In fact, this is an important gap in much of the previous research in this field.
However, to understand the true extent of the challenges that affected cities and districts face, it is
vital to gauge their more ‘invisible’ dimensions alongside the immediate physical destruction. In
particular, information on social vulnerability in a post-disaster context is frequently limited or
elusive. Though these aspects are not so readily quantifiable as damaged infrastructure, for
example, they nevertheless play a major role in determining post-disaster hardship and recovery at a
community, household and individual level.
This study aims to highlight this gap and the urgent need for an adequate flood-assessment proxy
that, by incorporating a variety of quantitative and qualitative measurements, creates a more
comprehensive picture of the impacts of flooding on communities and individuals. The research
involved two approaches. First, it reviews the available secondary data, such as damage profiles,
relief subsidies and mental health assessments, and examines the current information shortfalls.
Secondly, it present the findings of fieldwork undertaken in the case study districts, using semistructured interviews with residents to gain a better qualitative understanding of the 2006 flooding.

3.1 Secondary data
Table 4 outlines a detailed taxonomy of physical, economic, financial, technical, environmental and
social flood-related impacts. These extend from tangible effects like property damage to less
material considerations, such as psychosocial change: the associated costs are both direct (such as
loss of life, damage to physical capital) and indirect (such as reduced consumption, conflicts).
Together, these provide a template for a holistic disaster assessment.
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Physical
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Loss of life
and injuries
Damage to
property
Damage to
physical
infrastructure
Loss of land,
crops,
livestock

Economic
Stock

Flow

Damage
to
physical
capital
Loss of
inventory

Reduction in
income
generation
Effect on
investment
Reduction in
consumption
Effect on
production
Effect on
employment
generation

Financial

Technical

Environmental

Loss of
Disruption of
Air or water
financial
essential
pollution
capital
supplies like
Land
Effect on
water,
degradation
public
electricity
revenue
Disruption of
and
communication
expenditure services
Effect on
private
revenue
and
expenditure
Table 4: Impacts of a natural disaster (Source: Patankar, A. 2009)

Social

Displacement
or relocation
Loss of assets
Loss of
livelihoods
Poor quality of
life
Conflicts
Psychophysical
and
psychosocial
changes

However, the available data is very limited and often fails to present a meaningful picture of the
impacts on the ground. In table 4, the areas where data is available for the 2006 flooding is
highlighted, drawing on previous studies and assessments, some conducted in its immediate
aftermath. These are discussed in more detail below:

Physical
• Total inundated area
• Damage to property and infrastructure
• Loss of agricultural produce
Environment
• Water quality
• Sanitary level
Social
• Psychological assessment64
Unfortunately, in terms of official data there are clear information shortfalls, especially relating to
social vulnerability: even the mental health profiling used in the psychological assessment and
presented here was conducted informally by nurses working in flood-affected areas. In addition,
much of the official data is collected by national agencies at a country-wide level, with no
disaggregation of the effects at a local level. Yet gauging flood-related impacts on individual
communities, rather than just the country as a whole, is critical to understanding their actual
consequences for worst affected. This section is not only summarizes what data is available, but also
highlights the substantial gaps, particularly regarding the social and local dimensions of the disaster.
In future, if the quality and scope of data collection improves, it will then be possible to develop a
stronger, more comprehensive proxy to assess flooding impacts in Bangkok.

3.1.1 Physical effects

Figure 7: Total inundated area in Klong Samwa, Minburi, Ladkrabang and Nong Jork districts

64

This was an unofficial assessment undertaken by nurses operating in selected flood-affected communities.
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Total inundated area
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Figure 7 shows the extent of inundation in the districts of Klong Samwa, Minburi, Ladkrabang and
Nong Jork districts respectively. The total area is 334,331.9 rai, with 175,851 rai (52.6%) flooded.
However, the proportion varies substantially between districts, from 29.1% in Minburi to 70.7% in
Minburi.
Damage to property and infrastructure
The physical impact of flooding on districts and communities is multi-faceted. To reflect this, the
calculations in this report use a wide variety of measurements and proxies to estimate the cost of
the flooding, including damage to property, damage to infrastructure, and loss of land, produce and
livestock. These exert, in different ways, direct and indirect burdens on the government, local
communities and individual residents.
Table 5 gives an overview of the reported damage in each of the four case study districts on October
5, just after the flooding. In particular, it gives an idea of the physical damage to communal
infrastructure and the associated impacts this has on education, social life and mobility for residents.
District

Settlement

Nong Jork

Education

Religious

Transportation

13 schools

3 temples

22 roads

4 mosques
Minburi

4 villages

Ladkrabang

30 communities

12 schools

6 villages
Khlongsamwa

10 communities

1 mosque

4 roads

6 temples

12 roads

3 mosques
2 schools

3 temples

11 roads

1 village
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Table 5: Physical damage by district: settlement, education, religious and transport (October 5,
2006)65
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Table 6 outlines the damage to Thailand’s transport infrastructure and the consequent costs of
restoring its highways, roads, railways and waterways. These are national figures for the entire
country, collected by the Ministry of Transport. In terms of direct costs, such as the repairs to the
physical fabric, this is valid as the expense for this is shouldered by the central government rather
than the local authorities. What these figures arguably do not capture is the indirect costs of
infrastructure damage in flood-affected districts. While the government bears the bulk of the direct
costs of repairing and reconstructing roads, waterways and rail lines, the potentially substantial
indirect costs that the damage imposes on the local economy is largely passed on to the community.
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Government data.

Infrastructure

Damage

Costs

Highways66

286 routes on 757 roads: 31 roads
with no access.

1,735 million baht ($58
million): 1,650 million baht to
rebuild damaged roads and 85
million baht to restore
accessibility to obstructed
roads.

Rural roads67

496 routes: 12 roads with no access.

1,257.7 million baht (around
$42 million)

467.6km of roads and 1,337m of
bridge to be rebuilt.
102 pipe and 49 land erosion projects.
Railways

6 projects, all in northern Thailand.

300 million baht (around $10
million)

Waterways
and dykes

496 routes requiring protection from
erosion/deterioration. 12 roads with
no access.

226 million baht (around $7.5
million)

Table 6: Damage to national infrastructure and associated costs, Thailand (Ministry of Transport)
Table 7 outlines the damage to Bangkok’s rice-growers, both its terms of land damage and crop
losses. The total cost, exceeding 84 million baht, highlights the ongoing importance of agriculture in
Bangkok, particularly in suburban and peripheral areas such as the case study districts. In the
country as a whole, the costs ranged from as little as 0.6 million Baht in Ranong province to as much
as 663 million Baht in Nakornsawan.
Cost
Total land Affected
Damaged
Crop losses
(Baht,
(km2)
land (km2) land (km2)
(tons)
millions)
In-season
92,590
rice
km2
90.6 km2
27.2 km2
12,742.20
84.099
Table 7: Damage to agricultural land and crops, Bangkok
Table 8 outlines the compensation awarded to farmers for flood-related losses. While most goods
such as livestock have remained at the same nominal levels and hence in real terms are actually
lower in value in 2010 than in 2006, the subvention for rice fields has increased fivefold, from 414 to
2098 baht/rai. The compensation measurements, however, reflect the same flaws that affect the
narrow scope of conventional damage assessment: the scope is technical and confined to direct,
readily quantifiable outputs. This approach may be beneficial for larger agro-industrial operations
that can readily convert their losses into these terms. For smaller-scale, family-managed farms and
fisheries, on the other hand, the indirect costs in terms of their long term livelihoods are more
complex. These costs are not factored in to conventional compensation frameworks.

66

Figures collated from 53 provinces in Thailand, as of November 29, 2009.

67

Figures collated from 57 provinces in Thailand, as of November 29, 2009.
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Compensation (Baht)

Compensation (Baht), 2006

Compensation (Baht), 2010

Rice

414/rai

2,098/rai

Crops

579/rai

2,921/rai

Others

786/rai

4,908/rai

Chicken

27.5/each

27.5/each

Layer chicken

20/each

20/each

Duck

20/each

20/each

Sheep/Goat

1,400/each

1,400/each

Cow (6-24 months)

3,600-15,800/each

3,600-15,80/each

3,406/rai

3,406 rai

257/m2

257/m2

9,098/rai

9,098/rai

Farm produce

Livestock

Fishery
Fish (pond/field)
Fish (floating basket/cement
pond)
Shrimp/Crab/Shellfish

Table 8: Agricultural compensation by product, 2006 and 2011
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As table 9 shows, both the damage and subsidies were far greater in 2006, illustrating the
substantial difference between the 2006 flood and the more ‘normal’ event of 2010. In Khlong
Samwa, for instance, the total inundated area came to 14,254 rai, at a cost of 7.259 million Baht: in
2010, the coverage was only 494 rai, at a cost of 1.269 million Baht.
Total flooded area
Total flood-affected
Total compensation
District
farmers
(Baht, millions)
(rai)

]
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2006

2010

2006

2010

2006

2010

Khlong Samwa

14,254

494

772

47

7.259

1.269

Minburi

5,877

464

441

54

1.891

1.278

Lad Krabang

14,826

410

325 &

32

4.377

0.987

52

7.090

2.129

671
(inland
fisheries)
Nong Chok

16,817

1,010

672

Table 9: Flood-related agricultural impacts and compensation, 2006 and 2010

3.1.2 Environmental effects
Flooding can exert serious strain on local ecosystems, destroying habitats, degrading land quality
and contaminating other essential natural resources. One of the main issues during the 2006 flood,
was water pollution. Like other forms of environmental damage, the effects are often diverse and
long-lasting. Official ‘costs’, such as government spending on basic rehabilitation, represent only a
fraction of the overall burden. Much of this is borne instead, in different ways, by the local
communities.
Water pollution

Figure 8: Pollution levels in Thailand’s rivers, 200668

3.1.3 Social effects
The flood-related effects that are arguably the hardest to quantify are social. As a result, these tend
to feature less in damage assessments than the physical costs in terms of infrastructure, crops and
so on. Yet in reality, the social consequences for individuals and communities may represent a
‘second disaster’, with long term implications for a city and its residents. Integrating social
vulnerability appropriately into disaster assessments is an essential first step to addressing these
effects – and a prerequisite for the meaningful recovery of communities struggling with the human
cost of environmental catastrophe.
Mental Health
There is a striking absence of official data on the social impact of flooding on communities. The
proxy used here, mental health, in fact draws on informal assessments conducted by nurses in floodaffected areas. Figure 9 illustrates the result of these assessments of selected community members

68

Pollution Control Department.
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In Figure 8, pollution mapping of Thailand’s rivers shows that of the 5 main rivers, the two in the
flood basin, the Chao Phraya and the Tahjeen, were both heavily contaminated. While the Tahjeen
River was classified as ‘polluted to very polluted’ (with 2-4 mg oxygen/liter), the Chao Phraya was
‘very polluted’ (<2 mg oxygen/liter). Water pollution in fact represents one of the indirect costs of
flooding that affects, among other areas, agricultural fisheries. Hidden costs such as these are
generally overlooked in flood damage assessments, and do not feature in compensation payments.
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and their high levels of stress, trauma and disorientation. It also illustrates the causal link between
the poor psychological state of the subjects and other related health issues.

Figure 9: Psychological state of selected members of flood-affected communities, 2006
However, the assessment also reported high levels of psychological recovery, in terms of resilience,
adaptability and self-reliance, following a mental health rehabilitation program carried out by the
researchers. These findings suggest positive directions for future post-disaster processes in Bangkok,
with a strong emphasis on mental health as a significant element within a broader relief and recovery
strategy. This should include not only the direct victims of flooding, but also ‘secondary’ victims such
as their relatives and the volunteer workers. Again, this is also an important flood-related impact that
is often overlooked.
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In summary, the long-term consequences of the disaster on communities are highly localized, social
and psychological as well as technical and economic, and involve in addition to the direct costs of
damaged goods and infrastructure a variety of ‘hidden’ indirect costs that are often not recognized
in official assessments. In this sense, the relative scarcity of available information highlights the
need for more holistic and community-based approach to data collection.
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3.2 Fieldwork data
The primary research was conducted in the four selected districts of Nong Jork, Minburi, Ladkrabang
and Khlongsamwa, all located outside the King’s dyke in eastern Bangkok. A total of 380 surveys
were undertaken to assess flood-related impacts across four main sectors: 300 household samples,
50 agricultural samples, 28 business samples and 2 industrial samples, namely the Bangchan and
Ladkrabang industrial estates, the only ones in the study area.
12 communities in total from the 4 districts were selected for the surveys. These were a mix of poor
and middle-income communities (Table 10).

District

Communities

Income level

Nong Jork

Lampakchee and Lamtaoting

Poor

Minburi

Jairanai, Garden Home and Buakaw

Middle-income

Ladkrabang

Sudthawad and Leabklongmorn

Poor

Klongsamwa

Teerawan and Baanpoon

Middle-income

Table 10: Sample communities in case study districts
In order to gauge the true effects of the flooding, the researchers designed a series of proxies to
better measure the impacts, direct and indirect, on livelihoods and the local economy (Table 11).
Sector

Proxies

Household

Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /
Health (physical and mental)

Agricultural

Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /
Product price

Business

Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /
Stock / Custom and trade

Industrial

Flood prevention plan69
Table 11: Proxies for gauging flooding effects, by sector
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR

Loss Incurred

Work absence

Health

Sub-proxies

Total

Food and
utilities

Transportation

Repairs

Flood
prevention

15,000

600

25,000

5,000

Daily
income

Day (s) absent

300

3

44,400

900

Medication
300

300
45,600

69
It was not possible to access information in this sector, either at the employer or factory worker level, and so the impact could not be measured.
However, as most of the factory labor force resides close to the industrial estate, the information acquired through the household surveys was an acceptable
substitute. In addition, the researchers were able to access information regarding the flood prevention plan of both industrial estates to analyze the gap in
their adaptation strategies.
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BUSINESS SECTOR
Proxy Variables
Loss Incurred

Sub-Proxies

Total

Lost customers

Stock
damage

Repairs

Flood prevention

15,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

Expenses
(workers)

Day(s)
absent

300

3

Work absence

30,000

900
30,900

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Proxy Variables
Loss Incurred

Work Absence

Sub-Proxies

Total

Field damage

Flood prevention

30,000

12,000

Daily income

Day(s) absent

500

30

42,000

15,000
57,000
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Table 12: Proxy measurements for flood-related costs of flooding, by sector
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This provides a fuller picture of flood-related costs to individuals and the community. Table 12 above
summarizes the average loss for each household, business and farm in the sample communities.
While it includes repair costs to housing, vehicles and other equipment, it also extends to the
intangible or indirect losses that result from illness, work absence or additional transport costs
caused by flooding. Revenue shortfalls or unpaid leave create an added burden that conventional
measurements of costs and losses often fail to capture. As Table 12 shows, these indirect costs are
substantial for households, businesses and agriculture. In the case of businesses, the indirect costs of
lost customers, work absence and the ‘invisible’ cost of flood prevention in fact exceed the direct
costs of repairs and physical damage.
Table 13 is a detailed breakdown of the total costs, sorted by sector, month and district, of the
flooding between August and November. For the sake of clarity, the effects on each sector and
district is color coded according to its intensity, from ‘no impact’ (no color) to ‘high’ (blue), as the
legend below the table explains. These measurements are used to assess the relative flooding levels,
economic loss, physical damage, health effects and work absence resulting from the 2006 flood.
Data is also presented for the less severe flood event of 2010 by way of comparison.
The results highlight the importance of a localized analysis of the impacts of flooding, as both the
intensity and the nature of its effects vary considerably from district to district. Of the four, Minburi

was the worst affected in 2006 and 2010. The impact was particularly pronounced in September and
October, as residents suffered loss of livelihood as a result of economic disruption and health risks.
Work absence is also an important indirect cost in the flooding. In Klongsamwa and Ladkrabang, the
two most densely populated districts, some residents were unable to travel to work, especially in
October when the inundation was at its peak. Ladkrabang in particular is a major agglomeration
economy, with an industrial estate and the then recently constructed Suvarnabhumi Airport, opened
in September just before the flooding hit. However, as table 14 shows, work attendance remained
relatively unaffected through the flooding, suggesting a comparatively high level of adaptation.
Nevertheless, within the agricultural sector work absence was a major problem as fields and land
were inundated, in the worst cases potentially extending into weeks.
Interestingly, the impacts were comparable across different income levels. In particular, the
relatively low impact of work absence on poor and affluent households was in fact similar for the
lowest income (<10,000 Baht/month) and the highest income (>50,000 baht/month) households.
From these results, it would seem that low income households demonstrated a relatively high level
of adaptation to the flooding. There are probably a number of dimensions to this: for example, the
limited ability of low income households to shoulder the costs of work absence, especially when
unlike higher income households they may not have the security of formally salaried employment. In
this case, the adaptation strategies of low and high income households, however ‘successful’, are
likely to be substantially different in nature.
The survey also illustrated some interesting dimensions to flood preparedness at a household level.
The results highlighted poor levels of preparedness in 2006: for instance, only 26% of households had
stocked food and only 31% drinking water before the flood. However, this proportion rose
substantially for the 2010 flood (to 37% and 41% respectively), suggesting that many households had
learnt important lessons from the previous event and prepared more effectively. And when
respondents were asked whether in future they would be willing to stock up on food and water
supplies before flooding, for both goods around 75% of households stated that they were willing to
do so. This suggests that local communities have the capacity to develop better preparation
strategies and that there is still further potential to improve on these responses. This is where a wellcoordinated strategic partnerships could be very effective.
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Health care costs, whether for minor pharmaceutical purchases or more serious referrals, are
another important indirect cost that is often overlooked in damage assessments. These costs are
often not insubstantial. In Nong Jork, where much of the area is farmland, parts of the district
experienced protracted flooding, with some areas submerged in over a foot of water for more than a
month. As a result, the generally low income population was faced with a variety of health issues,
such as dengue fever and foot-and-mouth disease.
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MINBURI
Household Impact (2006)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Month

Work Health

Month

August
September
October
November

Household Impact (2010)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Work Health

Household Impact (2010)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Work Health

Household Impact (2010)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Work Health

Household Impact (2010)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Work Health

August
September
October
November

NONG JORK
Household Impact (2006)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Month

Work Health

Month

August
September
October
November

August
September
October
November

KLONG SAMWA
Month

Household Impact (2006)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Work Health

Month

August
September
October
November

August
September
October
November

LAD KRABANG
Month

Household Impact (2006)
Community
Home
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss

Work Health

Month

August
September
October
November

August
September
October
November

Table 13: Intensity of costs by month, district and sector, August-November 2006 and 2010
2006 Flood
Household Sector (300HH)
PROXY
PARAMETERS

Community

Agricultural Sector(50)

Business Sector(30)

Home

10,00030,000

30,00050,000

>50,000 <10,000

10,00030,000

30,00050,000

>50,000

Farm

Livestock

Fishery

Consumer Goods

Services

Flood Level
57.14% 54.07%
No. of Days Flooded 62.50% 47.41%
Loss Incurred
44.64% 43.70%
Work Absence
*
*
Health
*
*
Production Price
*
*
Stock
*
*
Customer
*
*

52.22%
52.00%
45.56%
*
*
*
*
*

63.16%
52.63%
31.58%
*
*
*
*
*

41.48%
38.52%
28.15%
87.41%
59.26%
*
*
*

47.78%
44.44%
28.89%
85.33%
74.44%
*
*
*

42.11%
42.11%
36.84%
84.31%
68.42%
*
*
*

45.45%
78.79%
42.42%
90.91%
*
75.76%
*
*

66.67%
75.00%
50.00%
91.67%
*
58.33%
*
*

60.00%
80.00%
40.00%
80.00%
*
100.00%
*
*

68.75%
56.25%
43.75%
56.25%
*
*
31.25%
43.75%

57.14%
57.14%
50.00%
42.86%
*
*
*
64.29%

<10,000

32.14%
57.14%
30.36%
80.36%
66.07%
*
*
*

2010 Flood
Household Sector (300HH)
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PROXY
PARAMETERS
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Community

Agricultural Sector(50)

Business Sector(30)

Home

10,00030,000

30,00050,000

>50,000 <10,000

10,00030,000

30,00050,000

>50,000

Farm

Livestock

Fishery

Consumer Goods

Services

Flood Level
39.29% 31.85%
No. of Days Flooded 32.14% 30.37%
Loss Incurred
42.86% 41.48%
Work Absence
*
*
Health
*
*
Production Price
*
*
Stock
*
*
Customer
*
*

39.00%
31.00%
41.00%
*
*
*
*
*

42.11%
31.58%
36.84%
*
*
*
*
*

31.11%
34.07%
35.56%
85.93%
65.93%
*
*
*

31.00%
34.00%
36.00%
85.56%
67.78%
*
*
*

36.84%
31.58%
31.58%
89.47%
52.63%
*
*
*

51.52%
72.73%
39.39%
81.82%
*
90.91%
*
*

50.00%
58.33%
58.33%
75.00%
*
66.67%
*
*

60.00%
60.00%
40.00%
60.00%
*
60.00%
*
*

56.25%
43.75%
31.25%
56.25%
*
*
18.75%
50.00%

50.00%
42.86%
35.71%
50.00%
*
*
*
78.57%

<10,000

32.14%
32.14%
33.83%
87.50%
66.07%
*
*
*

Table 14: Intensity of flood impact by sector and income level, 2006 and 2010

High
Medium
Low
No Impact

Flood Level
30 cm
15 cm
5 cm
No impact

No.of flood days
> month
1-4 week
< week
No impact

Loss Incurred
>10,000
5,000-10,000
<5,000
No impact

Key to Tables 13 and 14

Work Absence
> week
3-5 days
1-2 days
No impact

Health
Admission
District Officer
Store Purchases
No impact

Another important finding from the survey is that that the costs of the flooding, through lost income
and damaged infrastructure, is generally more severe for the community as a whole than individual
households. This suggests a different perspective on the effects of flooding and the value of viewing
its impacts at a community level: the conventional measurements used in official data, besides
national aggregations, is typically the unit of the individual household. If the impacts at a community
level are more severe, as these results suggest, then this would reinforce the importance of collective
adaptation and mitigation strategies at a community level. Currently, preparedness in the event of
extreme flooding is generally undertaken privately by individual households, with government
encouragement focusing on self-reliance and personal initiative. But to minimize the very substantial
community-wide costs of the flooding, there needs to be a platform for collective action.
The results also show that within the agricultural sector, farmland was the worst affected by flooding
in both 2006 and 2010, with levels in excess of a foot lasting over a month. Therefore, from one
perspective, farmland is arguably the most vulnerable to flooding. Nevertheless, it is important to
note that fisheries were the most affected by the increasing cost of production in 2006. The
government therefore must factor these different effects into its assessments and compensation
strategies to reflect the varying costs to different agricultural sectors.
As for small businesses, the impact is less straightforward and depends in particular on the product
of the enterprise. In this case, the sub-proxies that sort the findings by occupation and business type
are instructive. For instance, while the service sector was weakened by flood-related disruption,
demand for basic consumer goods actually rose among residents who were more reliant on local
shops to provide them with food and other provisions. Again, these nuances potentially have
important implications for how post-disaster economic recovery strategies should be targeted.
Together, the data on the impacts of the flooding in terms of health, work absence and other costs,
direct and indirect, highlight the limitations of the dominant approach to flood protection in
Thailand: as largely a matter of water management. This is reflected in its institutional governance
and the strongly technical responses to flood-related threats, as discussed in section 4. Yet in reality,
flood events impact on education, health, social welfare, community cohesion and other areas that
present strategies, with their emphasis on megaprojects and structural investments, generally fail to
reach.

4. Adaptation responses

Bangkok has long been supported by the historic network of khlong and the polder system,
supported by the King’s Dyke, that protect the inner city (see section 1.2.2). Nevertheless, as this
study has shown, large areas of suburban Bangkok were inundated in 2006 and at a substantial
social and economic cost to local communities. This highlighted the need for further protective
capacity and so, as with the 1983 and 1995 floods, further measures were proposed in its wake,
including the creation of a diversion canal at the upper Ta Chin river to channel some of the water
away from the Chao Phraya70. The strategic focus since then - for example the Royal Irrigation
Department (RID) master plan - has been primarily infrastructural, with an emphasis on creating and
enhancing drainage and pumping71. In partnership with the Department of Drainage and Sewage,
Vongvisessomjai, S. (2007). Flood Mitigation Master Plan for Chao Phraya Delta. Paper presented at the 4th INWEPF Steering
Meeting and Symposium. Retrieved at: http://web.rid.go.th/ffd/papers/Paper-Session%201/p104%20Flood%20Mitigation%20Master%20Plan.pdf
70

ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, pp.25-26. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
71
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4.1 Current adaptation measures
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the RID developed a 450 km2 protected area in the eastern suburbs beyond the King’s Dike,
supported by a system of monitors and flood walls along the main canals to restrict inflows of
floodwater from nearby. Three pumping stations have been constructed at Hok Wah Sai Lang, Saen
Saeb and Pravetburirom to provide the system with an additional CMS of drainage capacity72.
Despite the substantial investment in flood protection in the last three decades, the city’s flood
management system may prove inadequate in the years to come. Already, during the 2011 flooding,
it was reported that the system was struggling to cope with the massive volumes of runoff flowing in
from the north: according to former officials, the infrastructure had been primarily developed to
cope with localized flooding from heavy rainfall73. In addition, the King’s Dyke is designed to cope
with low level flooding, as opposed to a major flood event74. In the future, with the effects of climate
change, land subsidence and other factors, the existing and planned dykes and drainage may not
even be able to protect flood-vulnerable areas such as the western parts of Bangkok against more
than a 1-in-10-year flooding event75. While Bangkok has a strong potential adaptive capacity, it may
nevertheless find that it fails to keep pace with the increasing threat and exposure brought about by
climate change and rapid population growth76.

STRUCTURAL MEASURES

NON-STRUCTURAL MEASURES

Water management

Land use control

Main pump

Land regulations

Polder embankments

Public information/education

Dykes

Flood proofing

Loss reduction

Retention area (basin)
Canal improvement

Flood forecasting/ warning

Drainage (inner pumps, sub-khlong,
pipes)

Flood fighting

Table 15: Structural and non-structural flood prevention measures77

Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA (2009). Flood Protection in Bangkok. Paper revised from Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007).
Flood protection in BMA 2006.
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Bangkok Post, ‘Drainage system not up to task’. October 30, 2011. Retrieved at: Flood Protection in Bangkok. Paper revised from
Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007). Flood protection in BMA 2006.http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/263836/drainage-system-notup-to-task73 Bangkok Post, ‘Drainage system not up to task’. October 30, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/263836/drainage-system-not-up-to-task
IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319
74

World Bank (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.xii. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/58263661248255995902/executive-summary.pdf
75

Yusuf, A. and Francisco, H. (2009). Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia. Economy and Environment Program
for Southeast Asia.
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Department of Drainage and Sewage. Retrieved at: http://www.rid.go.th/thaicid/_5_article/2550/chanchai.swf

Whether Bangkok proves itself capable of developing comprehensive and holistic responses to
climate change and other environmental threats will be of critical importance to the city’s future. In
part, any long term solution will probably require additional, well-targeted investment in physical
infrastructure. The World Bank has already proposed a range of future investments to enhance the
capital’s pumping and drainage capacity78. However, it will need to be accompanied by a broader
legislative, regulatory and planning framework to address the multidimensional character of floodrelated threats. Much of Bangkok’s strategy to date has been characterized by structural and
preventive measures, in particular ‘megaprojects’, with an emphasis on mitigation. As Table 15
shows, structural measures are primarily about the technical aspects of water management,
supported by the physical hardware of dykes, embankments, drainage tunnels and so on. But there
are also important non-structural approaches that should be implemented, with a focus more on
regulating land use and reducing exposure, such as planning regulations and community education.
To support the city’s adaptation to the reality of climate change in the decades ahead, Bangkok must
afford a much greater priority to these measures. Some non-structural measures are already in place.
For example, the Flood Control Center is an information and decision making tool, with a flood
forecasting system that predicts rainfall intensity across 650 km2 of the east bank. The focus is still
fundamentally on short term mitigation, however: the timeframe is generally 3-6 hours ahead of the
flooding79. Furthermore, though the coverage within the central part of the city is extensive, there
are also striking gaps, as figure 10 shows: there are no centers located in the eastern suburbs, for
example, in the case study districts.

While there has also been some emphasis on other non-structural measures, particularly in outlying
urban areas such as the district in this case study, this arguably reflects expediency rather than a
commitment to adaptation: much of Bangkok’s existing infrastructure is devoted to protecting its
inner centre, while the suburbs of the city are largely unprotected. This has been a major source of
78

In eastern Bangkok, where the case study communities are located, pumping capacity to channel floodwater into the Tha Chin River and
the Gulf of Thailand is still inadequate, according to the study: it suggested expanding pumping capacity from 737 to 1,065 m³/s and so
raising the total capacity of the canals from 607 to 1,580 m³/sec. In the western area of the city, the three major pumping stations at Khlong
Phasi Charoeng, Sanam Chai, and Khun Rat Phinit Chai currently have a combined capacity of only 84 m³/s. Other approaches, already
proposed by the BMA, include a coastal erosion protection strategy and embankments along the shoreline of the eastern area of the Chao
Phraya River to protect the industrial community area from rising sea levels. The study estimated that for1m1-in-30 year flood in an A1F1
climate scenario, the inundated area in Bangkok and Samut Prakarn provinces would be reduced by 51%, from 744.3km2 to 362.1km2. It
found that the funding necessary to protect Bangkok from a 1-in-30- year or 1-in-100-year flood event was 35 billion or 49 billion baht
respectively, and concluded that in both cases the investment would be economically feasible. ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks
and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, pp.56-57. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
79 http://www.unescap.org/idd/events/2009_EGM-DRR/ThailandFlood%20Protection%20in%20Bangkok.%202009.pdf
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Figure 10: Flood control centers, Bangkok
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tension during flood events, such as in 2011, when the capital’s protective infrastructure failed to
protect large swaths of the city’s suburbs from inundation. In fact, by blockading the flow of the
floodwater from entering the city, this ‘flood protection’ was regarded by some flood-affected
residents as an aggravation. In Khlong Sam Wa, for instance, there were standoffs between locals
and the police over community demands that the sluice gate there be opened to relieve flooding in
the area80, with residents subsequently breaking a hole in it81.
To date, the emphasis has been weighted too heavily on mitigation and short term prevention,
generally through structural means. The BMA’s strategies focus primarily on three approaches:
•

Flooding prevention: this is achieved through both structural and non-structural measures.
While the former is typically employed in dense, inner city districts, the latter is often favored in
low density residential and agricultural areas. This potentially suggests that in suburban areas,
such as the case study districts, full prevention may not be achievable, but the negative effects
of inundation can be substantially reduced through effective adaptation measures.

•

Post-flood disaster recovery: focused on immediate mitigation through operating and
maintaining pumping and drainage capacity, as well as developing a short term action plan. In
2006, this included the installation of additional pumps in high risk areas, the release of surplus
water into irrigation areas and upstream water retention.

•

Medium-term post-flood disaster recovery: maintaining existing infrastructure and constructing
additional capacity to sustain and enhance protective capacity, accompanied by measures to
prevent and resolve flooding. Careful coordination, monitoring and evaluation is necessary to
achieve this.
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The weaknesses of this approach are clear, especially in the context of chronic land subsidence and a
rapidly changing climate. What is needed instead is a meaningful strategy of long term adaptation
that would prepare Bangkok for the possibility of ‘safe failure’. This would mean that, in the event of
the partial or total failure of its protective infrastructure against a future flood, the capital would be
sufficiently adapted to recover quickly and without catastrophic consequences. This is a far securer
approach than relying solely on infrastructure for protection, while doing little to improve the city’s
adaptive capacity. If Bangkok’s history of flooding has demonstrated anything, it is that even welldeveloped infrastructure is not infallible.
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There have, in fact, been urgent calls along these lines for many years. After the 2006 flooding, for
instance, there were proposals to develop a broader developmental vision for the capital that would
minimize its exposure to future flooding. Additional flood protection was planned and budgeted at a
national and city level until 2014, along with a long-term land use plan up to 2057 with designated
development nodes and protected zones for environmental drainage82. In practice, though, the
effectiveness of these measures has been weak. For decades, what regulation has been put in place
has frequently been sabotaged, ignored or circumvented. One example, back in 1992, is the BMA’s
belated planning restrictions in the eastern floodplain, with detailed zoning for landfills and housing.
Had these regulations been observed, it is likely the eastern area of Bangkok would have retained
Bangkok Post. Khlong Samwa still tense. October 31, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/264082/khlong-samwa-still-tense
80

Bangkok Post. Khlong Samwa sluice gate ‘fixed’. November 2, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/264440/khlong-samwa-sluice-gate-fixed
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ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, pp.25-26. Retrieved at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
82

more of its natural capacity as a floodway, and the destruction inflicted by the 2006 flooding in the
case study districts would have been substantially lower. Yet in practice, the code was widely
ignored83. Bangkok also has a system of ‘green diagonal’ zoning in areas of Khlong Samwa,Minburi,
Ladkrabang and Nong Chok, where the construction of most property types is prohibited and limited
to single houses on a plot of 1,000 wah. Regulations also impose a minimum of 100 wah for houses
in certain areas to the west of the city. This is intended to benefit farmers and provide them with the
land they need for cultivation. However, through a legal loophole the regulations have been
exploited to facilitate the construction of luxury housing in areas such as Thonburi, in western
Bangkok84.
In the wake of the 2011 flooding, the city is now proposing to introduce designated floodway zones
in the eastern and western suburbs of Bangkok, protected by development restrictions, in its
forthcoming 2012 city plan85. Whether this time the regulations are properly imposed remains to be
seen and will depend in no small part on the city’s ability to resolve the ongoing issues of fragmented
governance and poor cooperation described in sections 4.2 and 4.3.

4.2 Flood governance and strategic frameworks
By their very nature, flooding and other environmental disasters are multidimensional in their
devastation: their solutions must therefore be multidimensional too. Rising sea levels, for example,
will necessitate improved neighborhood dykes and drainage, as well as a well-managed coastal
retreat strategy and substantial infrastructure to protect harbors. Similarly, the growing frequency
of extreme weather events will require a holistic range of responses that encompasses prevention,
mitigation, adaption and short term relief and involves a variety of stakeholders, from central
government and the local authorities to communities and the private sector. Measures should
include flood-proofed buildings and better drainage, but also extend to related areas such as energy
diversification. As for coping with the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster, preparation should
be both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’: effective emergency planning by the relevant public bodies
should be balanced, at a household level, with measures like an emergency stock of provisions to
ensure a period of self-sufficiency if supplies are disrupted by a major flood event86.

Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice
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Bangkok Post, ‘Floodways key to keeping capital safe’. November 20, 2011. Retrieved at:
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Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
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Sapphaisal, C. (2007). Planning and Flood Mitigation for the Chao Phraya River Basin. Retrieved at:
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This approach requires a holistic and highly integrated collaboration between different departments
and administrations. In practice, however, Bangkok’s flood governance is a major obstacle to
effective action. Historically, Thailand’s institutional authority has suffered from fragmentation by
multiple agencies with autonomous, overlapping or conflictual mandates.
Tensions and
contradictions, often highly politicized, also exist between central and local governing bodies. This
pattern is evident is in Bangkok’s flood adaption policies. The lack of cooperation and integration
between these various bodies has in fact been identified as one of the main obstacles to future flood
management in the basin87. The barriers are typically:
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•

Specialist/institutional: reflecting designated technical expertise or even ingrained special
interests.

•

Local/central: reflecting conflicting or overlapping responsibilities.

•

Geographic: reflecting the absence of a substantive coordinating authority within greater
Bangkok.

Figure 11 summarizes the different central and municipal government bodies responsible in various
ways for flood prevention/relief and post-disaster recovery. What is immediately clear is the
divergent roles and mandates that each organization has, with specific institutional remits to
prevent, alleviate and resolve flood-related issues such as pollution, road maintenance, mental
health and environmental degradation. In fact, a variety of sector-specific agencies are operating
within the broad remit of flood management, including the Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand (EGAT), the Royal Irrigation Department (RIG) and the Public Works Department (PWD)88.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives is responsible for agricultural water management and
flood protection for a large number of urban centers. The Ministry of the Interior, on the other hand,
deals with disaster preparedness and prevention at a local level. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment develops climate change adaptation research, and the Ministry on
Science and Technology plans future water management strategies for the country 89 . Flood
protection within the Chao Phraya Basin is also fragmented by central and local administrative
mandates. There are administrative bodies with localized governance remits, such as the Local
Administration Department (LAD) and the BMA within Bangkok90, as well as city-level specialist units
such as the Department of Drainage and Sewage and the Flood Control Center, both responsible for
different aspects of flood prevention in Bangkok91. As a result, flood protection strategies may
involve a wide array of different actors with separate mandates92.
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But while this might at first appear as positive evidence of a multidimensional and integrated
disaster prevention approach, due to Thailand’s institutional divisions the overall effect is not
cooperative and holistic. For instance, the confused institutional structure means that there is often
little clarity among stakeholders over which agencies are overseeing various aspects of flood
protection: respondents in the surveys undertaken for this report demonstrated a range of divergent
opinions on which department was primarily responsible, suggesting poor linkages between public
authorities and communities. Furthermore, in important ways, the BMA has only limited control
over its own flood protection strategy. Firstly, in terms of financing, there is the BMA’s requirement
to secure funding for its flood protection through grant subsidies from the national government,
rather than locally controlled levies. Secondly, in terms of governance, it has no formal influence
over flood-related issues outside its geographic remit, such as water management strategies
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For example, existing proposed dam projects jointly managed by EGAT and RID; dike alignment by RIG, LAD and BMA; a polder
system to protect municipal areas involving BMA and PWD; non-structural issues such as legislation by LAD; and the extension of
flood protection areas in the eastern suburbs by RID and DDS. Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA (2009). Flood Protection in
Bangkok. Paper revised from Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007). Flood protection in BMA 2006.
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upstream, particularly the release or retention of runoff in the country’s major dams. While flooding
in the city may be significantly affected by these issues, they are generally formulated by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, with no official platform for the BMA to advise or influence
its decision making. Thirdly, the authority of the BMA is also limited in other ways, in relation to
other local bodies. While Bangkok itself has extended far beyond its original boundaries and now
encompasses the surrounding 5 provinces, this is not reflected in a single executive agency: the BMR
still comprises multiple autonomous authorities with only limited shared cooperation. This means
that the BMA has little or no say over many decisions that in practice impact heavily on Bangkok city.
For instance, while the BMA has imposed regulation on natural floodways in areas of Bangkok
province, including the eastern suburbs, it has only been able to impose these controls within its
own geographical remit, not throughout the BMR. Therefore it had no control over the construction
of Suvarnabhumi airport within the neighboring province of Samut Prakan, even though the
development in the heart of the eastern floodplain had a predictable impact on the drainage
capacity of the area, and is now a major obstruction to the natural flow of floodwater from the
north93.

What is also striking is the strong institutional emphasis on short term solutions, as figure 12 shows:
the priority focus areas of the different agencies within the management framework are reactive
and immediate. Though the Department of City Planning and the Department of Drainage and
Sewage have some medium term vision, there is no substantive overarching policy framework to
develop a long term strategy. Furthermore, strategy is constrained significantly by the four-year
terms that govern political office at both the city and national levels. The substance of government
policy and action plans are structured to a considerable degree around these cycles, while long term
strategic frameworks remain largely conceptual.

Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice
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Figure 11: Governance framework for disaster prevention and emergency relief
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Figure 12: Governance framework for post-disaster recovery
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These two issues - weak institutional integration, and short term priorities - are particularly evident
in Bangkok’s climate change policies. Officially, climate change has been acknowledged by the
government as a national threat since the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan
(1992-1996)94. But to effectively alleviate the effects of climate change requires, as the BMA has
acknowledged, the involvement of a wide variety of sectors including public health, building
regulations, renewable energy generation, disaster monitoring, disease surveillance, community
engagement, water services, transportation and recycling95. However, though there has been some
degree of integrated strategic development at a national level, and even recognition among
different agencies (including bodies within the BMA) of the need for greater institutional cohesion,
this has not translated into a comprehensive and integrated policy approach. For instance, while
the Bangkok 5-Year Action Plan for Climate Change acknowledged the need for cross-sectoral
cooperation, it largely overlooked the critical issue of vulnerability reduction96. The World Bank also
found that, while a number of municipal bodies within the BMR had developed future strategic
frameworks, climate change considerations had not been factored into their projections97.
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Developing an adequate long term response to flooding will require an integrated and multidisciplinary policy framework, coordinated to ensure coherence but flexible enough to
accommodate localized strategies. However, this will be difficult to achieve without substantive
institutional reform.

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
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4.3 Private sector and local community participation
In the context of climate change and other environmental threats, Bangkok will need to develop a
longer term, cross-sectoral vision that engages the participation of diverse stakeholders and
maintains a local as well as a national strategic focus. Yet to do so will require a substantial
realignment of the government’s approach in favor of a more open and collaborative relationship
with other stakeholders, particularly the private sectors and local communities. These efforts, at
present partial at best, could galvanize a more coherent and cooperative adaptation response.

4.3.1 Private sector
When tackling climate change, government authorities must make efforts to collaborate more
effectively with the private sector. Businesses and industry themselves have a vested interest in
improving flood protection systems, given their exposure: for instance, the cost of the 2011 flooding
to the manufacturing sector alone has been put at $32 billion98.
Since 2006, the BMA has undertaken some initiatives to promote partnerships along these lines,
such as the 2007 BMA Declaration of Cooperation on Alleviating Global Warming Problems, with 36
private and public sector signatories99. More recently, in the wake of the 2011 floods, a coalition of
state and private sector bodies was up to help prevent future disasters100. The government has also
suggested that it will offer ‘soft loans’ to industrial operators to invest in flood protection
infrastructure101. This shows at least positive recognition of the need for better cooperation, even if
the long term effectiveness of this commitment has yet to be determined.
The Bang Chan Industrial Estate, in the case study district of Min Buri, is an interesting example of a
private sector approach to flooding. This was the first large industrial estate to be constructed and as
a result is relatively central, located within a low-lying section of Minburi that is inside the King’s
Dyke. Since 2006, it has taken substantive steps to develop an independent flood protection
strategy. This has a number of elements, including:
•
•
•
•
•

Strengthening protection through more sandbags.
Maintaining drainage systems to ensure effective floodwater dispersal.
Continuously evacuating excess water.
Ongoing monitoring of water levels.
An emergency response team to prepare and respond to flood threats.

World Bank. The World Bank supports Thailand’s post-floods recovery efforts. December 13, 2011. Retrieved at:
http://www.worldbank.or.th/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/THAILANDEXTN/0,,contentMDK:2306744
3~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:333296,00.html
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Among the structural measures the industrial estate has taken is the development of a detailed map
of the water channels into and out of the Lorlae and Sanaab canals (Figure 13).
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Figure 13: Water channels into and out of the Lorlae (top) and Samsaab (bottom) canals, Bang Chan
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A network of sluice gates and drainage stations has also been installed, as shown in figure 14, to
manage the circulation and evacuation of floodwater through the estate.
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Figure 14: Sluice gate (red cross) and drainage station (circled area) network, Bang Chan
However, while these responses suggest a growing sense of initiative, the strategy is compromised
by two fundamental weaknesses. Firstly, the focus is still on flood prevention through heavy
structural investment, with little in the way of actual adaptation. Secondly, there was no meaningful

participation of the local communities. Yet the canals around the estate are a public and the water
management decisions of a large industrial estate such as Bang Chan has potentially serious
implications for surrounding communities, particularly during flooding. A collective response,
therefore, involving local stakeholders and with a substantive adaptation component, would have
been more appropriate. Community participation, as discussed in the next section, should be a
central component in public sector as well as private sector flood management strategies.

4.3.2 Local communities
It is also essential that the government develops a more collaborative relationship with local floodvulnerable communities. Engaging communities in the design and delivery of flood-related strategies
not only raises the probability of effective uptake and implementations, but also enhances their
quality by allowing local knowledge and experience to inform the response.
There have been some tentative efforts. For example, in 2008 the BMA implemented a ‘canal water
quality improvement’ campaign to raise awareness of the importance of canal environments, with
the participation of local canal-side communities102. Still, there is still a widespread lack of sustained
and substantive cooperation between different bodies and institutions. This is due in large part to
the absence of a clear platform or institutional structure to facilitate cooperation, both among
individual communities and also between them and other sectors, in particular public authorities.
This was particularly clear, as mentioned in section 4.2, when participants in the research surveys
conducted for this report were asked to name which agency, in their opinion, was responsible for
various aspects of flood prevention and protection. The range of responses suggests that linkages
between the relevant authorities and local residents were not well-developed or clearly defined.
As part of its study, the research team for this report conducted community workshop 103 in
December 2011 with the aim of developing a clearer picture of flood-related challenges and
responses during the 2011 flooding in 3 communities (Buakaw, Wangtongpattana and Jaroenchai) in
the area. The overall objective was to outline possible collective adaptation strategies for these
communities in the future. To maximize the benefits of the meeting, participants were invited from a
range of stakeholder groups. Around 20 participants were in attendance, including a hydrology
expert from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, the team researchers, urban
development experts, a workshop facilitator, 3 community leaders and other local residents.

Physical problems
• Water stagnation – particularly in low-lying areas and in older communities where the more
recent surrounding communities were located on higher ground.
• Mobility and transport issues – some roads were impassable as a result of flooding.
• Waste – uncollected garbage and waste was a potential pollutant health hazard.
• Ineffective drainage – blockages occurred in the drainage systems and canals, reducing local
drainage capacity.

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP
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The community workshop was conducted in the Buakaw center on the morning of December 25, 2011, between 1030 and 1200.
Around 20 participants were in attendance, including a hydrology expert from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the
Environment, the team researchers, urban development experts, a workshop facilitator, 3 community leaders and other local
residents.
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As a result of the discussions, a clear picture emerged of the physical and social/communal problems
experienced in the area as a result of the flooding:
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Social/communal problems
• Lack of collaboration – communities did not cooperate effectively with neighboring communities.
• Slow official response – there were some delays in district-level responses
• Health threats - both physical (through dengue fever and polluted water) and mental (through
stress and trauma)
• The absence of a community-level advance warning system – insufficient information provided to
communities regarding the intensity and timing of flooding.
Drawing on these insights, the participants together developed the outline of a possible strategic
framework to promote a more effective collective response to water management and future
flooding adaptation:
•

•

•
•
•
•
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•
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Greater cooperation between communities – this could be facilitated through the use of
community surveys and the creative of a collective drainage channel by clearing the surrounding
canals to allow water on Buakaw Road, the main route between the 3 communities, to drain into
the Bung Kwang or Sansaab canals.
Plan and indentify the primary access points and transport routes – in the event of future
flooding, the participants determined that the 2 main routes would be accessed through 174
Ramkhamhang road and the Thanakorn community as these are at the highest elevation.
An expanded flood prevention system - plan for a larger inundation zone for the water flow
through the Bung Kwang canal
Drainage maintenance - canals and drainage systems should be cleared regularly by district
authorities and other related organizations.
Water pump installation – a water pump should be permanently installed in the area to drain
floodwater into the Bung Kwang canal
Community flood warning system - develop several flood markers in the area as reference points
for community residents to gauge flood levels and prepare after official warnings.
Pre-disaster waste management plan – remove household waste regularly from the flood-prone
areas to prevent water pollution and treat household waste with a sanitary tank. As the
communities were built before the Estate Act, when no regulations existed requiring a communal
sanitary tank, a local sanitary tank should be installed south of the community near the Bung
Kwang canal.

The research team is also preparing a flood prevention map for the communities, informed by these
findings. This workshop, bringing together local knowledge and professional expertise on an open
platform to facilitate productive knowledge-sharing, serves as a potential blueprint for mainstream
approaches. By engaging with the community, public officials would develop a better understanding
of specific localized flood-related impacts and also be able to harness their involvement productively
in a collective adaptation framework. As the concluding section of this report highlights, this should
be a central component of Bangkok’s flood adaptation in the future.

5. Conclusion: Mainstreaming adaptation into long-term planning
This study highlights the very real threats that Bangkok will face in the future as climate change and
other environmental hazards exert increasing stress on the fabric of the city. Yet at the same time,
alongside these authoritative projections, the recent past should also serve as a vivid reminder of
the city’s vulnerability. In this study, the 2010 flooding was used as a baseline comparator to assess
how much progress, if any, the city had made in protecting itself from inundation. Unfortunately,
however, as the fieldwork for this report was concluding the city was presented with an even more
extreme flood event. 2011, it transpired, was one of the worst years in the capital’s history as much

of Bangkok was submerged beneath floodwater. According to the Federation of Thai Industries, the
cost to the seven hardest hit industrial estates could reach $13 billion, involving 891 factories and a
total of 460,000 workers104.
While there is not room in this study to examine the various causes of the flooding in detail, it is
worth noting a number of elements that highlight the persistence of many key issues. Firstly, the
official response to the flooding was sharply criticized for its lack of institutional coordination, the
divisive relationships between different agencies and the strong degree of politicization that
accompanied relief efforts. While some institutional reforms have been made since 2006, the overall
challenges of fragmented governance were still apparent. A recent seminar on the flood highlighted
the absence of an integrated and inclusive management approach to flooding disasters, and the role
this played in amplifying its destructive impact105. Secondly, the spatial limitations of the city’s
structural fortifications were also evident. In today’s context, when Bangkok is a sprawling
metropolis with much of its population and industry concentrated in the suburbs outside its core,
the strong focus on securing the city centre does little to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of
thousands of the city’s residents. In fact, as the frequent assaults by flood-affected communities on
barriers and dams showed, the protection of inner Bangkok was sometimes regarded as coming at
the expense of other neighborhoods that were forced to suffer deeper and more prolonged bouts of
flooding as a result106. Thirdly, the primary response in the wake of the flooding has been on
maintaining and extending the city’s physical infrastructure. In January 2012, it was even rumored in
the media that a number of experts in the country’s water management committee were
considering resigning over the government’s plans to invest hundreds of billions of baht in additional
infrastructure - measures that they believed would not be spent effectively nor resolve the country’s
long term challenges107. Finally, though, commentators diagnosed the same pressing need for a
more considered and effective approach to city planning and land regulation108.
What is clear is that, if Bangkok fails to adapt successfully in the future, flood disasters could become
a regular and recurrent problem for large areas of the city. The costs will not only be the substantial
direct effects of damaged housing and lost livelihoods, but also the longer term implications for
Bangkok as a national centre and regional hub. In the wake of the 2011 flooding, some
parliamentary lawmakers have even proposed that the capital be moved to the higher land elevation
of Nakhon Nayok109. While Bangkok has successfully overcome the challenges of its natural setting in
the past, as its economic and demographic vitality testifies, it needs to develop a sustained and
meaningful strategic response to a future of climate change and environmental instability if its
strength as a global city is to be maintained. It is not clear that infrastructure alone will be able to
provide residents of suburban areas like the districts in this case study protection from future
flooding. As noted earlier in this report, it was clear during the 2011 flooding that some local
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communities considered that the infrastructure protecting inner Bangkok was making their own
situation worse.
Firstly, flood protection measures must develop a long term planning vision. Too much effort is
expended on reactive measures once flood events have already occurred, with limited preparation
for or anticipation of projected future trends. Furthermore, strategic directions are often only
partially or inconsistently implemented, as with development restrictions in the eastern parts of
Bangkok where the case study districts are located. For outlying areas such as these, far from the city
centre and in many cases located in flood-prone territory, the protection afforded by infrastructure
will only go so far. Adaptation to the realities of climate change and environmental instability, for
example through well-designed land use regulations and rigorous forecasting, will be essential for
the city to achieve a ‘safe failure’ when a future flooding event exceeds the capacity of the city’s
defenses. In the wake of the 2011 floods, it has been announced that parts of Khlong Sam Wa,
Minburi, Nong Chok and Lat Krabang will be designated as flood zones in the draft Bangkok
development plan, published in 2012. Future housing developments will be denser, vertical
condominium-style complexes alongside designated water drainage routes where construction will
not be permitted. Western areas of Bangkok will also be preserved for drainage, with largely
agricultural land and high rise housing alongside the electric train routes.

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

Secondly, this approach must be underpinned by a strategy of collective adaptation. One of the key
findings of this study was that the damage caused by the 2006 flooding was typically higher at a
community level than for the average household. This suggests that a platform for meaningful
communal cooperation, drawing on the middle ground between highly centralized public
interventions and the ‘privatized’ approach of household preparedness and self-reliance, would be
extremely valuable.
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Going beyond internal communal collaboration, there needs to be a broader vision of meaningful
stakeholder participation between communities, government and the private sector. The data from
this research shows the substantial direct and indirect costs that businesses incur as a result of the
flooding. At present, the interaction between them and the government is primarily defined by
compensations and subsidies. Yet given their substantial interest in developing a more secure and
adaptive flood response, the government could engage them in partnerships to help strengthen
preparedness - for example, by developing adequate protective infrastructure for vulnerable
industrial estates that, unlike the measures adopted at Bang Chan, extend beyond mitigation to
adaptation and involve other relevant stakeholders such as local communities. Through substantive
communication and outreach, the government could also ensure a more harmonious post-disaster
response in flood-hit communities (for instance, by educating them about the necessity of protective
barriers that may worsen flooding in their districts and compensating them appropriately for the
added cost these may impose). The findings from the surveys in this study showed that, though
preparedness at a household level had been relatively poor in 2006, responses had improved
considerably by 2010 and interviewees expressed a strong willingness to do so. But governmentcommunity partnerships should be a two-way process and be conducted in a spirit of genuine
partnership. In this sense, the community workshop conducted by the researchers of this study in
December 2011 with community members and a government expert should be considered as a
blueprint for a more participatory approach.
Fourthly, flood protection strategies must consider not only the technical and economic implications
of flooding, but also the social and human dimensions. Flooding has been widely regarded in the
past as a water management issue, rather than a complex phenomenon that impacts on livelihoods,
urban development and other fields. Yet as the study findings show, the risks of flooding are not
only environmental, but socioeconomic. In particular, the research highlighted the substantial

indirect costs, in terms of medical care and livelihoods, for households and communities. Flood
prevention therefore requires an integrated approach that spans health, waste management and
the dynamics of agglomeration economies. It cannot be successfully achieved through engineering
alone. The reason why many megaprojects fail is because they seek to ‘solve’ purely technical
problems while largely overlooking the important social realities that play a major determining role
in the resilience and vulnerability of flood-prone areas.
Fifthly, to be effective, adaptation strategies must be supported by adequate and multidimensional
data. As the review of the available secondary data section on the flooding showed (section 3.1),
previous risk assessments have been hampered by information shortfalls, ranging from a lack of
baseline climate data to the marginalization of non-technical considerations such as socioeconomic
vulnerability, water security and health profiles. The research for this study highlights the
importance of localized data, with a focus on the specific impacts on districts and communities, to
identify the worst affected areas. Furthermore, it shows how the size and nature of flood-related
impacts varies by occupation, income group and business type. Replicating this fine-grained
approach to data collection and analysis in future, with a focus on the holistic and local impacts,
would help develop a clearer picture of flooding effects on the ground - leading in turn to better
responses.
Finally, to help achieve all of the above, the dysfunctional nature of the city’s flood management
must be addressed through national and municipal governance reform. This should resolve a broad
range of ongoing challenges, including poor institutional coordination, deficient city planning,
funding constraints, poverty-related vulnerability and building code development. These in turn will
require better cohesion between national and municipal bodies, stronger cooperation between BMA
and neighboring provinces of the BMR, and a supervisory platform or executive body to integrate
the competing interests of different agencies into an overarching strategic framework. A nuanced
flood protection strategy will also necessarily require a site-specific perspective and potentially the
decentralization of some authority to districts and communities. Responses should also be holistic,
partnering different disciplines and agencies to create cross-sectoral responses to the complex
problems of flooding and other environmental disasters.
By integrating these approaches into an informed and collaborative strategy that recognizes the
effects of flooding on not only the physical fabric of the city but also its citizens and communities,
Bangkok may be better placed in the future to face the very real threats of climate change and
environmental disaster.
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7.3 Case study of Manila

Enhancing Adaptation to Climate Change by Integrating Climate Risk
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Disaster Management: The Case of Manila, Philippines
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Part I
Introduction
The Philippines ranks third in the world in terms of being at risk to climate change-related risks and
disasters. Over the years, the number and scale of natural disasters have increased and its effects
intensified by the lack of preparedness among the affected communities and most of all, on the part
the government, non-government, and private sectors to respond pro-actively.
In early July 2008, the World Bank estimated that the Philippines loses P15 billion annually110 to
disasters like typhoons and floods. This amount represents about 0.7 percent of the gross national
product (GNP). In October 2009, Typhoons Ondoy (Ketsana) and Pepeng (Parma)111 caused a total of
Php 3.8 billion in damages and Php 24.8 billion in immediate losses to agriculture, fisheries, and
forestry sector. Immediate reconstruction costs were estimated to be about US$ 4.42 billion or
almost 3 percent of the national GDP for the next three years (Joint Assessment of Typhoons Ondoy
and Pepeng, World Bank, 2009).
The Philippines gets an average of 20 typhoons annually. In 2009, Metro Manila weathered 10
strong typhoons bringing about heavy rainfall and floods to the metropolis. In 2011, damages of
typhoons Pedring and Quiel were estimated to amount to Php 15 billion. Meanwhile, as this report is
being written, tropical storm (later upgraded into typhoon) Sendong (international name, Washi)
brought heavy rainfall and flash floods to Northern Mindanao and Eastern Visayas in southern
Philippines killing over a thousand people, higher than those lost/killed during the Ondoy and
Pepeng in 2009. This is the worst climate-related disaster in the last decade to have hit the
Philippines. Initial estimates of damages to property and agriculture is estimated to reach P1.03
billion; although not as high as that of Ondoy and Pepeng, the loss of lives, physical injury and
displacement is much higher (1, 572 deaths, 1,079 missing, 1, 792 injured, and 102, 899 families
displaced). Initial assessments showed that unpreparedness on the part of the affected
communities and the government agencies/officials in charged of disaster risk reduction was a major
factor in raising the damages and costs of the disaster. This study, hopefully, will contribute to the
making of a culture of preparedness, adaptation and resilience among us, Filipinos, and to other
similar groups at risk to the effects of climate change. A partial list of deadly typhoons/storms in
2011 showed damages to property, agriculture and fisheries to have reached more than P20 billion
(see Appendix A). Thus, investments on disaster and climate risk vulnerability assessment are crucial
to minimize losses from these calamities (Porio 2011).

With funding support from the Asia Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN) and
coordinated by the Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research, Mumbai (along with the
other research partner in Bangkok, Thammasat University)112, this report is based on a study
110 But this amount seem to be an underestimate as seen in the partial list of 2011 storms/typhoons and
related damages in the appendix.
111

Hereinafter these events will just be referred to by their local names, Ondoy and Pepeng.

Coordinated by Dr. Archana Patankar of the Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research,
Mumbai and Dr. Anand Patwardhan of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Mumbai and collaborated
by Dr. Ann Marome Wijitbusaba of the Asian Institute of Technology fro the Bangkok Case Study and Dr.
Emma Porio of the Ateneo de Manila University for the the Metro Manila case study.
112
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conducted from April 2011-December 2011 in Metro Manila, particularly in the Pasig-Marikina flood
basin, with special focus on the cities of Marikina and Pasig. These cities suffered extreme flooding
brought about by the tropical storm, Ondoy in late September 2009 and Pepeng in early October
2009.
In this study, the impacts and responses to Ondoy in these cities were compared to another flooding
event in 2011, the heavy rains and floods brought by Pedring and Quiel in September 2011 and early
October 2011. Until tropical storm Sendong hit northen Mindanao and Eastern Visayas in December
2011, these were considered the worst to have brought extreme flooding to the national capital.
Part I of the report provides an introduction to the political and economic context of Metro Manila
and its relationship to the climate change-related events and processes. Part II presents the findings
regarding flood vulnerability and impacts/responses in the cities of Marikina and Pasig, a major flood
basin of Metro Manila (see figures 1-9 below). Part III outlines the prospect of mainstreaming
climate vulnerability assessments/profiles into long-term urban development policies and programs.
This study focuses on the institutional measures adapted at city/local government, community and
household levels in response to the extreme flooding of Ondoy (Ketsana) in 2009. The overall aim of
the study is to enhance climate change adaptation by integrating climate risk into long-term
development plans and disaster risk management.

Methodology/Data sources
The study utilized three major data sources, namely, 1) secondary data sources, 2) key informant
interviews, 3) household and commercial surveys, and 4) focus group discussions (FGDs). A main
secondary source utilized here to complement the current APN survey is the 2008 climate change
household survey conducted by the author in the three flood plains of Metro Manila.
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This study interviewed 200 households113, sampled from those severely flooded communities in the
extreme flooding of Ondoy in late September and Pepeng in early October 2009 located in the flood
basin of the Pasig-Marikina River Basin, one of the three flood basins of Metro Manila (see map
below). The other two flood basins are located in the cities of Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas, and
Valenzuela (KAMANAVA) and in the city of Taguig and the municipality of Pateros known as the West
Mangahan area. These areas often experience flooding coming from the nearby riverine systems and
the regular tidal/storm surges (see figure 1 below). To obtain the losses/damages and responses at
the commercial-industrial level, the study conducted a survey of 100 commercial-industrial units or
50 in each of the cities.
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The above data sources were supplemented with key informant interviews and FGDs among local
and national officials, civil society leaders, influential private sector leaders, and community
leaders/residents. Overall, the study assessed the vulnerability of Metro Manila residents and
commercial-industrial establishments to extreme flooding in 2009 (Ondoy and Pepeng), their
adaptive responses and potentials for mainstreaming these adaptations to urban planning,
governance, and to medium/long-term development.

113 Originally, the study planned to interview 300 households obtained through systematic sampling with
a random start but had to reduce this to 200 because the people were tired of being interviewed about
the effects and their responses to Ondoy. In the same manner, 100 owners/managers of commercial and
industrial units were expected to be interviewed in both cities but in the end we were able to process 87
interview protocols because 13 respondents had several call backs that eventually we dropped them out
of the sample.

1. Metro Manila: Demographics, Urban Development, Environment and Socio-Economic
Characteristics
In third world cities like Metro Manila where urban growth and sprawl remains largely unregulated,
the vulnerability of populations, especially marginal sectors, to climate change-related effects like
floods is quite high, reducing their potential for adaptation and resilience.
Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) has a land area of 636 square kilometers in semialluvial plain formed by the sediment flows from the Meycauayan and Malabon-Tullahan river basins
in the North, the Pasig-Marikina river basin in the East (Bankoff 2003), and the West of Mangahan
river basin. These river systems used to be actively used as transport gateways to the central district
of Manila until heavy siltation and the land-based transport rendered this system ineffective (see
maps below).

With Metro Manila as the center of political, economic, and socio-cultural activities of the nation, its
vulnerability to climate changes becomes heightened. Its strategic location by Manila Bay and the
mouth of the Pasig River accounts for the growth of the capital city. Being near a river and a good
harbor made possible the development and expansion of the city of Manila to its suburbs in the last
30 years. With large in-migration and rapid population growth, the city expanded to the suburbs,
surrounding municipalities, and to risky areas for habitation (e.g., swampy areas, near or above
esteros or water canals, along the river or earthquake fault lines, etc.). In response to this rapid
population growth, urban infrastructural development continued though not as well as expected for
a burgeoning population. This is seen in increased investments in housing, basic services (water,
sewerage, electricity), and infrastructure (roads, bridges, flyover, etc.). While large public and private
investments try to operate within existing regulatory frameworks, the ability of government
agencies to impose building and infrastructure standards is quite weak. Meanwhile, the growth and
expansion of informal settlements have gone largely unregulated. Thus, in Metro Manila, many
buildings and infrastructure are built on dangerous and risky areas (e.g., near the seashore or flood
zone, unstable ground and prone to landslides, etc.), without permits (Porio 2011).
Socio-economic forces like land use, infrastructural development, building practices, urban
development policies and programs have greatly shaped the settlement patterns of the city. The lack
of effective interaction among these forces had resulted in a built environment that poses high risks
to residents and infrastructure alike. Rapid urbanization, population growth, and the weak
infrastructural and economic bases of the metropolis have heightened its vulnerability to the effects
of climate change. Metro Manila’s population expanded from 5.93 million in 1980 to 7.95 million in
1990, 9.93 million in 2000 and is projected to reach 19.43 million in 2020. In 2007, the National
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The NCR is composed of a coastal margin with a reclaimed area in Manila Bay, the central plateau,
and the Marikina Valley. The city is open to Manila Bay on the west and connects to a large lake,
Laguna de Bay, on the southeast. Thus, “the metropolitan area is a vast drainage basin that
experiences frequent inundations from overflowing rivers and storm waters that render the existing
system of esteros (modified natural channels) and canals constructed during the Spanish and
American colonial periods inadequate” (Liongson 2000 cited in Bankoff 2003). Manila and the
surrounding cities are prone to flooding alongside Marikina Valley and along the coast of Laguna de
Bay. The effects of climate change on these river systems are highlighted by sea level rise (SLR) and
increases in monsoon rains, typhoons, and floods. Traversing the north-south direction of the
metropolis are several fault lines: 1) Marikina Valley Fault, 2) Philippine Fault, 3) Lubang Fault, 4)
Manila Trench, and the 5) Casiguran Fault. This environmental context interacts in complex ways
with the patterns of human activities in the metropolis, giving rise to patterns of survival strategies
among the residents and institutional and regulatory responses of the local government units and
the national government agencies in charged of disaster risk reduction and management policies
and programs (Porio 2011).
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Statistics Office (NSO) reported that Metro Manila has 12 million residents but the average daytime
population is about 16 million (see Figure 1 below). In 2000, the population density in the metropolis
was 15, 617 persons per square kilometer but is projected to increase to 29, 146 in 2020. These
forces have dramatically increased the demand for goods and services as well as the waste
generation in the metropolis. Since this trend shows no signs of abating, the impacts of climate
change on the vulnerable populations of the metropolis will definitely be heightened in the coming
years (Porio 2010).

Figure 2. Population Trends of Metro Manila (1970-2020)

Source: Corpuz, A. (2010)
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Adding more vulnerability is the large portion of the population in the metropolis that does not have
security of tenure in their housing, jobs, and livelihood sources. The 2008 Philippine Asset Reform
Report Card estimated that only 61 percent of households in Metro Manila have sufficient access to
basic services. Most informal settlements (mostly urban poor) do not have adequate access to the
water and sewerage nor electrical services. Of the national housing backlog of 4 million households
(or about 24 million people), about 6 million is accounted by Metro Manila alone. The Philippine
Human Development Report of 2010 estimated the Philippines to have a poverty incidence of 32
percent. With high poverty incidence and population density and the shortage of proper services,
Metro Manila has become very vulnerable to storms, typhoons and floods in recent years (Bankoff
2003).
Metro Manila’s primacy and the lack of rural development have lead to large number poor and
lowly-skilled migrants looking for work in the city. Because the economy expanded in services and
light export-oriented (e.g., electronics, assembly work) industries, majority of the migrants are
young, single, and female. This female-dominated migration stream feeds on the migration of
Filipino women overseas, who in turn, get absorbed in the services sector of their places of
destination. Locally, most of these migrants get absorbed by the informal economy where entry is
easy because the skills demand is not high but the remuneration levels and job security in this sector
are low (Porio 2011).

1.1 Environmental and social characteristics
The 2008 survey of flood-prone households (Porio 2011) showed that these vulnerable communities
are located near in low-lying areas, mostly wetlands/swamp lands, around the following river system
and its tributaries (Pasig-Marikina River, Napindan River in West Mangahan, and the Malabon and
Tullahan Rivers in the KAMANAVA areas) which are connected to the sea through Manila Bay and to
the lake system of Laguna de Bay. Aside from their being flood prone, these areas also suffer the
effects of heavy monsoon rains, typhoons, and the regular tidal surges. Most of the surveyed
households belong to informal or slum/squatter settlements, with no security of tenure in their
housing and no adequate access to basic services like water, electricity, sewerage and drainage
systems. The households in these communities regularly suffer the risks from floods, water surges
during storms and high tides, in addition to sickness of household members and from lack of
community security (e.g., incidence of drug abuse, theft and other petty crimes).

The social and physical location of these flood-prone communities make them vulnerable to storm
surges and floods from typhoons and heavy monsoon rains from June to November, the traditional
rainy season for Metro Manila. The Pasig-Marikina flood basin is prone to flash floods from the
Sierra Madre mountains while the KAMANAVA flood basin is particularly susceptible throughout the
year to the effects of sea level rise (SLR) and tidal storms or surges. During the last few years, the
residents also reported changes in the climate patterns marked by increases in water levels during
tidal/storm surges as seen in the water marks left of their house posts. These pose additional risks
to their household appliances, garments, and higher losses in their work days.

1.3 Economic risk and social vulnerability
The 2008 climate change survey also showed that while respondents recognized the risks of floods
and storm/tidal surges to their homes and communities, economic problems were their over-riding
concern. This was followed by security-related risks like thefts/hold-up, fire, and drug abuse in their
neighborhoods. These security-related issues are closely linked to the physical congestion and
economic insecurities (i.e., high unemployment/underemployment) of their communities/families.
Given these socio-economic risks, their vulnerability to the effects of typhoons, floods, and sea level
rise (SLR) or storm/tidal surges increasingly becomes heightened (Porio 2011).
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1.2 Climate change, environmental, and social risks
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In turn, these household level risks and vulnerabilities also increase with the expansion of
residential, commercial, and industrial development in their immediate localities and cities. This
could be observed in the rapid expansion of construction projects around the Mangahan River Basin,
which do not have the necessary infrastructure support like proper drainage, sewerage, and road
systems. The consequent flooding become intense as the areas near the Napindan Channel and
Laguna de Bay are not really suitable for habitation nor for commercial-industrial use as these are
mostly wetlands. Meanwhile, these have not deterred building activities in these areas because
developers just fill up the marshy areas and raise the building height of ground floors.
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One major source of risk in these flood-prone areas is the continuous building of temporary
structures in already congested, informal settlements alongside formal residential subdivisions
located in/near danger zones of the community. Respondents reported that land filling activities of
middle/upper-class real estate development have increased the flooding and environmental damage
as traditional waterways have disappeared with these activities. Substandard sewerage and road
systems have also worsened the living conditions of the urban poor informally settled around these
areas. Informal housing built against dike walls, along creeks, rivers, tributaries, and swampy areas
abound in this part of the metropolis. Slum lords, taking advantage of the expanding rental markets
and the lack of regulation by local officials, also contribute to the risks faced by those residing in
nearby factories of Pasig City, Taguig City, and the fish port in Navotas City. Heightening the risk
exposure of these households are inadequate services like water, electricity, health and substandard
roads, drainage, and sewage systems (Porio 2011).
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Figure 1: Map of the Flood Prone Areas of Metro Manila River Basins (yellow circles). Source: JICA
Research Institute and Porio (2009)
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Figure 2: Map of Metro Manila Showing Flooded Areas in 10, 30, 100 Year Floods.
Source: JICA Research Institute (2009).
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The following sections show the geographical characteristics of the specific study sites, namely,
Marikina City and Pasig City. As the following topographical and flood maps will show, the two cities
are very vulnerable to flooding because they are located in the heart of the Pasig-Marikina flood
basin, just below the Marikina watershed nestled in the Sierra Madre Mountain Range and the
Montalban hills. Nearby is also the La Mesa Dam and watershed. So, during the Ondoy floods in
2009, the cities of Marikina and Pasig, literally became a depository basin for the volume of water
from the heavy rains (180mm) equivalent to 1 month rainfall. Moreover, the West Valley fault also
runs through these cities making them vulnerable to earthquakes and subsequent liquefaction.
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Figure 3: Marikina-Pasig River Basin. Source: Marikina City Disaster Risk Reduction Management
(DRRM) Office
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Figure 4: Marikina-Pasig River Basin. Source: Marikina City Disaster Risk Reduction Management
(DRRM) Office and the Metro Manila Earthquake Impact Reduction Study (MEIRS 2004)

Watershed Area
Description
Upper Marikina
Lower Marikina
Total

Area
Hectares
Percent
54,412
81
12,997
19
67,409
100

Rivers/Streams Length
Description
Upper Marikina
Lower Marikina
Total

Rivers/Streams
Km
Percent
499
77
152
23
651
100

Climate Change Impacts

Impacts
Landslide
Soil Erosion
Flooding
Not Affected
Total

Hectare
s
Percent
12,114
18
21,336
32
16,692
25
17,267
26
67,410
100

E.C. Godilano, Ph.D.

Figure 6: Terrain/Topography of APN Study Sites in Metro Manila (Marikina City and Pasig City)
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Figure 5: Marikina Watershed and Marikina-Pasig River System Source: Metro Manila Earthquake
Impact Reduction Study (MEIRS 2004)
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Figure 7: Flood Map of Metro Manila and APN Study Sites (Marikina City and Pasig City)
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Valley Faults) at its eastern
margin

East Valley Fault

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

West Valley Fault

]

131

Figure 8: Earthquake Fault Lines (East-West Valley) Transecting Metro Manila Source: Metro Manila
Earthquake Impact Reduction Study (MEIRS 2004)

Residential Building Damage Risk
Marikina
Marikina
Manila

Manila

Pasig

Pasig

Makati
Taguig

Risk
High

Makati
Taguig

Muntinlupa

Damage Number

Low

Muntinlupa

Damage Ratio

MMEIRS (MMDA-PHIVOLCS-JICA)

Figure 9: Projected Residential Building Damage Due to Earthquake, Source: MEIRS Study (2004)

1.4 Other Complicating Forces
Other factors like earthquakes could intensify the damage impact of extreme floods like that of
Ondoy. The MEIR Study (2004) projected that the impact scenario for Metro Manila in 7.2 magnitude
earthquake from the West Valley Fault (located along the cities of Pasig and Marikina, see figures 8-9
above) could damage:
• ~40 percent of the residential buildings (175,000-heavily damaged; 345,000-partly damaged)
• ~38 percent of the 10-20 story buildings
• ~14 percent of the 30-60 story buildings
• ~28-35 percent of the public buildings (8-10 % -heavily damaged; 20-25%-partly damaged)
• Estimated 33,500 deaths and 114,000 injuries
• Additional deaths from fires
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The above projected earthquake damage impact could make extreme flood events like those of
Ondoy in 2009 and Pedring in 2011 (see picture below).
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Typhoon Pedring brings heavy rains and flooded Roxas Boulevard in Manila (Photo by Rem Zamora
for abs-cbnNEWS.com)

1.5 Topography of Metro Manila and Climate Change Vulnerability of Populations
The topography and geological characteristics of Metro Manila and its inherent vulnerability to
strong winds and floods were revealed during the height of the typhoon Pedring in late September
2011. Its susceptibility to the storm surges and strong winds pummeling on Manila Bay makes its
foundation quick to be saturated with water making it weak. Rough winds caused a section of the
breakwater to collapse, and blew Manila Bay's waters past the seawall and onto Roxas Boulevard.
For the first in history, the public saw the main thoroughfare, the United States Embassy, Sofitel in
the CCP Compound, restaurants along the Bay flooded. The waters even reached the Baseco
Compound, a 14 hectare property owned by Manila Port Authority, and informally settled by 6,000
urban poor families.
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According to the head of the of the Department of Science and Technology, the following factors
lead to the collapse of the Manila Bay Seawall (along Roxas Boulevard), namely, 1) heavy monsoon
rains continuous for four days, 2) strong storm surge 3) high tide, 4) soft soil and subsidence, 5)
strong rough winds.
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The climate authority suggested stronger compliance (enforcing stricter building and zoning codes,
evacuation of people once the storms and surges hit the bay, etc.) to safer engineering solutions.

1.6 Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of “at risk” population in Manila’
major flood basins
The following description is mainly based on the 2008 household survey conducted in the three
flood basins of Metro Manila, namely, 1) Pasig-Marikina, 2) West Mangahan, and KAMANAVA Area
(see figure 1 above). Based on the survey, the respondents were mostly female (86 percent) as they
were the ones available/open to be interviewed, compared to the unwilling male members of the
household. Their ages ranged from 18-92 years old, with a median age of 42 years old. They were
mostly legally married (61 percent), or were in live-in/cohabitation arrangements (20 percent), while
the rest were widowed, separated or single (18 percent). Their mean household income was P10,033

per month but their median monthly household income was P8,000, suggesting some disparity
among the respondents. Of the communities surveyed, West Navotas and San Joaquin in Pasig and
Ibayo Tipaz in Taguig City had the lowest monthly median incomes of P8,000 while Longos in
Malabon City and Bangkulasi in Navotas City (KAMANAVA Basin) with P23,250 and P18,000,
respectively, had higher median income levels. Most of the very poor households (old,
widowed/separated, no income and dependent on the relatives’ food support), also came from
these low income communities. These urban poor settlements remain very vulnerable because of
dilapidated housing structures and absence of services and drainage systems in their water-logged
environments. Most respondents had 8.5 years in schooling and only respondents from Malabon
attained some college education (11.20 years). Their low education and income, in part, explain their
low levels of formal employment as most of their earnings were from the underground economy.

Part II
2. Impacts and Adaptation Responses to the 2009 Ondoy Extreme Flooding
2.1 Description of the APN Study Population in Metro Manila
2.1.1 Socio-economic characteristics
Most of the respondents from the 10 sample communities came from households (HH) with average
size of 5.5 members (5 for Marikina City and 6 for Pasig City). Most of them had an average number
of 3 children, except in the upper-class communities of Industrial Valley Complex in Marikina City
and in Sta. Lucia, Pasig City where households had an average of 2 children. In terms, of male-female
ratio of HH members, Pasig City had an equal ratio but Marikina had more females (3) than males (2)
in their households. Moreover, their average ratio of earning members to dependent HH members
was one (1) for three (3) members or 66 percent dependency. Almost a quarter (22 percent) had
elementary education, 53 percent with high school education, and 26 percent had college education.
But all respondents, on the average, had 10 years of schooling.

The materials that their homes were made of seem to reflect the socio-economic stratification of the
people in these cities. Twenty-nine percent had houses made of second hand or scrap materials,
while 63 percent had houses made of GI sheets, lumber and cement for flooring, and 8 percent had
GI sheets for roofing and tiles or cement for their flooring. These households seem to represent the
low-income, lower middle to upper middle, and upper class strata, respectively. This is supported by
the income and occupational profiles. About 30 percent were retired or
unemployed/underemployed, while slightly over a third (34 percent) of them were professionals and
skilled workers, and 35 percent into trading/marketing activities or overseas workers. Their average
schooling is 10 years or high school graduate while their median income is P16,000/month (average
mean income: PP42,000). The average income here of respondents is double that of the poverty
income threshold of Metro Manila which is P9,000/month for a family of five.
At the time of the floods, most (74 percent) of their housing structures were single-storey and only a
few (26 percent) were made of two storeys or more. The floor areas of their homes averaged from
50-80 sq. meters. Most (68 percent) of these buildings and housing structures, however, were
constructed within the last 10-20 years while 22 percent were 30 years older or more. On the whole,
most of them (83 percent) owned their dwellings while the remaining sample population were either
renters or living rent-free in their dwelling and home lot. According to the owners, they hardly
conduct regular maintenance or repair of their homes, except when there is occasional need to do it.
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2.1.2 Housing characteristics and community socio-eco strata
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Based on the structures of their homes and the housing materials used by the respondents in Pasig
City, their capacity to adapt to floods and other climate change-related effects do not seem to be
well-developed. In this city, more than half of the homes (56 percent) were single detached,
consisting of one floor only and made of not very strong materials. But the residents of Marikina
City, however, seem to fare better because about half of their homes had two floors or more. But in
general, most (80 percent) of them do not regularly maintain their homes; they only do occasional
repairs when needed. Thus, the culture of safety and preparedness is not at all present among the
residents, despite the fact that they already experienced a major deluge (“delubyo” the local term
for extreme flooding, akin to the biblical floods during Noah’s time) during the 2009 Ondoy floods. A
bit of an exception is the one-third of Marikina City who had either raised their floors or have added
a second or third floor to their homes after the Ondoy floods. In part, this is because these
households have the capacity to make these improvements or adjustments to the extreme flood
events.
That at the time of the survey, there were more housing structures in Marikina City which were
made of more than one storey could be the effect of post-Ondoy rehabilitation efforts. After the
Ondoy’s devastation, the Marikina local government encouraged residents to leave the ground floor
open so waters could freely flow through their homes and make the 2nd and other floors for
habitation. In fact, the re-drafted building code of the city that is now being deliberated for approval
by the city legislative council requires that all new construction must leave the ground floor open for
waters to pass and the second floor for habitation (for elaboration see later section on institutional
responses to floods).
The above socio-economic patterns become more meaningful when considered within the larger
context of Metro Manila’s vulnerable poor. According to the Asian Development Bank (2009), over
35 percent of Metro Manila’s population lives in informal settlements, suffer from “insecure land
tenure, lack adequate health and educational facilities, and (are) unable to access capital, credit or
social safety nets. They are further exposed to makeshift housing, unsafe water, poor sanitation,
crime, fire and sudden flooding”.

ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

2.1.3 Major problems encountered during flooding
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Most of the respondents identified the following major problems that they encountered: 1) shortage
of transport, fuel, food and water supplies, 2) disruption of electricity, water distribution, and
communication services 3) garbage/mud pollution, 4) sickness, 5) rise in price of commodities, 6)
damage to their housing structures, and 7) children unable to go to school while their parents also
could not report for work. In the latter case, some schools in Marikina City and Pasig City were
closed for almost a month during the Ondoy floods in September-October 2009 because either these
were used as evacuation centers or were heavily damaged. Most factories in the flooded areas also
closed and/or relocated to other places outside the city after the 2009 floods, resulting in enormous
loss of work for the residents.

2.2 Specific Impacts of Flooding: Damages to Home/Property, Losses and Absences from
School and Work
Majority (90 percent in Marikina City; 71 percent in Pasig City) asserted that that they suffered
highly from the Ondoy floods in 2009. But in 2011 only a few (1-4 percent) of them were highly
affected by Pedring and Quiel floods in 2011 (see photo above in page 14). Perhaps, this is in part
because the rains in 2011 were not so heavy and occurred in a span of 2-3 days compared to 180mm
rainfall (equivalent to 1 month rainfall) in six (6) hours during Ondoy.

Pasig City Flood Maps

SEPT. 26, 2009
Typhoon ONDOY
First Hit early morning 5 am to 8 am
2nd Hit morning 9 am onwards
Flooded Areas

Water Level:
RED – 2 feet up
BLUE – 2 feet below70 percent flooded
FLASHFLOOD along major and minor streets.
Houses near the river (Santolan) water level
reaching 20 feet above with strong current.

2.2.1 Damage/repair to housing structures
On the average, the flood waters in their homes reached an average of 20 ft., while in some it
reached the maximum height 30 ft. in 2009. But of the two cities, Marikina had suffered more with
75 percent of their dwelling structures fully or partially damaged while only 35 percent of Pasig had
suffered the same.

Most (81 percent) of their major repairs and reconstruction were concentrated on adding and
repairing/repainting the floors, walls, and roofing of their homes while the rest (19 percent) either
constructed a new home, fixed their plumbing, drainage system and toilets. The length of time
needed to repair or reconstruct their houses was dependent on the extent of the damage and the
availability of resources. On the average, it took them 30 days to complete the repair and
reconstruction of their homes, with a small minority (10 percent) unable to do so because of not
having the resources to do it or were prevented by the authorities to reconstruct their homes as
these were located in danger zones. In Marikina, affected residents spent an average of P141,000
but maximum of P4 million (compared to P12,000 in Pasig City but maximum of P150,000) to repair
their damaged homes and appliances. Overall, it took them an average of 2.5-3 months to
completely reconstruct their damaged dwelling structures. The disparity is due to the fact that
extreme flooding in Marikina hit more upper/middle-income households while in Pasig City the
extreme floods (in terms of height and length) devastated mostly low and middle-income
households.

2.2.3 Assets
In terms of losing household assets, almost half (45 percent) of the surveyed households reported
having lost severely, while 30 percent lost mildly and 16 percent had negligible losses. Severe losses
mean losing most of their household appliances and electronic equipment/gadgets. Negligible loss
could mean an electric fan becoming inoperable or losing some household utensils/things.
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2.2.4 Loss of workdays/schooling due to damage/interruption of basic services
On the average, 30 man-days were lost by the residents in 2009 because of the flood damage to
their homes, basic services, and infrastructure (roads, bridges and water channels) while in a few (5
percent) households the number of days lost totaled 365 days or equivalent to 1 year. For example,
the water supply was interrupted for 22 days in 2009 (compared to zero in 2011). In the same
manner, electricity could not be delivered for about a month (Marikina) and 14 days (Pasig) to about
half of the sample population in 2009 compared to almost nil (1 day) in 2011. Children’s schooling
also suffered with about 70 percent of the households unable to send their children to school. In
terms of income loss, the respondents averaged losing P21,000 per household (average salary of
public school teacher is P10,000) with some reaching P500,000 income loss due to Ondoy floods in
2009 compared to P20,000 during the Pedring and Quiel floods in 2011.

2.2.5 Sickness/Diseases during Floods
Most (almost 80 percent) of the respondents suffered from coughs/colds and fever due to the
floods. About 40 percent complained of diarrhea and stomach ailments. About one third (32
percent) said they suffered from skin diseases/allergies. But it is quite alarming that almost one-fifth
of the respondents suffered from deadly diseases like leptospirosis (18 percent) and dengue (15
percent).114 Majority (84 percent) of the respondents were also alarmed with the increase of
climate/flood-related diseases such as diarrhea, dengue, and leptospirosis. As shown in the summary
of expenses table below, these diseases also happen to be quite costly among medical services. In
subsidized government health centers/hospitals, treatment for dengue could cost P35,000 - P60,000
while treatment for leptospiroses ranged P10,000 to P50,000. In private hospitals/medical centers,
expenses could be double or triple these amounts.
On the average, they spent P 6,517 for medical expenses, with some families spending a maximum
of P70,000 during the Ondoy floods. Of those who got sick, only half (50 percent) of them said they
were benefited by the medical services provided by the government and/or non-government
organizations (NGOs). But majority of them said they were able to receive free medicine, first aid kits
and services like water chlorination and dengue-infested area fumigation or defogging.

2.2.6 Loans
Only a fifth (20 percent) of them took out loans because of the 2009 floods; with an average loan of
P10, 517. Of those who have taken loans, about half of them paid interest of less than 10 percent
while the other half paid high interest ranging from 12-30 percent per month! Of those who have
loaned money, only half of them (50 percent) were able to pay their debt/loan at the time of the
survey. The used the loaned money to build and repair their homes, replace equipment and
livelihood losses.
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Below is a comparative summary table of costs and losses incurred prior, during, and after the
Ondoy floods based on the recollection of respondents during FGDs. The number of absences from
school and/or workdays lost rose a 100 percent for both men and women. But their average income
losses rose to 300 hundred percent for male-headed households but a bit lesser (200 percent) for
women-headed households. This is perhaps due to the longer closure of factory-based work for
males while home-based work for females opened earlier than the former. But the worst is the
increase in their expenditure for medicines, sanitation, and health care which rose a thousand
percent during the Ondoy floods.

114

The percentages do not add up to 100 percent because of multiple responses.

Comparing male and female-headed households show that women bear a heavier burden in times of
disasters, especially during extreme floods during Ondoy as seen in the tables below. But in nonextreme situations like that of Pedring and Quiel in 2011, the damages were negligible.

Summary of Costs/Losses Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy

Ondoy Period

Post-Ondoy

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women
HH

Absences from school

6

8

14

17

6

7

Number of workdays lost
from sickness due to flood

5

7

9

10

5

8

Number of work days lost
due to flood

6

8

20

22

6

9

Average income loss due to
floods

P1,715

P3,250

P7,250

P6,450

P2,750

P3,400

Average amount of spent on
medicine

P300

P400

P3,200

P3,000

P500

P450

P25,000

P20,000

-

-

P6,500

P4,200

Average losses (appliances,
etc.)
Average income

P6,250

P5,000

Source: Porio (2011).

Summary of Costs of Basic Needs/Services (in pesos,
monthly, US$ 1=P43)
Pre-Ondoy

Food

Ondoy Period

Post-Ondoy

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women HH

Men
HH

Women
HH

P6,000

P5,800

P2,500 + relief
goods

P2,000 +
relief goods

P6,500

P6,000

P50

P45

P240

P240

P60

P50

P80 (well)
P500
(piped)

P80 (well)
P550
(piped)

P80 (well, long
lines)
P1,500 (piped)

P80 (well,
long lines)
P1,500
(piped)

P80 (well)
P740 (piped)

P80 (well)
P700 (piped)

P2,000

P1,800

P5,000

P4,500

P2,000 (wet)
P3,000 (dry)

P1,800 (wet)
P2,500 (dry)

P300

P310

P2,000

P2,000

P360

P320

P1,500 –
P15,000

P1,000 –
P8,000

• Drinking
• Cooking/washing
utensils

Energy/electricity

Sanitation/Laundry
(mud, waist deep;
cleaning – 2 weeks – one
month)

House repair

Source: Porio (2011)
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Percent Increase/Decrease of Costs/Losses Between Men- and
Women- headed Households Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy
Men
HH

Women HH

Ondoy Period
Men
HH

Women HH

Post-Ondoy
Men
HH

Women
HH

Absences from school

33%

21%

17%

Number of workdays lost
from sickness due to flood

40%

11%

60%

Number of work days lost
due to flood

33%

10%

50%

Average income loss due to
floods

90%

-11%

24%

Average amount of spent on
medicine

33%

-6%

-10%

-20%

Average losses (appliances,
etc.)
-20%

Average income

-35%

-

Source: Porio (2011)

Percent Increase/Decrease of Costs/Losses Between Men- and
Women- headed Households Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy
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Men
HH
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Women HH

Ondoy Period
Men
HH

Women HH

Post-Ondoy
Men
HH

Women
HH

Absences from school

33%

21%

17%

Number of workdays lost
from sickness due to flood

40%

11%

60%

Number of work days lost
due to flood

33%

10%

50%

Average income loss due to
floods

90%

-11%

24%

Average amount of spent on
medicine

33%

-6%

-10%

-20%

Average losses (appliances,
etc.)
Average income

-20%

Source: Porio (2011)

-

-35%

Cost of Health Services in Health Center/Hospital
to Climate Change-Related Complaints
Estimated Cost

Service

PhP300-500 up to 1,500

Ordinary check-up

PhP750-1,500

Sputum analysis/check-u[

1. Dengue (referred to public hospitals

PhP35,000-60,000

where patient pay minimal payment)*

2. Leptospirosis

(referred

to public hospitals

PhP10,000-50,000

where patient pay minimal payment or free)*

Services given pro-bono or charge minimally to urban poor by medical missions

P2320 = PhP750-3,200

Blood analysis

P90 = P700

Urine analysis

P90 = P700

Blood typing
ECG

P90 = P1,500 – 2,500

X-ray

P90 =P500

Physical Exam A (including Blood Chem, Blood typing and ECG)
P490 = P2,500

Source: Porio (2011)

3. Adaptation Strategies to Floods/Monsoons: Family/Household Level115

Not surprisingly, in preparation for bad weather and floods, most families (89 percent) prepared or
stocked on food like rice and groceries, water and medicines. Only a third of the respondents said
they stocked on candles, flashlights and other emergency supplies. For electricity, 90 percent of
them contacted the local provider, the Manila Electric Company, in case of electricity disruption,
while a minority called their community officials and/or neighbors/electricians. Almost three-fourths
of them said the provider’s response was quite or moderate, only a few (about 10 percent) said the
response was slow and the remainder saw no need to contact anybody. In the same manner, the
majority (88 percent) contacted their water provider, Manila Water, for disruption in water services.
Only a few (12 percent) said they contacted their barangay/community officials, neighbors and

115

Many of these percentages do not add up to 100 percent as these are multiple responses.
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Most of the adaptations made by families/households can be categorized into the following: 1)
physical-structural adjustments, and 2) changes in lifestyles and habits. Of the physical-structural
type of adaptation, quite a substantial number (about one-third) added a floor or raised the floor
and strengthened the foundation of their homes. They also moved the storage of goods, valuables,
and irreplaceable goods to a higher level so these won’t get wet or damaged (60 percent). They also
prepared ready packed clothes/toiletries and emergency supplies like flashlights, boats and secured
emergency evacuation place with relatives/friends. Meanwhile, they also become more diligent in
cleaning their surrounding canals/drainage channels for garbage/debris (35 percent). Almost all of
them asserted that they try to monitor the weather through radio/TV. The local warning system
installed by their local governments alerted them to the rising water levels in the river and direct
them to prepare and evacuate. A small minority (5 percent) said they just pray to god to protect
them.

140

friends. Again, majority (67 percent) said the provider’s response was very quick or moderately
quick. Only 2 percent said it was very slow while the remainder did not see any need to contact their
water provider.
When asked whom do they contact when their homes gets flooded, majority of them (49 percent)
contacted their city/barangay disaster reduction office while 17 percent called their neighbors,
friends and relatives and the remainder (35 percent) did not call anybody but relied on their own
selves. Of those who called for help from their officials and neighbors/relatives, majority of them (95
percent) found the latter’s responses very quick or moderately quick and only 5 percent found the
response very slow.

3.1 Funding support for relief/rehabilitation needs
When queried about their funding needs during floods, not surprisingly almost all off them (99
percent in Pasig and 90 percent in Marikina) said food and other basic subsistence needs should be
given priority by the officials. But in Marikina which was severely hit by the floods almost half (43
percent) wanted assistance in housing/shelter and reconstruction. Others said they needed fund
support for clothes (61 percent in Marikina compared to 27 percent in Pasig), medicines (6-11
percent), and livelihood restoration (3 percent).

3.2 Preparation, insurance and compensation
An overwhelming 83 percent have no form of insurance whatsoever while a small minority (17
percent) had purchased life, property and medical insurance. This small minority had employment in
the formal sector and/or came from upper-income groups. But after the Ondoy floods in 2009 and
Pedring/Quiel floods 2011, only 9 of the 17 percent were able to make insurance claims. Most of
them could not file claims because damages due to the Ondoy floods belong to the category of
“fortuitous events” or “acts of God” and not covered by their insurance.

3.3 Response and recovery.
When queried about flood assistance, an overwhelming 83 percent claimed to have been assisted by
the local/city government with food and clothing. They received this assistance on the average after
48 hours, minimum 14 hours and maximum of 504 hours (or about 21 days). Only 1 percent claimed
to have received financial assistance of P4,000 (about US$ 9) because of the death of a family
member during the flood.
During and after the floods, the following measures were taken by the barangay/city government to
reduce the impact of flooding in their communities:
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Evacuation of residents, especially those in informal settlements along the rivers,
creeks and other danger areas
Clearing and rebuilding of roads and bridges
Rebuilding of the water supply network
Clearing and rebuilding of water channel and drainage networks (including riprapping of river/creek walls and elevating water dikes)
Pumping flood waters out of the area
Relocation/resettlement of affected residents
Acquisition of equipment/supplies necessary during calamities (e.g., rubber boats,
fire trucks)
Defogging of mosquito infested areas, especially those with high incidence of dengue
cases
Capability
building
programs
(training/seminars,
information
campaigns/dissemination)

In short, the immediate, medium and long-term responses of the city/local government can be
summarized into: 1) evacuation, 2) restoration of basic services and 3) rebuilding of infrastructural
support. Given the above interventions, majority of the respondents (65 percent) feel satisfied with
the interventions provided by the national/local government agencies. A small number (35 percent)
wished the government could provide better services such as water, sewage and sanitation but most
of all sustainable livelihood and land/housing for those displaced by the floods. Thus, when asked
who is responsible for preventing and responding to hazards and calamities, an overwhelming
majority (70 percent) pointed to the barangay/city LGU as the one responsible while others
identified the family (17 percent), civil society (8 percent) and the private sector (5 percent) as being
responsible.
Glaringly highlighted in the identified medium and long-term responses of the city governments of
Marikina and Pasig is the absence of a continuous-systematic training and capability program for the
staff of the agencies responsible for disaster risk reduction and, more importantly, for the
vulnerable, flood-prone communities and residents.
When asked whether they knew of the existence of their own barangay and/or city disaster risk
reduction and management council (DRRMC), only 25 percent were aware but only 7 percent knew
of their location in the barangay and/or city hall. Logically, only 5 percent and 2 percent were aware
of the emergency numbers and website of the DRRMC, respectively. And only 2 percent had
contacted their emergency numbers to ask for information about typhoons/floods or assistance.
Surprisingly, majority of them (86 percent) have heard of climate change and have accepted it as
part of environmental change. In fact, when asked how they understand the phenomenon, majority
were able to enumerate the following indications: ozone depletion, sea level rise, air pollution,
heavy rains/floods, droughts, water shortage, melting of glaciers and rapid/intense weather
changes. But they were not agreed on the causes of climate change as they gave varying responses
like: environmental pollution (50 percent), increasing population (36 percent), and God’s
wrath/mankind’s sins (14 percent). But on the whole, they acknowledge that the major causal forces
of climate change are: people’s lifestyles (68 percent) as mainly responsible, followed by inaction or
negative actions of government (20 percent), industries (10 percent), and God (2) percent).
Majority of them (71 percent) obtained their information from television while some heard it from
friends/relatives (13 percent), radio (8 percent), government agencies (2 percent) or have read
about it in magazines/newspapers (7 percent). Thus, almost everyone (83 percent) think climate
change is a serious problem that local/national governments should take into consideration in
formulating their urban planning policies and implementing their development programs.

•
•
•
•
•

Stricter norms for pollution reduction (26 percent)
Decrease vehicles and enhance public transport (24 percent)
Effective implementation of regulations/laws (30 percent)
Eradicate factories and other polluting industries (10 percent)
Rehabilitate environment like planting trees (10 percent)

When community residents were asked what they can do as individuals to help their government
tackle the effects of climate change, an overwhelming 50 percent said to strictly follow proper
environment waste management policies (reduce, reuse, recycle), observe government laws and
ordinance (25 percent) and the remainder (25 percent) directed people to plant trees and conserve
energy. In the same manner, when they were asked for suggestions on how the city or barangay’s
disaster risk reduction and management council (DRRMC) should do their work so the latter could
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When asked what the government should do to prevent or mitigate the effects of climate change,
they enumerated the following:
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respond better to their needs, only very few (less than 10 percent) could suggest that DRRMC
monitor flooding more effectively. This is quite logical because as indicated earlier only a quarter (25
percent) were aware of the DRRMC’s existence.

3.4 Risk communication.
In Marikina City, communicating the risk of city flooding is very much institutionalized in their early
warning system, indicated by the siren signals (e.g., first siren is preparation for evacuation, with
water level at 14 meters) according to the water level in the Marikina bridge (e.g., third siren is
evacuation, water is reaching the critical level of 16 meters). Meanwhile, Pasig City has also installed
an early warning system communicated through the city’s disaster risk reduction management
council (chaired by the mayor) and to the barangay/community DRRM counterpart bodies (chaired
by the barangay captain).
But in other parts of the metropolis, communicating flooding and related to people and making
them move accordingly constitute the most challenging task for LGUs as most residents do not want
to leave their homes because of theft/loss of belongings. They’d rather climb up to the ceilings/roofs
of their houses than move.

4. Damage and Losses from Commercial-Industrial Establishments and Adaptive Strategies
The commercial and business survey targeted 100 establishments (50 in each city) but the study
ended processing only 85 research protocols. Fifteen protocols were not included in the data
processing because these remain incomplete interviews despite several call backs or recalls. And
there was no more time for substitution due to weather problems (typhoons, heavy rains and
floods).

4.1 Physical characteristics, building type and ownership
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Majority (65 percent) of them were constructed 1-storey buildings while the remainder (35 percent)
were constructed multiple storeyed and/or multiple buildings/structures. Majority (41 percent) of
the buildings were made of reinforced concrete with steel, blocks, bricks, wood and metal while the
remainder (59 percent) was made of a combination of blocks, bricks, wood, metal, and steel.
Majority (55 percent) of the establishments were renting the buildings that they were using and only
45 percent owned them. Thus, it is understandable why only 43 percent do regular maintenance of
their buildings and premises while the remainder do it only occasionally. The total area occupied by
the establishments ranged from 22 - 2,500 sq. meters, with a mean value of 1, 412 sq. meter and a
median value of 300 sq. meters, suggesting a high disparity among the establishments. Most (62
percent) of these buildings were 1-20 years old while 18 percent were 21 to over 40 years old and
the rest did know when or how old were their build structures. But overall, the buildings were on the
average 15 years old.
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4.2 Number of shifts/work hours
While a majority (62 percent) had only 1 work shift, 38 percent of the establishments had 2-4
workshifts; with 42 percent of them had workers staying/living in the premises. The number of
workers ranged from 4-268 workers with an average of 29 workers per establishment. About 42
percent have employees staying/living in the premises of the commercial-industrial establishments.

4.3 Specific damages/losses and expenses for repairs
Most damages here were incurred only during the extreme floods of 2009, not in 2011 (the
comparative year). With regards to damages to their buildings and properties, the respondents
reported an average of P85,316, with values ranging from a miniscule P1,500 to P1 million; while
damages to equipment, appliances and furniture amounted to a median average of P100, 000 (mean

average: P925, 816; minimum of P3,000 and a maximum value of P12.8 million). Including other
damages, respondents reported having incurred total damages of median average of P140,000
(mean average: P1.3 million; minimum value of P3,000 and a maximum value of P13.3 million).
Their expenses for repair for buildings amounted to median average of P10,500 (mean average:
P90,580), with minimum value of P400 to a maximum value of P1 million. Meanwhile, their expense
repairs to equipment/appliances amounted to a median average of P50,000 (mean average:
P319,434), with a minimum value of P1,000 and a maximum value of P2 million. Including other
repair/replacement expenses, their total expenses incurred amounted to a median average of
P63,400 (mean average: P283,942), with a minimum value of P13,000 and a maximum value of
P479,788).
After the floods, other costs involved disinfecting, sanitation and rehabilitation. The respondents
reported spending a median average of P5,000 (mean average: P24,237), with minimum value of
P150 to a maximum value of P300,000. Flood fighting/control costs on the other hand, yield a
median average of P37,500 (mean average: P63, 484) with minimum value of P1,770 and a
maximum value of P300,000. Costs of removing debris from the premises amounted to a median
average of P8,000 (mean average: P52,232), with a minimum value of P300 and a maximum value of
P500,000. Meanwhile, the respondents reported a median average loss of net income due to flood
interruptions of P50,000 (mean average: P192,142), with a minimum value of P1,000 and a
maximum value of P1 million. Total annual revenue lost to floods had a median average of P225,000
(mean average: P1.9 million), with a minimum value of P3,000 and P2.2 million.

4.4 Major problems encountered by establishments
Major problem encountered by establishments (population affected ranged from 54-90 percent)
was the 1) lack of access to transport due to damages in bridges/roads, equipment, and heavy mud
sludges, 2) disruption of communication, water and electricity services, 3) shortage of fuel, food
supplies, and other necessities, and 4) the commensurate rise in prices of these basic necessities.
Given these problems, work in factories, offices and service establishments have to be stopped as
well, ranging from 4-8 weeks.

4.5 Work stoppage during floods and loss of work afterwards

Comparing the floods in 2009 and 2011, definitely the floods in the latter years were negligible in
terms of damages and other impacts. In fact, in 2011, the average total damage was only P10,000.
To summarize, most business and commercial establishments in this study faced high exposure and
vulnerability to flooding and other climate-related risks. Majority of them only had one storey
buildings which were mostly submerged at the height of Ondoy floods; thus, they incurred high
damages to their buildings/equipment as well their repair and replacement.
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Majority (96 percent) of the establishments stopped work or closed operation because of damage to
their physical structures, equipment and/or their places remained inaccessible due to the floods. The
median average height of floods was almost 4 meters (mean average: 5.42 meters), with a
mimimum value of a fraction of a meter to a maximum of 20 meters. The average time needed to
recover was 1-2 months; minimum time was 1 week and maximum time was 1 year and 11 months.
Thus, on the average in both cities, 27 people lost their jobs (minimum value of 7 and a maximum
value of 150 workers, suggesting a wide range of the size of the establishments and damages as
well).
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5. Institutional and Regulatory Responses: Structural-physical, Political- Economic and
Cultural
In general, respondents in the survey blamed the following activities for the extreme floods: illegal
logging, mining, quarrying in the upstream Marikina watershed and the consequent siltation,
clogging, of the river systems and minor water channels. The increasing pollution and overfishing of
Laguna Lake overfishing (manifested in the overpopulation of fish cages, most of them cemented,
thus obstructing water flow) also compromised the draining capacity of the lake of the volume of
dumped water from the uplands like the Marikina watershed, the Wawa Dam, and the La Mesa
Dam.
The above geo-physical and man-made sources of floods and related disasters have also been
intensified by the uncontrolled/unregulated real estate and commercial development in the uplands
of Marikina (e.g., Antipolo, Montalban, Binangonan, Taytay, etc.). This is further compromised by the
settling of large populations of informal settlements in danger areas like along river lines and hills,
slopes, and ravines prone to landslides. Most of these areas have weak/temporary housing, low
infrastructural support, and low access to basic services.
Given the above challenges and learning from the lessons brought about by the disastrous events of
2009 and the lesser floods of the past two years, several policies and programs were enacted by
Congress. Two overarching frameworks for adapting to climate change were crafted, the 2010
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and the 2011 National Framework Strategy on
Climate Change. Each was drafted in compliance with the law by virtue of the “Philippine Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” and the “Climate Change Act of 2009” The first
provides for the creation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council; the
second, for the Climate Change Action Plan approved for implementation by President Benigno
Aquino III towards the end of November 2011.
Former President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Act of 2010, amending the 30-year old Presidential Decree 1566, the old law covering risk reduction
and management matters. This law mandated that each city/municipality must institute each have a
disaster risk reduction and management plan. Meanwhile the Climate Change Action Plan made the
first law more actionable by specifying the programs to be implemented by the Climate Change
Commission and the other agencies of the Aquino government.
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The crafting of local risk reduction and management plans at the barangay (community), city, and
provincial levels, one of the principal outcomes of the law, provide a very promising scenario. These
local plans drawn locally and elevated to the city level make design strategies contextually-specific
and more appropriate, responsive and effective for local needs.
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6. Strategies of Private Sector and Communities
Were the adaptive responses of private sector and communities enough? Did these led to into
medium and long term capacity on the part of the business sector and the community? Most of the
manufacturing sector relocated their activities to other parts of the city where flooding is less likely
to occur. For example, Pure Foods in Marikina City transferred their manufacturing to Laguna, a
province located nearby the national capital region while others moved to higher ground (the 30
percent that were not flooded during Ondoy like Marikina SSS vilages). This was a strategy adapted
by large commercial and industrial establishments in the city like the conglomerate, Fortune
Tobacco. For those who remained or did not relocate, they just strengthened their buildings or build
upper floors where they conduct their business. Meanwhile in Pasig, most of the factories were
compelled by the City Environment Office (CENRO) to follow safety standards. So, majority of them
who refused to follow the safety standards imposed by the city moved to cities and municipalities

who were not so strict in imposing environmental laws. Overall, this poses problems when
considered at the macro level, because local government units (LGUs), in order to attract business
often relax the compliance standards that they impose on business/commercial establishments.

Part III
7. The Prospective Scenario: Mainstreaming into Long-Term Planning and Development
As shown in the tables below, it is imperative that climate change-related vulnerabilities and risks be
mainstreamed into long-term development planning and development.

The above tables show that floods and storms have caused the most economic damage to the
country. Damages from floods and storms have increased 18 times since the 1970s. Thus, the
fundamental lesson that has to be inscribed into our people’s life-ways and our institutions is the
urgent need to develop a culture of disaster prevention, mitigation, adaptation and safety behavior.
But Philippine society especially government institutions seem to refuse to take responsibility in
implementing the required engineering, land zoning, infrastructure planning and sustainable
relocation of people. Meanwhile, commercial and other private sector interests and informal settlers
continue to build over, across, beside waterways or in mountain slopes/hills that obstruct, constrict,
deflect water/river flows. Presumably environmentally certified programs and riverside
beautification projects continue to be made heavily of concrete preventing water absorption and
flAmidst this bleak contemporary scenario, the following rehabilitation and recovery design
principles have been suggested by government officials, business/community leaders and residents,
especially the city disaster reduction and management councils along with their urban planning
offices.
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Source: Velasquez, J. (2011).
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7.1 Rehabilitation and recovery.
From the household/commercial surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions
(FGDs) among key stakeholders, the respondents suggested the following principles for recovery and
reconstruction.
• Design of the recovery and reconstruction program must be transparent, accountable and must
deliver evidence-based results and outcomes.
• The approach must be community-based, people-centered, and equitable approaches; and
reduction of future risks in recovery and reconstruction.
If followed, these principles will enhance the effectiveness of recovery and reconstruction efforts,
increase transparency and accountability, and ensure that resources are distributed and applied to
those really in need. In fact, most of these are embodied in the 2010 National Disaster Risk
Reduction Management Framework and the 2011 Climate Change Action Plan.
•

•
•
•
•

Flood management: Given its vulnerability to flooding, protecting Metro Manila requires
institutional changes, comprehensive planning, and investment in both restoration and
infrastructure for effective flood management system.
Housing: The vast majority of damage to housing stock was concentrated in the informal sector,
so reconstruction means providing better alternatives for informal settlers.
Disaster Risk Reduction: The existing disaster risk reduction system needs to become more
proactive, coherent, and effective; and
Local Governance: LGUs should have the key role in implementing the recovery and
reconstruction program and future measures to mitigate disaster risks.
Enterprise sector: A mix of financing mechanisms are needed to help small and medium-scale
enterprises recover from damage and losses and to implement rehabilitation and relocation
plans.

Six major strategies specifically for reducing flood and earthquake impact in Metro Manila:116
•
•
•
•
•
•

Enhance legal framework and institutional capacity for effective disaster management system
Build capacity for relief and recovery
Strengthen community-based preparedness system for disasters
Strengthen/”climate-proofed” buildings, structures, especially infrastructure system
Enhance the national and local governments’ system resistance to earthquakes and floods
Promote research and technology for disaster prevention, mitigation and adaptation

7.2 On-going and Future Action Plans
ARCP2010-09NSY-Patankar-FINAL REPORT

•
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•
•
•

Response and recovery planning (evacuation plans, crisis management plan, resource
assessment and allocation, public safety, search and rescue)
Preparedness and awareness (short term actions): e.g., school safety programs, public
information, community preparedness
Mitigation and Prevention (long term actions): e.g., building code implementation and
enforcement, land use planning and zoning, insurance and risk transfer
Capacity building: equipment acquisition, training (e.g., first aid, search and rescue), certification
and qualification, organizational-institutional strengthening

Most of these were gleaned from the FGDs (focus group discussions), KIIs (key informant interviews)
and household interviews. But most of these are also embodied in the 2004 MEIRS study, the 2010
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and in the 2011 Climate Action Plan.
116

To summarize, this study found that Metro Manila, in particular, the cities of Marikina and Pasig are
highly at risk to floods and have suffered severely from extreme flooding impacts of Ondoy (Ketsana)
and Pedring (Parma) in 2009.
Adapting McGranahan et al (2007), this study recommends the following process of integrating or
mainstreaming the findings of this study into a “City Adaptation Plan for Climate Change” as shown
in the structures created and processes illustrated below.

Process for Developing a City Adaptation Plan
for Climate Change (cf.McGranahan et al)
Assessment of vulnerability to
socio-economic stresses

Assessment of vulnerability to
climate change impacts

Local economic development
strategies; integrated
development plans; integrated
municipal/city environment
plans

National/Regional climate
change strategy;
Local (barangay/city) climate
change assessments

Overlay to identify vulnerable areas
Develop adaptation options and actions
Prioritize actions

CAP
(City Adaptation Plan)

Figure

The integration of climate vulnerability assessments and climate action plans into the urban planning
and development of the city should be spatially-anchored and should recognize the overlaps among
political-economic and environmental boundaries. This should be calibrated in the
management/decision-making structures in urban governance systems. More importantly, it should
reconcile these boundaries within the context of centralized-decentralized models of governance. If
these issues are calibrated well at the governance level, then moving towards water-based urban
design, vertical urbanism and green economy, technologies and architecture can be programmed or
mainstreamed into urban development.
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One major innovation that this study would like to suggest is to complement the above process with
a bottom-up process whereby the particular environmental and social-political-economic
vulnerabilities (as reflected in their local risk and vulnerability maps and data bases produced
through participatory action research methods) of the affected communities are also taken into
consideration. This can be integrated in the “Local Climate Action Plans” and the “Local Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Plans” which builds into an integrated “Municipal/City Climate Action
Plans” and “Municipal/City Disaster Reduction and Management Plans”. Highlighted in these
localized plans and city-wide integrated plans/programs are the particular community and
household adaptive strategies that are empowering, effective, transparent, and accountable.
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Appendix A. Deadly Storms/Typhoons (Out of the 19) in 2011 in the Philippines (plus
earthquakes)

Month
January

March

May

June

Name of Storm
Typhoon Basyang and other
storms
5.2 magnitude earthquake
(Ilocos)
5.8 magnitude earthquake
(Manila)
Typhoon Bebeng

Typhoon Falcon

July
Typhoon Juaning
August
Typhoon Mina
September Typhoons Pedring & Quiel
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December
16
December
27
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Typhoon Sendong
5.1 earthquake (Surigao,
Northern Mindanao)

Damages
Deaths - 68; Missing - 26; Displaced - 2 million
Damages to property/agriculture: P1.78 billion
Minor damage

Deaths - 44; Displaced – 500,000 in 12 provinces
mostly in Bicol;
Damage – P1.37 billion (or US$ 31.7 million)
Deaths – 70; Displaced – 69,000; Damage – P10
billion
Deaths – 52 ; Damage P1.7 billion
Deaths – 16; Damage P1.009 billion
Deaths – 77 ; Displaced – almost 1 million; Damage
– P15 billion
Deaths – 1585; Missing – 1,079; Injured – 1, 979;
Damages – P1.03 billion
Minor damage

7.4 Young scientist’s report
INTERNSHIP REPORT
Project title: Asia Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN) funded research project
‘Enhancing adaptation to climate change by integrating climate risk with development planning and
disaster management’
Project duration: June 1 —July 31, 2011
Name of the Student Intern: Ms. Jyoti Nair
Report:
Any city has its own threshold capacity to overcome the hazards but it is the adaptive capacity of the
city that helps it to live with it when it bound to face the event recurrently. For Mumbai floods are
one such event which is not new. The extremity of the 2005 event caused the people to raise
questions on the adequacy of the existing system to help the people and infrastructure survive
through any such extreme event in near future. To tackle this issue the municipal authority came up
with several measures to reduce the flooding. Through the project the aim is to identify such specific
infrastructure redevelopment projects or strategies being undertaken to minimise the impacts. The
study aims at identifying the medium and long term measures to tackle hazards such as climate
related extreme events. Since, the project aims not just on climate change but also focuses on the
disaster management aspect of the risk climate change is accompanied with; helped me shift focus
from change in the climate and consider the disasters that we should foresee.
The application part of all what we read with regard to climate change is not very different from
theory yet when it comes to on field work things were a revelation to me. The objective of the
project was explained to me on the very first day and with that in mind I have learned through the
work the ground realities of adaptation.
My participation in the project has taught me several new things. Apart from the subject based
knowledge, the exposure has taught me few more nuances of communication skills.
Through the course of the internship the tasks allocated and completed are:
1. To identify case studies relevant to the study through literature review: This helped me get
acquainted with this form of scientific writing and gave me a broad and fresh perspective of
the flooding situation and the studies done worldwide.

3. To Interview local government officials based on the questionnaire: meeting with the
officials was an experience in itself. With the caliber of the authority they have it was an
great opportunity to meet some high level officers such as Ms. Uma Adusumilli, Chief urban
Planner of MMRDA , Mr. Mahesh Narvekar, Chief Officer, Disaster management cell and all
the Asst. Municipal commissioners at each ward covered. And the interviews helped
understand how the system deploys work and configures the project responsibilities. The
interviews with the officials at BMC, detailed many facts about the ongoing infrastructure
development projects such as BRIMSTOWAD and how they came into action post 2005 flood
event. The vision to perceive any hazard of such magnitude was lacking until 2005 and it
required an event of such magnanimity to open the eyes to the potential vulnerabilities. The
ward level difficulties were discussed at ward level and asked for their view on the ongoing
project development at the particular ward. Being a centralized system the local level
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2. To construct questionnaire for focused group discussions and personal interviews with the
local government officials.
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officials complained of the existing hierarchy but they were well equipped through the
disaster management authority to face hazards. We found that the perceptions on climate
change were fairly scientifically correct and a challenge sighted was the garbage
accumulation in the drainage system due to irresponsible public’s lack of civic sense. There
were missed reviews on the priorities of development over environment or vice versa.
I want to thank Dr. Archana Patankar, Project leader, for taking me into the project as the student
intern thereby helping me fulfil my academic criterion and giving me an opportunity to be able to
interact with the local level government officials. I am grateful for her patience; and the guidance
she provided me through the two months. Also, I want to extend my gratitude to Ms. Reema Ved,
Research Associate, for being a friendly senior and for accompanying and supporting me through the
interviews.
I look forward to take this exposure to help me focus better on the research goals I have to set for
myself in the near future.

Jyoti Nair
M.Sc. Climate Science & Policy
TERI University
New Delhi, India
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jyoti.nair10@gmail.com
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7.5 List of acronyms/abbreviations
APN- Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research
APTU- Faculty of Architecture and Planning, Thammasat University
BMR- Bangkok Metropolitan Region
BRIMSTOWAD- Brihanmumbai Stormwater Disposal System
CRF- Central Relief Fund
CENRO- City Environment Office
DMC- Disaster Management Cell
DMAP- Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan
DRRM- Disaster Risk Reduction Management
EGAT- Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
FGDs- Focus group discussions
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
IIT- Indian Institute of Technology
IRDR- Integrated Research in Disaster Risk
ICSU- International Council for Science
IPCC- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
INR- Indian Rupees

LAD- Local Administration Department
LGUs- Local Government Units
MCGM- Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
MMRDA- Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
NSO- National Statistics Office
NCR- National Capital Region
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KAMANAVA- Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas, and Valenzuela
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OECD- Organization for Economic Corporation
PWD- Public Works Department
RID- Royal Irrigation Department
RIG- Royal Irrigation Department
SIMSR- K.J. Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research
START- Global Change System for Analysis, Research and Training
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UNEP- United Nations Environment Programme

]

155

